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Preface
This book is the culmination of a long-held dream to one day assemble a stellar team of men-
tors and colleagues to discuss a burdensome question: What do science, technology, and 
innovation mean from Africa? Put another way: What is Africa in science, technology, and 
innovation on the one hand, and what are science, technology, and innovation in Africa on 
the other?
The rationale for asking this question is that Africa appears on the technological map of 
the world as a blank or as a problem—in fact, as an oceanful of problems—to be solved. But 
solved by whom? It was very clear to me at the turn of the century that science, technology, 
and innovation seemed to be things inbound from somewhere outside Africa, usually the 
West—hence the whole notion of technology transfer as a North to South or West to non-
West flow that would finally lift the continent up the development ladder in the hope that 
perhaps, one day, Africa would be developed. Therefore, the basis of the conversation about 
Africa was that it was a recipient of science, technology, and innovation, not a maker of 
them.
One cannot answer these difficult questions alone; it takes a village to raise a child. I have 
never believed in any one method; I believed even less that the European colonial academic 
traditions that have trapped the production of knowledge about Africa are enough—as free-
standing disciplines, each aloof from the other—to even attempt to address the questions 
stated earlier. As an African scholar trained in science, technology, and society (STS) and 
African history, I believe in the necessity of having many eyes—a multiple optic—that looks 
at the same question, the same thing, from different viewpoints. For this book, the only 
requirement was that all of these many pairs of eyes should concentrate on African ways of 
looking, meaning-making, and creating and should take Africans as intellectual agents whose 
perspectives constitute authoritative knowledge and whose actions constitute strategic 
deployments of endogenous and inbound things.
I had in mind not simply using African voices as empirical fodder for us to then bring 
in Marx, Foucault, Derrida, Kant, or other (normally) Western scholars to order these 
voices into knowledge about Africa. In The Idea of Africa, V. Y. Mudimbe (1994) traced this 
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placement of a “Western ratio” at the center of ordering knowledge about Africa. He threw 
down the gauntlet right at our feet: Could it be possible to decenter the West and recenter 
African modes of thought?
Thus my hope was to assemble scholars who could go beyond critique—which Mudimbe 
did not do—by taking African knowledge seriously as epistemology on its own terms, and 
who could consider themselves (at least those contributors who are Africans by birth or 
descent) engaged in offering an African perspective. The latter meant that the force of argu-
ment was derived from an African point of view, with inbound epistemologies not forming 
the foundation of but rather constituting ingredients for an Africa-centered position. For 
scholars that were non-African, I was looking for colleagues who take African innovations 
and registers seriously enough to expunge Marx, Foucault, or other Western ratios from the 
base and spine of their argument—indeed, to use African vernaculars as modes of theory, 
even if they then engaged Western modes of thought and practice.
The question thus became one of methods. What archives could we defer to? How could 
we read them not simply as sources for our own writing and authority, as scholars like Jan 
Vansina, Henry Odera-Oruka, and Ngugi wa Thiongo had done in their albeit groundbreak-
ing work, but as African modes of writing and authoritative philosophical texts in their own 
right? And given that most of these archives were simultaneously philosophies that had 
never been taken at their own value but were always filtered through the Western weighted 
scale of what is epistemology, philosophy, “proper historical sources,” and so on, how then 
should we approach them? How could we acknowledge the way in which writing is no lon-
ger pen to paper, or inscriptions on stone, wood, or human body, but the everyday mobilities 
that transform the human body and mind into the pen at large, inscribing what’s around it 
with marks?
These questions had decisive implications for the methods of assembling a team to address 
them. I could not gather all these scholars into one room at once, precisely because of the 
colonial disciplinary legacies of the production of knowledge about Africa discussed earlier, 
in which the language of engagement is normally barracked into anthropology, history, 
geography, philosophy, engineering, and so forth. The task of assembling a team to address 
these questions had to be piecemeal and, even after this volume, continue to be refined and 
expanded, particularly because my intention has always been not only to produce usable 
knowledge, but to intervene practically in advancing Africa’s future through introducing 
multidisciplinary understandings of science, technology, innovation (and lately entrepre-
neurship) in society.
The first scholar I decided to include to meet this goal was D. A. Masolo, whose works had 
first been pointed out to me by my mentor, Mamadou Diouf, during his Reading African 
Libraries graduate seminar at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Mamadou has this cun-
ning habit of throwing around names that students who are serious about African intellec-
tual history can follow up. That is how I was able to read Aime Césaire, Leopold Senghor, 
Kwame Nkrumah, W. E. B. Dubois, Frantz Fanon, Paulin Hountondji, Henry Odera-Oruka, 
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John Mbiti, Okot p’Bitek, Alexis Kagame, Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, Bogumil Jewsiewicki, 
Ivan Karp, George Shepperson, Kwasi Wiredu, Chinweizu, Adrian Hastings, Achille Mbembe, 
Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, Mahmood Mamdani, and Ngugi wa Thiongo. And, of course, D. A. 
Masolo, whose critique was that Ngugi, Odera-Oruka, and Vansina did not go far enough and 
left open—after negritude, after Pan-Africanism, after African socialism, and even after the 
“sage philosophy” that Odera-Oruka actively promoted—the search for new archives and 
modes of African philosophy. I approached these scholars as a learner, and I was looking to 
apprentice in the African way, in which elders impart knowledge to the young at close 
quarters.
The debt I owe to Mamadou Diouf for helping me understand the context of the question 
of the scientific and the technological in Africa from a combined philosophical, historical, 
contemporary, diagnostic, and prognostic perspective is, quite simply, unpayable. After my 
textual and face-to-face interactions with the above-mentioned scholars, it became quite 
clear that the issue at stake for the African reader of technology, the reader of technology 
in Africa, and better yet African technology, is not just the behavior of science, technol-
ogy, and innovation but the intellectual work of making things and their strategic deploy-
ment. Can one see Africans as intellectuals thinking about and making technology based on 
intellect?
This question was an acknowledgement of what I had witnessed in everyday interactions 
with people in different parts of Africa, but even more so during my own childhood in Zim-
babwe. In people’s mobilities I saw an archive, a statement, a critique, and an authoring of 
thought into reality through practice, operationalized through the movement of legs, hands, 
mouth, and other body functions. I wanted to locate the subject of conversation upstream of 
practice, to understand the intellection that drove it. Some micro-movements of and within 
the body were involuntary; the concern was with the voluntary actions, delegated by the 
mind-at-work.
STS had prepared me to understand one version of science and technology, to recognize it 
when I saw it. This was a vital skill—but it also turned out to be quite blunt for the nature of 
knowledge I was looking at. Conventional (Western) STS is good at identifying banal forms 
of science and technology but is severely limited in non-Western contexts, in which things 
scientific and things technological are not readily recognizable.
Here was the problem in the specific case of Africa. The project of addressing the meanings 
of science, technology, and innovation from Africa had to be philosophically grounded, 
because to my understanding the colonial ordering of knowledge had cut up African knowl-
edge, knowledge production, and structures and modes of knowing into tiny pieces. What 
had once been a whole entity known as a composite was now scattered into specialist disci-
plines like philosophy, theology/religious studies, African languages and literature, history, 
economic history, anthropology, and so on. The philosophy I remember being taught in the 
University of Zimbabwe in the early 1990s was about Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Marx, 
and so on. Where were the Africans?
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The history I was taught was simply a subject; it was absolutely useless for addressing the 
everyday life I lived as an African or helping me solve anything. History as taught in school 
and college was—and still is—utterly elitist and decontextualized, to the extent that it is in 
danger along with most “arts and humanities” of becoming completely irrelevant for us as 
Africans. It is not enough to know where we came from, to learn the phonetic arrangement 
and diction of our languages, or to study theology to earn a degree or teach after graduation. 
This knowledge is disemboweled into pieces, yet it used to be one whole, inextricable from 
the practices and sites of production by which it was taught. That is why Masolo had to be 
present at the MIT workshop; that is why Mamadou Diouf had to be there.
The conversations with Mamadou began in grad school, but those with Masolo started in 
2012. I was co-organizing the STS Colloquium with my colleague Michael Fischer, and we 
found ourselves converging on Masolo, whom Mike knew well from their time at Rice along 
with another emblematic Kenyan scholar, the late Atieno Odhiambo. We had wonderful 
conversations. The encounter was to be the beginning of a continuing conversation that 
endures to the present. Most recently, I have fulfilled my dream to pull together African phi-
losophers and STS scholars, especially my PhD advisor Gabrielle Hecht and those African 
scholars whose work intersects with and has indelibly shaped my own. The result was the 
highly successful Anthropocene Campus seminar that I organized at the Haus der Kulturen 
der Welt (HKW) entitled “Whose? Reading ‘The Technosphere’ and ‘The Anthropocene’ from 
Africa.” The seminar included lectures from Gabrielle (STS), Masolo (philosophy), Chaz 
Maviyane-Davies (graphic design), and Shadreck Chirikure (archeology).
The intellectual exchange that resulted in Chirikure’s contribution to this volume occurred 
during a workshop I convened at the University of the Witwatersrand in 2014 during my 
three-year tenure as an inaugural Carnegie African Diaspora Fellow (CADF). Entitled “African 
Laboratories, Laboratories in Africa, Africans in Laboratories,” the workshop sought to 
explore meanings and practices of laboratory from African experiences, departing from its 
association with the built space, bench science, and, even where bench science was involved, 
in the hands and minds of Africans. Besides Chirikure (University of Cape Town, paper on 
pottery and metallurgy), participants also included Lauren Hutchinson (London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, on Kenya’s first post-independence scientists attempting to 
decolonize malaria research and make it more responsive to local needs and knowledge) and 
Peter Sekibakiba Lekgoathi (Wits, on African intellectuals whom colonial ethnologists and 
anthropologists employed as and called research assistants despite the “assistants” performing 
all the research and even authoring certain texts). Dilip Menon, director of the Centre for 
Indian Studies in Africa, chaired the workshop, which was well-attended beyond Wits. Chiri-
kure’s paper and my introduction (this volume) were presented at this energetic workshop in 
the Senate Building.
The Wits workshop anticipated a second one I had finalized for MIT with generous 
funding from the Program in Science, Technology, and Society and the Dean’s Office in 
the School of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences. David Kaiser and Deborah Fitzgerald were 
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the director and dean at the time, respectively, and appreciated the importance of the 
question—the title of this book—in the global discussion in STS. The workshop, held over 
two days, November 13–14, 2014, was a culmination of a long process of identifying col-
leagues from different fields of enquiry and bringing them under one roof to engage 
in what Zimbabweans call kuonesana—helping each other see from perspectives besides 
one’s own.
I had met these colleagues separately and individually; many were seeing each other for 
the first time. Gillian Marcelle (innovation policy) had facilitated my visiting professorship 
at Wits, and we shared a passion for innovation policy in the present. Katrien Pype (anthro-
pology) had spent a year on a Marie Curie fellowship in the Program in STS at MIT, and we 
had also convened a successful workshop on “Technology and Mobility in Africa” at KU 
Leuven in October 2013. Also, we had begun to think of a special section for the new 
mobilities journal Transfers. I had never met Gloria Emeagwali (history), but had read her 
work and actively followed her attention to indigenous knowledge as a historian. Kristin 
Peterson (anthropology) was already a friend of many years dating back to the University of 
Michigan, when I was a graduate student and she was starting out as an assistant professor 
at Michigan State University. We used to sit for hours in Espresso Royale on State Street, 
Ann Arbor, discussing Africa over coffee. She had suggested that Olufunmilayo Arewa (law), 
her colleague at UC Irvine, would bring a needed perspective to the volume. Toluwalogo 
Odumosu (engineering/STS) was introduced to me by Garrick Louis (engineering and pub-
lic policy), whom I had met at the Brown International Advanced Research Institutes 
(BIARI) summer school in 2013. The person who had invited us both was Geri Augusto 
(international and public affairs and Africana studies). I had read cyberneticist Ron Eglash’s 
work on African fractals in graduate school, and it had given me confidence that the ques-
tions I was asking were not cuckoo. Ellen Foster (STS) was his student at RPI. Alvan Ikoku 
(comparative literature/medicine) was doing interesting work on Kenyan literatures. Rudo 
Mudiwa was a graduate student at Indiana University, one to watch for the future but who 
was still at an early stage in conceptualizing her project. Mamadou Diouf and Masolo were 
supposed to attend, but personal circumstances robbed us of their much-anticipated 
presence.
There was good attendance—from colleagues in the Program in STS and beyond. Rosalind 
Williams gave the welcoming address. Michael Fischer was there from start to finish, as were 
Abha Sur and Hanna Shell. Many graduate students were in attendance, not least the mem-
bers of the memorable Introduction to Science, Technology, and Society course I had the 
pleasure of teaching in 2014. In particular, I wish to thank Peter Oviatt and Ashawari Chaud-
huri for helping Judy Spitzer and Randyn Miller with the logistical work. This is also a project 
first conceived while Marguerite Avery was an acquisitions editor at the MIT Press and that 
Katie Helke is seeing off wonderfully into publication. This project would be impossible to 
achieve without a department and school in which if one has good ideas that advance STS in 
new directions, no effort is spared to realize them.
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All in all, the biggest challenge of bringing together diverse voices steeped in their disci-
plines and practices is that it shakes every participant out of their comfort zone. Sometimes 
it can lead to heated argument. Yet the reason I enjoy bringing people together from diverse 
cultures of doing things is exactly that: to avoid knowledge production becoming an echo 
chamber, and to set up a vibrant multi-optic crucible within which new ideas are forged. For 
that I pay homage to everyone who participated in the MIT workshop.
As you can tell from the table of contents, not all of the papers from both the Wits and 
MIT workshops made their way into this book. This was in no way due to a lack of quality 
but to sticking to deadlines democratically agreed to at the end of both workshops. There was 
also an editorial question to address of striking a balance between the disciplines represented 
at both conferences.
It was through Gillian Marcelle that I was able to meet Chux Daniels of the University of 
Sussex Policy Research Unit (SPRU). On November 28, two weeks after the 2014 MIT work-
shop, Gillian convened a panel to discuss Africa’s development blueprint: Science, Technol-
ogy, and Innovation Strategy for Africa (STISA). At the time, she had just taken up what 
turned out to be a brief venture as deputy executive director (DED) in the Centre for Science, 
Technology and Innovation Indicators (CESTII) in South Africa’s Human Sciences Research 
Council (HSRC). The workshop included, among others, Daan du Toit (deputy director-gen-
eral for international cooperation and resources in the South African Department of Science 
and Technology), David Ockwell (deputy director of research at Social, Technical and Envi-
ronmental Pathways to Sustainability [STEPS] UK), Hambani Masheleni (African Union 
Commission), and Chux Daniels, who was then finishing his PhD at SPRU. This workshop 
was also my introduction into science and technology policy circles in Africa.
Gillian Marcelle was supposed to write the chapter on policy for this book, but she was 
still settling in as the executive director of Research and Technology Park in the British Virgin 
Islands. Therefore, Chux stepped in to take her place—thus mitigating what was a potentially 
big loss. Since the HSRC workshop, Chux and I have since continued the conversation, 
co-convening a successful workshop at the Institute of Development Studies at the Univer-
sity of Sussex in 2015. We are currently editing and transcribing the video footage, with the 
aim of coauthoring a book on the diaspora in science, technology, and innovation policy and 
numerous multimedia products. The chapter from Chux crystalizes where we are in terms of 
the state of debate on the subject; the book seeks to go beyond critique to show how the 
African diaspora could be positioned as a serious factor in Africa’s prosperous future.
Introduction: What Do Science, Technology, and Innovation Mean  
from Africa?
Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga
Things do not (always) have the same meaning everywhere; when we insist that only “our” 
meaning is the “true” meaning, we silence other people’s meanings. What passes as univer-
sality is someone else’s culture and just enough power to spread it, even force it, upon others. 
The things that words denote never start as universal or available everywhere, their meanings 
already stabilized; they originate from a particular place, community, society, culture, and 
nation and then, through travel or mobility, become universal, global. The issue to address is 
why specific words get to be used when, how, and where they are.
Today, our definitions of science, technology, and innovation (STI) originate from countries 
and cultures that have acquired their dominance of others through global empires—military, 
capital, and media—and are able to purvey to or even impose upon those without such 
power their definitions. This asymmetry of definitional power was never lost to commenta-
tors in the West, like Edward H. Carr, who emphasized that people care to know and enquire 
into an event if it is worth knowing. If it is not, they forget about it (Carr 1961, 11). In that 
same discussion, Carr concluded: “When we take up a work of history, our first concern 
should be not with the facts which it contains but with the historian who wrote it” (22).
Similarly, in this volume the question is neither what the concepts of science, technology, 
and innovation mean universally or all the time nor what Western STI transferred or diffused 
to Africa means to Africans. Instead, we seek to put the concepts of STI up for grabs, on sale 
epistemologically, so that there is no universal or spatiotemporally transcendent definition. 
We seek to explore what the technological, the scientific, and the innovative might mean 
from Africa in lieu of outside introductions or influences. It is important to do this now 
because we feel that the importation and consumption of rigid Western meanings of STI are 
a serious and dangerous threat to a self-determined African path to the future.
The concepts of STI matter at this specific historical moment in Africa because there seems 
to be a feeling that Africa’s time has come. This Africa is rising narrative is all over the World 
Wide Web, often under the name Afrofuturism. As if to capture its spirit, in 2014 the African 
Union issued a Science, Technology, and Innovation Strategy for Africa (STISA 2024), with 
science, technology, and innovation as the centerpiece of modernity. In the document, the 
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three concepts are well-articulated according to their Western meanings but seem devoid of 
meaning coming from Africans themselves, barring a few well-educated elites. In this Africa 
is rising frenzy, there is a risk of uncritical discipleship, fed by corporate missionaries, driving 
the Africa conversation on STI.
But how does Africa come to STI, especially STI which is assumed as Western or transferred 
from outside into Africa? What should we make of modernity itself and its reduction to West-
ern standards of measurement? What should we make of the reality that European moder-
nity itself originated within the past five hundred years, a period of imperialism and its 
exploitative and colonizing tendencies (Mignolo 2011)? Are we certain that what we call 
“Western” science, technology, and innovation is indeed Western in origin, ingredients, and 
rationality? After all, from the Greek occupation of Dynastic Egypt of 323 BCE to the Euro-
pean colonization of the nineteenth century and now to this era of “big data,” there has been 
a long history of translation and mobility of African, Asian, and Islamic knowledge and prac-
tices via the medium of colonial occupation and domination (Diop 1974; Mudimbe 1994). 
We should not be shocked that Europe’s scientific revolution occurred after, not before, the 
colonization of the Americas and India. Through a global empire, Europe established a vast 
enterprise capable of reaching far-off lands and gathering the knowledges of other societies, 
bringing them home to Europe and America, and planting them in botanical gardens, zoos, 
and labs, subjecting them to biochemical analysis, which ushered in new drugs.
Given all that, Africans are coming to “Western” STI not as outsiders looking in but as 
coauthors of a knowledge store monopolized through imperialistic power. It is an empower-
ing feeling: Imagine a positive Africa—creative, technological, and scientific in its own way. 
The problem is not with STI but how it is defined in alienation, such that Africans are made 
to enter as unsure and trembling visitors to other societies’ achievements. That mindset is 
ahistorical, whereas the psychology of knowing that science, technology, and innovation are 
not Houdini acts of white people but the latest iteration of a long process of accumulative, 
multicultural knowledge production frees the mind to come to STI as a builder—past, pres-
ent, and future. To that end, we must explore how the terms science, technology, and innova-
tion have evolved into something so Western-centric, commercial, and artifactual to start 
with so as to put the chapters into context.
Science, Technology, and Innovation: The Origins of Concepts
In its rigid Western form, the language of science emerged in the nineteenth century. Since 
classical antiquity or the Greco-Roman period (500 BCE–500 CE), science was natural philos-
ophy, with Aristotle and Thales as its key markers. The beginnings of the scientific method 
are from Europe’s Middle Ages (400–1400 CE); two philosopher-scientists, the Arab and Mus-
lim Ibn al-Haytham (Sabra 1996) and the Englishman and Franciscan Roger Bacon, were its 
flag bearers. The beginnings of contemporary scientific practice are pegged in Europe’s scien-
tific revolution (1400s–1800s) (Pingree 2005). Knowledge prior to that point is deemed 
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“prescientific” and “false beliefs,” whereas that after that point is thought of as “scientific,” 
“modern,” and “true theory” (Golinski 2001).
Thus, despite being systematic observations, pre-1400 methods (Chinese ones, for 
instance) are relegated to prescience because they were based on eyesight (visual observation) 
rather than laboratory or physical observation (Needham and Gwei-djen 1974, 1983; Need-
ham, Ping-Yu, and Gwei-djen 1976; Needham, Gwei-djen, and Sivin, 1980; Hoffman 1998). 
What developed as means to fulfill and outcomes of mundane and spiritual needs—like 
dynastic (black) Egypt’s architecture, astronomy, medicine, and mathematics (Homer 1998, 
40)—is deemed unscientific (Lloyd 1970, 1979; Sambursky 1974). Thales, Aristotle, Plato, and 
other Greco-Roman natural philosophers are the “founding fathers” of science because they 
separated the natural from the spiritual. Scientific method became synonymous with the antis-
piritual or secular; credit went to a specific individual, not the entire society or school (Corn-
ford 1971; Arieti 2005; Dicks 1970; O’Leary 1949).
Little has changed, as the debates of the last century involving Karl Popper, Ludwik Fleck, 
Robert Merton, Thomas Kuhn, David Bloor, and Paul Feyerabend illustrate. For Popper, falsi-
fiability is the basic criterion for determining whether something is or is not science (Popper 
[1934] 1992, 102–103). That true or false measure follows Western scientific method and 
nothing else. Fleck had a more workable view of science as an outcome of not one but many 
“thought-collectives” and “thought-styles”—collective bodies that share a common culture 
(Fleck [1935] 1979, 35–47). However, his thought collectives were limited to experimental 
practice and expertise derived from formal training. For Kuhn (1962), science follows a cycli-
cal pattern of normal science, crisis, revolution, and normal science again. Scientific commu-
nities, he said, conform to certain norms until a crisis challenges them, forcing the emergence 
of a new paradigm that resolves the crisis. Merton ([1942] 1973) defined science as “certifiable 
knowledge”—that is, statements of regularity that are empirically confirmable and logically 
consistent. In short, what made science scientific was its method—including disinterested-
ness, peer review, a reward system, competition, and intellectual property. For Bloor, science 
can only be examined within the social context of its production; the “natural” of science is 
not devoid of social content, nor is the laboratory a site of pure objectivity unpolluted by 
interests (Bloor [1976] 1991). Thus, Feyerabend rejects method as a marker for separating 
science and its others. Science, he says, is “one view among many and not ... the one and 
only road to truth and reality,” and “the success of ‘science’ cannot be used as an argument 
for treating as yet unsolved problems in a standardized way” (Feyerabend 1975, viii, 2; also 
Ayer 1959, 14). Despite these protestations, Western scientific practice continues very much 
to be a privileged method, the source of all true knowledge.
The word technology comes from the Greek root techne (an art or craft) and -ology (a branch of 
learning). Nobody really asks: Where did the Greeks get that definition? Or: What did other 
civilizations, like the Egyptians for instance, call similarly denoted phenomena? Rather, the 
conversation moves too quickly to the term’s first English translation, referring to the 
mechanic arts as a field, not an object. Technology only became a salient term at a specific 
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moment in American history—the 1840s, when concepts like the useful arts and mechanical 
discovery, improvements, and invention became inadequate to describe steam power, electricity, 
the railroad, the telegraph, and myriad other new markers of “progress” (Bigelow 1829). Even 
in Das Kapital, Karl Marx consigned the word to a footnote urging “a critical history of tech-
nology” (Marx [1867] 1954, 406n2). The impetus for the concept drew from the so-called 
second industrial revolution of the Western world (1880–1910) and its products, like the 
electric light, the radio, the telephone, the X-ray, the airplane, the motion picture, and the 
automobile (L. Marx 2010).
This is how technology was reduced to a machine, invested “with the power to initiate 
change, as if it were capable of altering the course of events, of history itself.” Respected 
American historian of technology Leo Marx’s warning must concern Africa: “By treating 
these inanimate objects—machines—as causal agents, we divert attention from the human 
(especially socioeconomic and political) relations responsible for precipitating this social 
upheaval. Contemporary discourse, private and public, is filled with hackneyed vignettes of 
technologically activated social change— pithy accounts of ‘the direction technology is tak-
ing us’ or ‘changing our lives’” (L. Marx 2010, 574).
The concept of technology has thus been weighed down by its privileging of economies 
of scale, a Cartesian and arbitrary view of what spaces must produce STI, and assumption of 
separation of powers between the producers (scientists and engineers in their built labora-
tory, as experts) and the consumers (society, as laypersons). We are made to believe that 
engineers design for, not with, society. A geophysical zoning of the definition and direction-
ality of technology has been hammered into our brains: that technology is for academy-trained 
engineers, hence the emphasis on experts, and that technology can only come from the West 
and is “transferred” to the technology-poor Global South.
When Western technology travels, it is often cast in similar language. Historians of tech-
nology writing about the nineteenth century talk of products of the industrial revolution as 
“tools of empire” (Headrick 1981) and “tentacles of progress” (Headrick 1988) that enable 
Europe and America to exercise “power over peoples” (Headrick 2010). With better ships, 
Europeans could travel far; with quinine, they could stay alive while traveling; and with the 
telegraph and radio, they could communicate while on the move. Indeed, machines became 
the “measure of men” and “a spur to overseas expansion” (Adas 1989, 2; also Adas 2009). Yet 
as David Edgerton (2007) has cautioned in direct response to Headrick and Adas, the behav-
ior of technology in the spaces of design and use “at home” does not always map readily onto 
foreign lands.
The task of doing STS in nonwestern contexts need not be one of simply tracing the 
mobility of Western artifacts and practitioners, situating them in the Global South, and com-
menting on their behavior in different environments, but taking seriously what technology 
means from the perspective of people of the South. It requires not merely looking at how 
people respond to incoming things, but placing the latter’s arrival, meanings, knowledges, 
and materialities within the locals’ technological longue durée. The arbitrary restriction of 
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what constitutes technology to measurable things and experiments in the built laboratory 
performed only by those with mastery over them constitutes not just an epistemological 
exclusion, but also an ontological and sociological one (Shiva 1988; Stengers 2008). The pro-
paganda around Western imperialism as civilizing mission was that Europe—and later 
America—alone had a monopoly of technology to “transfer” to a dark, primitive world. In 
the Global South, by contrast, both Western science and technology arrived and have lived 
their lives as tools of racist domination (Fanon 1970a, 1970b; Nandy 1988; Raj 2006; Ander-
son and Adams 2007).
A vast scholarship has focused on the systematic plunder of “native” plant knowledge to 
“feed the beast” of imperial technoscience (e.g., Shiva 1997 Osseo-Asare 2014). Another for-
midable body of literature investigates Western institutions experimenting in or bringing 
medical technologies to the South (Petryna 2009; Prasad 2014; Peterson 2014; Tilley 2011). 
Although these are powerful and much-needed explanations and critiques of the workings of 
Western technology, they still leave wide open opportunities for investigating the Indian or 
African as the central innovative agent driving or decisively affecting these incoming forces 
over a longer historical period. The people who have experienced colonialism, racism, and 
other forms of disadvantage generally come to discourse as the victim or subaltern of tech-
nology, inevitably because the chosen period of focus of these scholars (the twentieth cen-
tury) was one of colonialism and apartheid or of its legacies (e.g., Shiva and the Research 
Foundation for Science Technology, and Ecology 2000; Moraña, Dussel, and Jáuregui 2008; 
Hecht 2012; Breckenridge 2014). Normally, when preferring to talk about the subaltern as a 
technological agent, scholarship focuses mostly on the strategic deployment of incoming 
ideas and artifacts as the so-called subaltern begins postcolonial self-reconstruction (Rajan 
2006; Medina 2011; Prakash 1999; Abraham 1998). Always, the narrative starts from the 
colonial onward, ignoring that people of the South were already technological before colo-
nialism happened. The language of STS generated from Western philosophical and empirical 
contexts is also exported and used to order Asian, African, and Latin American knowledge 
and practices, thus reducing local, non-Western registers to raw material for the scholars’ 
own intellection.
Africa must be repositioned in technology as other than its pitiable victim. The younger 
generation—our children, our children’s children—will require a positive African story to be 
inspired and to aspire. The narrative of victimhood alone will not be enough; the generation 
of our children, the African millennials, will want to see signposts of creativity—positive 
stories that will uplift them. As noted elsewhere, even where death is certain, situations 
insurmountable, people do not just roll over and die or raise arms of surrender. They die 
fighting (Mavhunga 2015). We have seen many stories of slavery, colonialism, apartheid, 
poverty, war, and disease associated with the black existence that can make any human being 
cry and want to “do something to help Africa.” Can we not also write narratives that can 
inspire Africa to help itself, to do something about its own issues? Where are laughter, joy, 
happiness, creativity, means-making, and resilience in the African story? We have invested in 
6 Introduction
showing how cruel others have been and forgotten how resilient, resourceful, and creative 
we have been in spite of it all.
The image of Africa in the technological imagination is still Hegelian; as scholars we feed 
and subsidize it by ending only with the trivial and the negative. Hegel himself ([1837] 2007, 
99) described the continent as having “no movement or development to exhibit” and 
belonging to “the Unhistorical, Undeveloped Spirit still involved in the conditions of mere 
nature.” In Heart of Darkness, Joseph Conrad captures well Western man’s movement silhou-
etted against Africa’s undeveloped spirit (Conrad 1902). Toward the end of the century, Hugh 
Trevor-Roper declared: “Perhaps in the future, there will be some African history to teach. 
But, at present there is none: there is only the history of the Europeans in Africa. The rest is 
darkness” (Philips 2006). Historian of technology Jack Goody (1971) singled out the absence 
of horse, plow, and wheel as a marker of Africa’s technological inconsequence. For Walter 
Rodney (1972), the blame was elsewhere: in the export of Africa’s human capital as slaves and 
its mineral and agricultural resources as industrial raw materials. Europe’s technological 
development took place at the direct expense of Africa’s. That led Marxist scholars to con-
clude that Africa was “preindustrial” before European colonization (Marks and Atmore 1980).
This is precisely the problem with simply importing concepts from outside to order intel-
lectual discourse on science, technology, and innovation in Africa. This “imported magic” 
(Medina, da Costa Marques, and Holmes 2014) is not new. Since 1900, one could make out 
at least four turns or paradigms—most imposed either by Westerners or their colonial descen-
dants, with Africans merely as “informants.” The first turn (1910s–1930s) concerned two 
anthropological versions of functionalism, one emphasizing the psychology of “the native” 
(Malinowski 1922) and the other the structure of “native society,” captured well in the work 
of Radcliffe-Brown (1952) and Claude Levi-Strauss ([1949] 1969). Whereas this paradigm was 
deployed to serve Europe’s imperialist and colonial project, the second decisive, albeit struc-
turalist, turn (1950s to 1980s) was in service of anti-imperialist and decolonial projects. Its 
applicators imported the writings of Karl Marx ([1867] 1954) and V. I. Lenin (1917) and repo-
sitioned the African historical experience as a class struggle, with Marx as a tool for analysis 
and political action (e.g., Nyerere 1962; Senghor 1964). The third turn was the cultural or 
poststructuralist turn, which imported and tested the ideas of Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, 
Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Walter Benjamin, and others, well captured in the work of 
Ann Stoler and Fred Cooper (1997), V. Y. Mudimbe (1988), Jean Comaroff and John L. Coma-
roff (1991), and Achille Mbembe (2001). Meanwhile, a fourth paradigm shift, the environ-
mental turn, was relocating the analytic from the social and cultural to the environment, 
borrowing its concepts from American environmental history. Its leading lights were William 
Beinart (Beinart and Coates 1995), Jane Carruthers (1995), Fairhead and Leach (1996), and 
Terence Ranger (1999), among others.
The fifth turn, to which this project contributes, is the science, technology, and innova-
tion turn, dominated at present by self-identified STS scholars who deploy Western-derived 
concepts to order African empirical evidence. Because their priority is to follow Western-derived 
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phenomena, and science, technology, and innovation as defined in Western societies, they 
do not devote energy to African meanings and practices to any significant temporal or 
nuanced extent. They do not necessarily intend to or have to, and we should appreciate what 
they bring to the conversation; their strengths positively help us understand the traveling 
Western artifact, idea, or expert. It is one optic we cannot do without, so that when we as 
black folk tell our stories, we better understand how the inbound forces that complicate our 
lives operate, from where they derive their motivations, and the ends to which resources 
extracted and freedoms and prosperities enjoyed at our expense are deployed. When mean-
ings and practices of science, technology, and innovation derived from outside have become 
inextricable from who we are as Africans, we need explanatory allies, scholars who have 
dedicated immense energy and care to the workings of these inbound forces. The literature 
that has equipped us with this capacity to decode science, technology, and innovation in 
Africa is becoming quite impressive (e.g., Mitchell 2002; Storey 2008; Tilley 2011; Hecht 
2012; Breckenridge 2014; Peterson 2014; Osseo-Asare 2014). 
The point is not that the scholarship focusing on inbound things and versions of science, 
technology, and innovation is wrong; that way, we can constructively identify the shortfalls 
as opportunities for us to come into the conversation from a different optic. For a start, the 
scholarship mentioned earlier helps us understand the specific versions of (and traditions of 
thinking about) technology the scholars follow. The meticulous attention to these inbound 
versions of science, technology, and innovation leaves little, sometimes no room, for 
versions—let alone the very possibility of versions—that have local (pre- or non-European) 
origin. The inbound—besides that brought by European colonizers—was coming from sites of 
production marked by exclusions on the basis of race and gender. It was mostly produced by 
white males; and it was coming to make wealth, power, and prestige for them in Africa. It is 
not enough, however, to have an account of how these white technologies, this white science, 
unfolded in the hands of white agents at the expense of black victims. For those versions to 
speak to Africans as intellectual agents and as thinkers, creators, and doers of technology, a 
deep immersion in Africa’s idioms and long histories is required, with its own vernacular reg-
isters and syntaxes that are only partially found in writing. Few scholars are ready yet to be 
both thoroughly immersed in STS idioms and empirical material on one hand and those 
emerging out of Africa on the other. In any case, most STS scholars are trained in methods that 
enable them to work within only colonial and postcolonial history and anthropology; it 
requires a vaster repertoire to undertake an intellectual history of technology.
Africa clearly needs histories and philosophies of technology, but which ones? Although 
there is now a large body of social science and humanities literature on technology design 
and use relating to the Global North, Africa is made conspicuous by its absence from the 
discussion. When it is included, it comes into the story only as a recipient of technology 
transfer from the North or as a victim of (Western and colonial) technology or its appropria-
tors. That, or Africans, are portrayed as just tinkering (that horrible word!) and responding 
without initiative or inventing anything. Tinkering is such a horrible word because it refers to 
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a mender of what is already made, a trial and error person, a meddler, or, worse yet, a clumsy, 
unskilled worker. The chapters that follow seek to go well beyond that lazy narrative to 
propose people deeply engaged in intellection, firmly anchored in their own philosophies, 
and alert to the world around and beyond them as a source of things that they render 
technological.
The reduction of innovation to technological and commercial ventures—and technology to 
iconic objects and processes—is a recent interpretation of phenomena that used to embrace 
much wider historical, cultural, environmental, and political systems (L. Marx 2010; Godin 
2014). Three elements are at the core of Western innovation today: novelty, invention, and 
making money. Until the mid-eighteenth century, imitation was positively viewed as selec-
tive borrowing and creative copying that substituted for imported goods and lowered costs 
of original products (Godin 2008a, 7–10). During Europe’s renaissance, imitation was inven-
tion (Wittkower 1965; Hathaway 1989). By 1750, originality had become invention, imita-
tion mere copying.
Invention itself has a long history in Western society. It emerged out of the classical rhe-
torical arts as a guideline for the fine arts. By 1350, it referred to the discovery of knowledge 
or knowing, and two centuries later, it referred to makers and their artifacts. Hence, in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, invention was a venatio (hunt or search) for knowledge 
(Eamon 1994; Hadot 2004). From the seventeenth century onwards, with patent laws and 
the West’s consumer and industrial revolutions, invention referred to technology and luxu-
ries. With the rise of the research laboratory, invention was conflated with machines, arti-
facts, devices, engines, and methods for “the relief of the human condition” (Francis Bacon, 
cited in Zagorin 2001, 390).
The term innovation itself emerged out of novation, a thirteenth-century legal term referring 
to the process of redrafting a contract to renew a debtor’s obligations. We love to be called 
innovators today, but until the nineteenth century a novator was a very distrusted person 
(Godin 2008a, 21–22). With the advent of the patents regime, imitation became theft (Macleod 
1988; Hilaire-Pérez 2000). The technologization of innovation began in the 1860s, with econ-
omists increasingly seeing technology as a cause of economic growth, a spur to industrializa-
tion, social change, crisis, and revolution. Thus, from the 1920s to the 1930s, technology was 
seen as labor and capital saving and a sign of measurable efficiency; productivity became an 
indicator of technology usage (Stern 1927, 1937; Gilfillan 1935; Ogburn 1941, 1950).
The decoupling of innovation from invention and its attachment to technology gathered 
momentum in the 1930s and is often credited to Joseph Schumpeter, especially via his 
now famous statement: “Innovation is possible without anything we should identify as 
invention and invention does not necessarily induce innovation” (Schumpeter 1939, 84). 
However, as Godin (2008b) has decisively argued, the Austrian-American economist and 
political scientist’s notion of technological innovation was feeding off the literature of the 
1920s to the 1930s. The concept is owed instead to Rupert Maclaurin (see 1949, 1953), who 
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increasingly pinned technological innovation to commercialized innovation. His writings 
posited that technological innovation starts in basic research, goes to applied research, then 
development, then production, and then diffusion (marketing, supply, distribution; Godin 
2008b). Productivity becomes the measure of progress, technology the means to achieve it. 
Economy is summarized to growth, not sustainability; as resources dwindle, a postindustrial 
society beckons (Toffler 1970; Bell 1973; Gosh 2009, 2012, 2015).
The science policy model that emerged in the post-1945 period was a Maclaurinian one 
(Godin 2008a, 36) and illustrates the synergistic roles between theorists, research institu-
tions, and governments. The most influential theorists of innovation have also been consul-
tants for or employees of governments. They have advanced policies based on their theories, 
like “the knowledge-based economy,” “the information economy,” “the new economy,” and 
“national systems of innovation” (Godin 2009). Examples include researchers from the 
RAND Corporation in the United States (Hounshell 2000), the Science Policy Research Unit 
at Sussex, and Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology 
(MERIT) in the Netherlands. Their models have been exported as templates to other coun-
tries through manuals, IMF and World Bank structural adjustment policies (SAPs), and bilat-
eral trade agreements (Godin 2005). To cite one example, under the R&D-centric approach, 
two-thirds of R&D expenditures are devoted to the development of new technologies (Godin 
2006). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s method-
ological manual for measuring innovation, the Oslo Manual (OECD, 1991), as defined in the 
US Department of Commerce’s Charpie Report, is a perfect example of this technological and 
commercial reductionism in the concept of innovation (Godin 2008a).
Can Africa follow these models of STI given its specific conditions? When 80 percent of 
the budget of countries like Zimbabwe goes to civil service salaries? When the bigger share of 
Africa’s budget relies on IMF and World Bank balance of payments support? When countries 
thus have meager funds to invest in R&D and yet make it the centerpiece of their STI policies 
anyway? When since slavery the West has used Africa as a mere source of raw materials 
(including cheap labor) for its development, a market for its finished goods, and a dumping 
ground for its disused products? Moreover, how exactly does Africa trust STI advice from the 
same experts that have devised systems of innovation that relegate Africa to a receiver of 
Western-produced R&D and a source of unprocessed natural resources and agricultural prod-
ucts for the West and East’s industries?
African Science, Technology, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship: Snapshots
This book locates Africans between their locally generated and inbound ideas, instruments, 
and practices. It places these two, endogenous and inbound, within cultures in which 
bench science was not the norm of knowledge production and bench science itself was an 
inbound system of inventing and for which local practice has not contributed too much to 
changing the lives of ordinary people. Bench science—especially R&D—remains an elitist, 
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university-centered practice, something taught in class in primary and secondary school and 
usually left there. It doesn’t come home—to the village, to the streets. The dilemma of knowl-
edge production in Africa centers on how its structures, practices, and concepts came to be 
informalized while inbound European ones were rendered formal. This was particularly the 
case with metalworking, pottery, beer brewing, agriculture, trade caravans, and hunting, for 
which modes of knowledge and knowing (science), ways and means (technology), and inno-
vation (creativity, experimentation, and strategic deployments) are already well-known. 
These pursuits are sketched in figure 0.1.
From the time that humans began making tools in stone, bone, and wood, Africa has 
hosted different forms of nzvimboshandwa (workshop or, as the French encapsulate, atelier). 
There were no spaces singly designated for science, technology, or innovation; in fact, one 
cannot separate one from the other. In Transient Workspaces (2014), I called them schools  
and showed how African children were educated within them through doing, through 
being vadzidzi (apprentices). Hence the hunt was a professoriate of forest knowledge; 
the ironsmith’s blast furnace, the potter’s workshop, and the weaver’s loom were Africa’s 
Figure 0.1
Some sites where science, technology, innovation, and entrepreneurship have been practiced in Africa, 
from the earliest times to the present.
Source: Author.
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apprenticeship and engineering schools or innovation/tech hubs, while the trade caravan 
and marketplace was and remains the African business school par excellence.
Research on longstanding trade practices and routes has exposed African innovations in mar-
keting, transport, currency systems, and commodity exchange. Some of these narratives sug-
gest that the idea of an entrepreneur—defined as a person who starts a business and is willing 
to risk loss in order to make money—is sometimes morally repugnant and ethically fraught 
in the African context. For example, how should we address entrepreneurship involving the 
hunting, capture, and force-marching of African men, women, and children as commodities, 
bound in shackles and talons, to the waiting slave ship and, on the other side of the Atlantic, 
turning them into Europe’s—and America’s—first machine of mass production on the plan-
tation? This is the case of the ogaranya (wealthy men) among the Igbo of West Africa, not 
only prior to the abolition of the trade in Africans as slaves in 1807, but right into the second 
decade of the twentieth century—ogaranya, for example, men like Chief Igwebe Odum 
(Njoku 2008, 27–33). Mandinka jula (merchants), often celebrated for their risk-taking and 
overwhelming success, traded extensively in enslaved Africans at the Fatatenda and Wuli 
markets (Wright 1977). Throughout Africa, the practice of sacrificing the enslaved, kin, 
strangers, and their body parts to make a business thrive is well-known; there has existed the 
perception that sound business principles are not enough to stabilize and scale up a business. 
Colonialism was itself a start-up project in most countries: some ambitious individual 
obtained fraudulent concessions from African rulers; formed a company to exploit the con-
cession; obtained a charter from the British, French, Portuguese, German, or Belgian govern-
ment to occupy the land to safeguard its investment; and raised money on the European 
stock exchanges to undertake colonization, with the goal of paying the investment back by 
exploiting the land and its people (Agiri 1977, 3).
As repugnant as all these examples are, we should also note the trade practices and educa-
tion for children of merchants to become merchants. It offers us a space from which to radi-
cally rethink the ideas of hubs, startups, and platforms that is now associated with the 
narrative of “how mobile technology is changing Africa.” Indeed, this long history of inte-
grated production-transportation-marketing systems with information management and 
communication at its core is an invitation to think of science, technology (even engineer-
ing), innovation, and entrepreneurship more organically and over a long time frame.
Take the example of the trans-Saharan trade routes, the history of which stretches across 
millennia. The oasis was a marketplace, an important juncture and resting depot for traders. 
Commodities were transported on the desert highway by camels, all the caravans and routes 
passing by oases. Commoners were forbidden from participating personally in foreign trade, 
and rulers taxed all export commodities (Kapteijns and Spaulding 1982, 30). The reason for 
paying the tax was simple: “In whose country, by which road could one have traded?” Gifts 
were exchanged between rulers of lands along which trade routes passed and in which 
essential commodities were produced. This was done to secure the macroeconomic environ-
ment for entrepreneurship. Hence, as Kapteijns and Spaulding (1982, 32) have noted, 
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“Reciprocity gifts were the language of diplomacy and expressed both the nuances and fluc-
tuations of political relations between the states.” Private traders were attached to the royal 
caravan and received protection, guides, and royally sponsored interstate exchange 
facilities—for a fee, of course. Foreign traders’ first port of call was the king’s court or the 
household compounds of the big traders, with enslaved people usually sold privately (La 
Rue 1984, 60). Where marketplaces did exist, the forest paths functioned frequently if not 
primarily as trading lanes linking together different regions and peoples (Handwerker 1980, 
3). Bear in mind, however, that markets were not simply fixed places but mobile or 
itinerant—what I call transient workspaces—that depended entirely on reliable market infor-
mation passed through merchants moving between source and market (Dalton 1978, 134).
The trans-Saharan trade route is a perfect example of a transient workspace in which the 
training and apprenticing of children occurred via doing and showing. This is hardly unique; 
in Transient Workspaces (2014) I gave the example of the hunt as a professoriate. Even today, 
African entrepreneurial training is on-the-job apprenticeship; it constitutes the bulk of exper-
tise that drives the informal sector. In precolonial Sudan, for instance, an entire clan was 
composed of merchants. They exposed boys to mercantilism early in life—in hospitality, 
bargaining, desert-crossing survival skills, and caravan guiding—under an uncle or father, for 
example, among Darfu caravans (La Rue 1984, 62). In Arochukwu society (Nigeria), trading 
was a form of education, and children learned buying and selling processes early. A boy usu-
ally started with trade in lizards (mgbere ngwere) under his master, a successful merchant; by 
the age of ten, he began trading in tortoises (mbe), considered a higher commodity than liz-
ards; by age thirteen, he graduated into trade in towels (ákwá-mmiri); by age sixteen, he par-
ticipated as a warrior in local wars; at twenty-two, he entered training as a slave dealer (Njoku 
2008, 35).
The tech talk about Africa today is populated with phrases like start-up and financing. 
Among the Mandinka of West Africa, two types of strangers coming into a jula community 
offer intriguing insight into start-ups long before 1500 and prior to European colonization. 
One was the suruga, a person who would come to a new village without means, submit to the 
care of a generous host through whom he became kin, gain access to trade on the host’s good 
name and account, and eventually marry within the family (Wright 1977, 35). Compare the 
suruga to the samalan, a much more independent chap who provided for himself, paid a fee 
for land use, did his own work, and paid his way through everything, including marrying 
locally and becoming jula.
In earlier times, Tuareg herders of the central Saharan oasis of Kawar exported thousands 
of tons of salt dug from salt pits a year. Theirs was the hub of an economic system consisting 
of a large area astride the desert and its southern periphery from 1700 until French colonial 
conquest in 1906. They were not capitalists but clansmen, with a system for regulating salt 
production. The salt pit was a site of technological innovation and knowledge process, as 
seen from salt-production techniques (evaporation of subsoil water), digging and extraction, 
equipment, and modes of commodity exchange on site (silent trade); hence, this could be 
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called an integrated platform combining production and selling. The two parties to the trans-
action (the producer/seller and the buyer) never came into contact with one another. One 
came, left a commodity, and returned to his position a short distance away. The other came, 
inspected the goods, and left what he considered fair exchange beside it, and disappeared. 
The first party returned and inspected the exchange. If he accepted it, he took the proffered 
goods with him, and the deal was done (Vikør 1982, 125). Every salt basin produced its own 
unique product, and each salt basin owner therefore labeled his own salt differently to 
enhance competitive advantage. To develop the pit, each had to secure credit lines from 
wealthier kin or the chief.
In general, European colonialism from 1885 to the late twentieth century killed, dis-
rupted, or delegitimized these sites of innovation and entrepreneurship by displacing Afri-
cans from their lands, creating farms and game reserves out of them, subjecting them to 
forced or miserly paid labor, and forcing Africans into cash crop production. The example of 
early colonial southern Dahomey, a region that includes peoples of the Aja-Ewe and Yoruba 
groups, shows the danger of imports killing local modes of innovation. Before inbound 
goods, specialists performed spinning, weaving, tanning, dyeing, pottery, woodwork, cala-
bash making, and salt making work, but in many cases cheap, less arduous imports sup-
planted these vibrant yet strenuous activities that demanded more labor for less output. The 
competition from imported salt, carried as far north as the Niger, caused abandonment of salt 
manufacture in many places. Sewing machines replaced hand sewing (Manning 1980). Kola 
nut, domesticated and grown among the Yoruba, became the critical ingredient in Coca 
Cola, but in addition from 1901 the British Administration urged the introduction of the 
crop into parts of Northern Nigeria to which the Yoruba had not already spread the crop to 
before the colonial partition (Agiri 1977, 4).
Rubber is another perfect example of the morally reprehensible aspects of capitalist entre-
preneurship as imperialism. Abir, the largest rubber concession company in the Congo Free 
State founded with Belgian and British capital, created no long-lasting entrepreneurial struc-
tures, introduced no new technology, no new market relations, no new indigenous elite—it 
was just like King Leopold II: “a plundering and tribute-collecting empire of the crudest sort” 
(Harms 1983, 125). The Belgian monarch had colonized Congo as his personal property. 
With the colonial subjugation of the area complete in 1898, a brutal regime of forced rubber 
collection began. Men who did not bring in enough rubber were often imprisoned and put 
to work drying rubber, but because a man in prison was two rubber-collecting hands lost, 
some Abir agents took hostages instead, holding a man’s wife or close kin until he completed 
his quota, or thoroughly flogging someone with the chicotte (hippo-hide whip), or imprison-
ing the chief of any village that fell behind in his rubber deliveries. Others tied people to 
platforms facing the sun, burned them with gum copal, or simply cut off their ears, noses, 
and hands and mutilated their faces (Harms 1983, 134).
The last example of European entrepreneurship severely disadvantaging Africans is that 
of cotton, and here the story becomes a complex one of brutal colonial practice and 
Africans’ creative resilience in the face of it—that is, innovation in the face of virtually 
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insurmountable odds. People in different parts of Africa had grown or used wild cotton for 
clothing and other purposes before European colonization. The colonial authorities com-
pelled Africans to grow cotton as a cash crop on a large scale. From 1911, the French in Chad, 
for example, forced Africans to grow cotton under supervision of their chiefs, who were 
stripped of their rank and turned into forced labor themselves if they refused. The authorities 
sent out local clerks—boys-cotons—to prescribe what and how much land to be set aside for 
cotton. The program was a staggering failure (Sturzinger 1983, 217). Initial attempts to exe-
cute a similar system in Mozambique had also come to nothing, prompting colonial power 
Portugal to issue a decree giving extensive power to concessionary companies to compel 
Africans to cultivate cotton. The decree still failed, despite putting eighty thousand Africans 
under forced labor. In 1938, Lisbon authorized that the full force of the state be placed at the 
disposal of the Cotton Board to squeeze more production out of Africans. The work day was 
extended, mandatory cultivation mercilessly enforced, and vast regions decreed “cotton 
zones.” The colonial administrators made regular inspections, chiefs harassed and threat-
ened their own people, and those caught fleeing were publicly flogged or often sent to jail 
(Isaacman 1985).
Creative resilience is best illustrated in the story of cotton in Uganda, which also exposes 
the parasitic nature of the colonial state as a capitalist entrepreneur or enterprise. It is the 
story of Africans already growing cotton and then proposing to scale it up into a cash crop to 
be able to pay taxes and avoid punishment from British colonizers. The key figure was Sam-
wiri Mukasa, a Muganda chief from 1897 to 1926, who approached the agent of the Uganda 
Company, Kristen Borup, with a proposal to turn cotton into a cash crop. Borup agreed, 
provided that Mukasa pay a surety in case his people refused to grow the crop. Mukasa 
pledged twenty square miles of land and 1,200 rupees as security and enthusiastically distrib-
uted cotton seeds. Thus began the Bulemezi cotton venture, which spread to other parts of 
Uganda. It is also how Chief Mukasa earned the name Muleta Pamba or introducer of cotton 
(Nayenga 1981).
Located on the Kenyan coastline, Lamu challenges the frequent argument that Europeans 
were able to conquer and govern because of their superior science and technology. By the 
first decades of the twentieth century, mangrove poles brought scores of dhows (locally made 
sail ships) southward each year from Arabia, Persia, and Somalia. Coastal people regarded 
mangroves as a resource free for the taking by anyone with the need or ambition to do so. In 
1907, the new British colonial government stepped in; it declared all mangrove swamps 
crown land and granted concessions to private companies like Smith, Mackenzie & Co. and 
then to Indian merchants like Mulla Taibali, whom it taxed. Still, as Philip Curtin shows, the 
real entrepreneur was neither the colonial government nor the concessionaire but the for-
eign captains of the jahazi (dhows), who paid the private concessionaires for a specific num-
ber of poles to cut and hired local Africans to cut them and transport them to ocean-going 
vessels. This grassroots process was exceedingly difficult to supervise, and dhow captains 
simply bribed the right people and paid for just half the poles loaded, with one-third of 
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proceeds going to the owner of the boat and the rest to the crew. The jahazi captain depended 
on buyers based in Lamu, who stockpiled the poles until the bigger dhows arrived with the 
monsoons from Arabia, Persia, and Somalia (Curtin 1981). In essence, the knowledge and 
methods used to harvest mangrove poles was endogenous and a continuation of non-European 
practice: a kind of technological version of indirect rule wherein the colonizer, severely out-
numbered by Africans, extracted resources through local idioms.
KwaZulu-Natal provides a different dimension and directionality of knowledge: of Afri-
cans and inbound things that they reassigned technological purpose. From 1845 to 1880, a 
period of increasing Euro-African contact in South Africa, Zulu kolwa (those who had con-
verted to Christianity) partook of a series of initiatives representing one of the most success-
ful integrations of inbound things to come out of Southern Africa. They turned the Christian 
mission into a platform upon which Africans staged many experiments, especially those of 
innovation and entrepreneurship. Congregational, Methodist, and Anglican converts had 
acquired “mission reserves” from the colonial administrator, and in these reserves, kolwa 
were allocated land. They took well to European tastes, adopting European clothing, looms 
and needles, sewing machines, and brick houses with iron roofs. 
Contrary to the statements of scholars like Norman Etherington (1978, 1), the missionar-
ies were not “prodding” these Zulu toward “progress”; the Zulu had dreams of their own and 
took bold risks to realize them. They were not just kolwa but Africans who came and located 
themselves at sites where better opportunities to acquire tools for realizing their futures 
existed. At a mission station called Mvoti, for example, one missionary in 1864 counted 
some forty-eight upright houses, twenty-two ploughs, fourteen wagons, and twenty spans of 
oxen. One Methodist minister, Daniel Msimang, owned two houses on an eighty-nine-acre 
plot at Edendale, plus the following moveable property: two ploughs, two wagons, thirty-six 
oxen, 260 goats, and twenty cows. Cattle were not means to wealth; they were wealth. Ploughs, 
oxen, and land were utilized to produce crops, oxen and wagons as transport for trading 
expeditions. Msimang’s community included thirteen farmers, eight men employed in 
teaching or ministering, six in transport or trade, ten skilled artisans, and three unskilled 
laborers. All their activities were profit-driven: growing cash crops like cotton (1847), sugar 
(1860), and manufacturing sugar.
This remark by one surprised missionary puts things in perspective:
Men with black skins who a few years ago were naked boys ... are now competing with the white man in 
manufacturing sugar in a steam mill of their own from canes of their own cultivation and without any 
superintendence in the work; the men have incurred rather heavy money liability in erecting the mill 
(about six hundred pounds) but I see no reason why with ordinary success they may not hope to clear 
themselves in a comparatively short space of time. (cited in Etherington 1978, 3)
However, the land upon which the Africans grew and processed sugar cane was inside the 
Locations and Mission Reserves, where freehold tenure did not exist, and magistrates refused 
to allow blacks to buy land elsewhere, and government did not provide credit lines to blacks. 
16 Introduction
By 1881, these Zulu entrepreneurs had become “afraid of sugar growing, because it takes so 
much capital” (Etherington 1978, 4).
The second type of entrepreneurship in this prerailway age was ox wagon transport. Zulu 
men had been raised and trained in cattle handling, and ox wagon transport was in high 
demand. Every driver dreamed of owning his own wagon and trading independently. As one 
American missionary noted:
You will find them with bundles of the skins of the wild cat or monkey, or blankets which they have 
probably purchased on credit, traveling through the length and breadth of this country and even those 
bordering it, bartering for hides, goats, sheep, young cattle, and then selling these to each other or to 
the white people. After a few years some will succeed in obtaining a few oxen and a cart or wagon, when 
they will engage in purchasing mealies and take to the towns for sale, or will draw sugar from the sugar 
estates to market, or perhaps transport merchandise from the Port to the upper districts, going some-
times as far as to the Dutch Republics or even to the Diamond fields or Goldfields five hundred miles 
distant. (cited in Etherington 1978, 6)
By 1850, Kolwa trading had begun spreading from the Natal settlements into the rest of Kwa-
Zulu, and by 1870 it extended into much of tsetse-free Southern Africa, the furthest extent 
oxen could pull wagons without succumbing to the insect’s deadly bite.
The Zulu example is only a snapshot of trends set with the coming of Europeans, colonial-
ism, and its legacies, which concentrated and specialized goods and services around specific 
nodes—namely, stores (urban factory-produced groceries, etc.); marketplaces (trading in 
goods produced in informalized activities); stock exchanges (formal sector trading); indus-
trial sites/factories (European-originated methods and instruments of production; formal 
goods); farms and mines (owned by Europeans or whites and Western multinational corpo-
rations); and “native” reserves or communal lands (the majority of the people). 
The interlocked narrative of innovation and entrepreneurship and the Euro-African 
encounter must also consider fully the role of Indian, Lebanese, and Jewish entrepreneurship 
in Africa. The Indian entrepreneurial presence in particular has been closely associated with 
both collaboration with and resistance movements against colonialism—in South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya in particular. Indians in Africa have 
always drawn their power from entrepreneurship, going into places where no other foreign-
ers want to go, setting up shop in remote localities where few to no other businesses exist, 
buying out the competition and establishing a monopoly. Their unequalled gift is persuasion 
and bargaining: in Zimbabwe, we call them buya tinapangana (come, let’s talk); fixed price 
means nothing to them. Their competitive advantage lies in being the cheapest, sourcing 
cheap, and moving stock off the inventory quickly. They locate their home either in the 
backyard or upstairs, get as many of their kin from India as possible, and often keep their 
money with them. This is exactly what they did in the British colony of Uganda in the early 
twentieth century, specifically in the kingdom of Busoga, where they settled at the homes of 
traditional chiefs, bought local produce, and sold locals goods from their stores. They became 
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middlemen, buying African-grown cotton cheaply and marketing it to ginners at exorbitant 
prices, and not before long they established their own ginneries. This is the story of two 
tycoons, Nanjibhai K. Mehta and Muljibhai P. Madvani, two men who bargained down the 
farmers whom Muleta Pamba had inspired into pioneering commercial cotton production in 
Uganda (Nayenga 1981, 189). Just two ginneries out of the eleven in 1920s Busoga were 
European-owned—testimony to the Indians’ monopoly model, which I also observed in Lim-
popo province, South Africa, and grew up with in Zimbabwe—the Gulabs in Marondera, the 
Patels in Harare, and Narans of Bulawayo.
The final snapshot comes from the post-independence period leading to the present. Most 
African countries either adopted socialist-based policies or a pragmatic blend of socialism and 
capitalism to address economic growth/modernization and social welfare programs. In social-
ist countries, government controls either stymied or completely eliminated “individualistic” 
or “capitalistic” business, with countries nationalizing multinational companies, specifically 
in Mozambique. In others, like Zimbabwe, governments nationalized some big corporations 
into or maintained existing parastatals (state-owned companies), established black economic 
empowerment programs to create an indigenous entrepreneurial class, and actively promoted 
both cooperatives and private entrepreneurship. These government subsidy–heavy programs 
put a drain on budgets, and soon countries were knocking on the doors of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. With this move came deregulation, economic 
liberalization, removal of socialist subsidies, and denationalization.
The consequence was that governments were compelled to pull out of business. I was in 
high school when the Zimbabwean government succumbed to the Bretton Woods institu-
tions’ “bitter medicine” in 1990. I was at the University of Zimbabwe when its many biting 
consequences began setting in. We began to see parastatals that had run quite well, like the 
Dairy Marketing Board (DMB), the Cold Storage Commission, and Ziscosteel, becoming pri-
vatized. As students we took to the street weekly in 1993 to protest (unsuccessfully) the privat-
ization of accommodation, food catering, and student tuition and living allowance (payout). 
We unsuccessfully tried through protests to convince the government that deregulation—
which now turns out to have been pushed by the Republicans during the George H. W. Bush 
era—would result in the dumping of cheap imports and kill local industry. At the time, David 
Whitehead, Cone Textiles, and Darryn Textiles were thriving. By the time the IMF was fin-
ished, each one had shut down, swamped by cheap, secondhand clothing. The IMF also 
insisted on cutting the budgets of the government and companies, especially relegating the 
role of the state to facilitator, not active investor or entrepreneur, ending a tradition of state 
involvement in business dating back to long before and during the colonial moment. Com-
panies that had relied on subsidies to continue producing goods deemed to be in the national 
interest and to sustain the trade balance were ruthlessly exposed. By 1997, thousands of work-
ers had been laid off as part of the “rationalization” programs of the IMF.
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Rationalization is a term that assumes that prior to the IMF and World Bank interventions, 
African countries that adopted such structural adjustment programs (SAPs) had been behav-
ing irrationally. Yet countries like Zimbabwe achieved significant milestones during the prag-
matic socialism phase of their postindependence moment. Zimbabwe leapt forward to become 
the country with the most literate population in Africa by the end of the 1990s and has 
hovered either at the top or thereabout since. That would have been impossible without free 
primary and secondary education and a vigorous payout and student loan system at universi-
ties. It was also an accomplishment based on a philosophy of African socialism, firmly rooted 
in communality, which mobilized rural communities to mold clay bricks, fire them, and cart 
them to school in lieu of school fees to build then nonexistent schools. I vividly recall molding 
these bricks to build the block that sits near the plantations at Chitangazuva Primary School, 
firing them, and, in typical African innovation school style, apprenticing in the arts of mold-
ing, placing the bricks on hovhoni/oven or kiln, loading the logs into the openings, sealing 
the walls of the kiln, pouring sand on top, then firing. These are the bricks that enabled us 
and our parents to meet government contributions—solicited from donors, mostly the Nor-
dic countries that had fought with the then-guerrilla movement now turned government— 
halfway.
Zimbabwe also developed perhaps Africa’s best postindependence healthcare system based 
on free primary healthcare—something which even the United States of America has never 
made available. It also embarked on “food-for-work” programs (which the elderly transliter-
ated as futuweki), whereby whole villages were mobilized to provide labor for rehabilitating 
sand- and silt-clogged rivers and nasty dongas and to plant gum trees to serve as windbreaks 
in open grassland areas like Chihota in exchange for drought relief food. There was nothing 
“irrational” about these programs to require “rationalization.” 
Finally, through its Grain Marketing Board (GMB), the government vigorously introduced 
an agricultural inputs scheme, whereby our parents would get deliveries of fertilizer and seed 
for the upcoming season on time. This program built on the industry of ordinary people, with 
children working in the fields with their parents, learning through doing, and utilizing the 
considerable family sizes of the black majority as the basic unit of mass production. The grain 
was sold to the GMB, which deducted its fertilizer and seed input costs and gave the farmers 
the rest. This inputs scheme also ended with IMF intervention. Food security in Zimbabwe 
was already threatened by the time the government embarked on its land-reform program.
The second part of this postcolonial snapshot relates to the contemporary period of informa-
tion and communication technology (ICT)-based platforms, characterized by imitation 
(importing or transferring models that have worked well elsewhere and implementing them 
in Africa) and by the creation of synergies between inbound and locally invented modes 
of innovation and entrepreneurship. It is often overlooked that Africans—specifically the 
Rwandan entrepreneur-engineer Miko Rwayitare and his Telecel company—are the ones who 
first introduced the cell phone and subsequently mobile technology to Africa in 1986. Until 
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then, Africa had relied on fixed telecommunications first laid out in the colonial period for 
voice communication and on letters and telegraph for textual communication. Mobile also 
relied on satellite to transmit. As I see it, ICT is just a platform, a stage on which Africans are 
setting themselves up to create innovations. They are strategically deploying things (the 
mobile phone, computer, and Internet) to effect their dreams. Credit often unfairly goes to 
the gadget, as in see how mobile technology is changing Africa. Wrong! We should instead see 
how Africans are changing mobile technology. Ahead, I will discuss only examples in which Afri-
cans are changing this technology in a way that integrates the inbound and the locally gen-
erated as raw materials for creating something entirely new.
Although Rwayitare pioneered mobile telecommunications infrastructure, continent-wise, 
credit for digital mobile technology is owed to the political and strategic vision of the main 
protagonists behind Africa hosting the 2010 World Cup tournament. The most important 
figure was Thabo Mbeki, then South African president, with not-insignificant help from the 
persona and charm of Nelson Mandela. I was in Johannesburg when the news broke. The 
argument I heard Mbeki articulate on radio and television was that the World Cup event 
should be awarded to South Africa—the tip of the continent—so that the undersea cables 
could go round the furthest part of the continent and thus circumnavigate the entire conti-
nent. If the event was awarded to Egypt—the other bidder—the moment would be lost for 
good, because the rationale for such infrastructure development was to televise the games 
digitally in Europe and the Americas. The subsequent event led to laying undersea cables 
near Africa’s shores, linking them with the Europe to India cables to connect the East Coast, 
and stretching from the West Coast to Brazil to link with Latin America and, by extension, 
North America. Often, we are caught up in the technical and financial aspects of the under-
taking, completely ignoring the strategic deployment of the World Cup to obtain cyber infra-
structure: the credit for Africa hosting the World Cup goes to Mbeki.
The effects of the new infrastructure were quite rapid. Two years after the World Cup, 
there were twenty-one innovation or tech hubs around the continent—spaces where research 
and development, entrepreneurship, and marketing that is heavily reliant on leveraging 
mobile technologies takes place. By September 2015, the figure had risen over five times to 
117—and counting. Some of these hubs were created in 2010. Most of the bigger ones are 
concentrated in the cities of Tanzania, Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia and serve as incubators for 
start-ups. Perhaps the most ambitious of all is Botswana’s first science and technology park, 
called Botswana Innovation Hub (BIH), an example of an integrated platform for scientific, 
technological, and indigenous knowledge-based innovation. BIH has five sectors: clean tech, 
ICT and ICT-enabled services, mining tech, biotech, and indigenous knowledge. BIH’s 
biotech node explicitly seeks to undertake R&D and entrepreneurship in the testing and 
manufacture of indigenous natural products. The indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) sector 
focuses on local-level decision-making and cultural activities of rural communities. IKS has 
value not only for the culture in which it evolves, but also for scientists and planners striving 
to improve conditions in rural localities.
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A second feature of the post-2010 era is the development of ICT- or app-based platforms 
that serve as spaces for conducting transactions. Here are a few examples. One is a multime-
dia platform for music streaming, which has opened up possibilities for African artists to 
reach new audiences, especially with the development of the smartphone. Among some of 
the most successful ones are Simfy Africa (South Africa); Spinlet, iRoking, Vuga, Orin, and Las 
Gidi Tunes (Nigeria); Mziiki and Mkito (Tanzania); and the Kenyan outfit Mdundo (Kenya) 
(figure 0.2). Their music inventory includes Afrobeat, gospel, dancehall, Fuji, highlife, 
hip-hop, hiplife, house, Jújú, Kwaito, reggae, R & B, and traditional genres. Many artists have 
over four hundred thousand subscribers. Spinlet, for example, invites such artists to upload 
music to the site and earn 90 percent of the revenue generated, with the company getting 10 
percent. The payout per stream is currently about US$0.038.
The second example is the social network app. Outside of Whatsapp, Twitter, Facebook, 
and LinkedIn, Africans are developing their own social networks. Most of them are still 
country-specific—for example, MXit in South Africa—or limited to certain countries or just 
the diaspora; a few are continent-wide and connect Africa and its diaspora, such as African-
zone and Yookos, the latter starting out as a Christ Embassy International platform before 
broadening. Some African Pentecostal churches use their church names—for example, the 
Kimbanguists in Congo and Tomitope Joshua’s Emmanuel TV. They speak to the power of 
spirituality driving ICTs in Africa, which shows the marshalling of forms of social kinship 
Figure 0.2
Music streaming platforms in Africa as of 2016.
Source: Author.
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into a sustainable base of customers. Increasingly, villages and communities—platforms in 
their own way—are entering online platforms so that scattered members in the diaspora and 
the city can network. Some of this activity occurs on Facebook and Skype, but it is Whatsapp 
that has really driven this movement, at least in my village.
The most inspirational and urgently needed innovations derive from people who respect 
and thoroughly understand local modes of knowledge and build upon them. They are not 
just looking at the local as a problem that tech (i.e., the inbound) can solve but as a source of 
technologies that they can synergize with incoming materials to unleash opportunity from 
what people are already doing. Good examples of such synergy include eSoko, Rural eMar-
ket, M-Shamba, iCow, and Hello Tractor. eSoko is an information and communication ser-
vice for agricultural markets in Africa built by local developers and consulting staff in Accra, 
Ghana, as an ICT-response to preexisting and thriving farming; it offers services like market 
prices, weather forecasts, and growing tips and business strategies relating to product mar-
keting, market monitoring, supplying, and sourcing. It also includes automatic and person-
alized SMS alerts, buy and sell offers, bulk SMS messaging, SMS polling, Android (operating 
system) surveys, and more. eSoko is the “e” in “electronic” affixed to Soko, kiSwahili for 
Market. Today, eSoko can be used anywhere with any mobile phone and is in use in Ghana, 
Kenya, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Benin, Madagascar, and Mozambique. 
iCow is a platform for dairy agricultural products lined up on a menu, the brainchild of a 
team of young Kenyan techpreneurs led by Su Kahumbu and Charles Kithika. It helps 
farmers to manage their cattle. What I found so impressive is that Su Kahumba is a woman 
who grew up on a farm and is using that knowledge not just to find a problem to be solved 
by ICT but as a rich knowledge base to add value to mobile phones and their possibilities. 
Rural eMarket is a multilingual app to affordably communicate commodity info about and 
enhance rural access to markets, including and especially in communities in which people 
didn’t go to or didn’t get far in school. It was developed in Madagascar in recognition of 
access to market being one of the biggest blockages for development—that is, the need to 
find the market and the right price for a product. M-Shamba is an interactive platform that 
also provides information (on production, harvesting, marketing, credit, weather, and cli-
mate) to farmers through the use of a mobile phone. Currently, four thousand rice farmers 
use the app in Kenya. Nigerian-based Hello Tractor is a social enterprise that addresses the 
shortage of rural draft power and labor shortages among rural farmers by creating a network 
of “smart tractor” owners from which farmers obtain tillage or tractors via SMS. The organi-
zation has designed innovative, low-cost smart tractors specifically suitable for small farm-
ers, each equipped with various attachments so that owners can adjust them to suit specific 
crops and stages of production. Most helpfully in terms of trust and viability, a GPS antenna 
is attached to each tractor, allowing Hello Tractor to track the machine’s usage and collect 
data on its location, market trends, and uptake. These are innovations for Africa by Africans 
who thoroughly understand, emerged out of, and have faith in the working of African 
knowledge.
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Outline of the Book
Intellectual Africa is the subject of the nine chapters of this volume. Their task is not simply 
one of mobilizing Africans as “native informants” and African languages and orature as 
archive. One of the contributors to this volume made this critique two and half decades ago 
when responding to the way Henry Odera-Oruka (1983), Jan Vansina (1986), and V. Y. 
Mudimbe (1988) treated oral traditions. Cautioning against this colonial way of using Afri-
can knowledge, D. A. Masolo urged us to move away from a tendency to reduce the produc-
ers, keepers, and purveyors of indigenous knowledge to the proverbial “native informant” of 
anthropology, who is “a mere resource material from whom the scholar extracts and con-
structs his mute knowledge.” Thus “the expert scholar” installs himself or herself “as the 
systematic thinker (lover of wisdom, scientist) who wades through the ignorance of his inter-
locutors in order to sift out episteme from doxa” (Masolo 1991, 1005; also Masolo 1994, 
2003). The book signals a sense of urgency to do something other than simply mobilize 
African knowledge and lives as fodder for Western theory. As Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1985, 19) 
says: “Cultural control, as a means of economic and political control, is the most dominant 
factor during the neo-colonial phase of imperialism, and we as an African people must 
address ourselves to this if we are really serious about the liberation of the productive forces 
of African people.” It is no longer enough to be content with decolonization as the physical 
evacuation of the colonizer; Africa must vigorously seize itself with “decolonizing the mind” 
(wa Thiong’o 1986), to fight the colony within, the colony in us, the colony as us, to resur-
rect ourselves from the “cemetery of mind” (Marechera 1992).
It is therefore appropriate to start with Masolo, who in chapter 1 offers the inviting prov-
ocation that Africa’s indigenous knowledge systems have stagnated. There was a bright past 
indeed, but the light has dimmed; Africans have lost their self-image as innovators and are 
mere consumers. He wonders whether a reversal of “this culture of self-mortification” (treat-
ing ourselves as if we were dead) is possible, how, and against what obstacles. The most spec-
tacular such example of self-mortification comes from the Nigerian scholar Abiola Irele 
(1983, 3; republished as Irele 1992), who said that the only future for Africa lies in turning 
toward and following Western culture and civilization: “It is of no practical significance now 
to us to be told that our forefathers constructed the Pyramids if today we can’t build and 
maintain by ourselves the roads and bridges we require to facilitate communication between 
ourselves, if we still have to depend on the alien to provide us for necessities of modern civ-
ilization, and if we can’t bring the required level of efficiency and imagination to the man-
agement of our environment.” Macien Towa (1971, 1979) is another prime mover of this 
view. Irele’s critics are justified in rejecting a total capitulation of African culture to Western 
values, because nobody can foretell what identity might emerge. They instead urge Africans 
to take all the positives they can get from outside, while maximizing the strengths of their 
own innovations (e.g., Gyekye 1997; Falola 2008; Wiredu 2000).
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Masolo traces the problem of self-mortification to the informalization and trivialization of 
indigenous knowledge during the colonial moment and since then to something extracurric-
ular to the “new and important” knowledge that Europeans introduced. The colonial school 
became the venue and source of knowledge, whereas home became simply a domestic space 
winnowed of any capacity to produce true knowledge. There were formed two worlds: one 
self-styling itself as the producer of secular, natural, or true knowledge (Western) while dis-
missing the other (the rest) as a world of myths, superstitions, and falsehoods. Those like 
Paulin Hountondji (1996) who saw myth as abstraction dismissed indigenous thought as 
philosophy on the basis that it was stagnant, communally produced, and anonymous, the 
antithesis of proper philosophy. As Masolo notes, Hountondji (2009a) no longer sees indige-
nous knowledge systems as stagnant and calls for accounting for change and continuity in 
African practices and modes of knowledge production. For his part, Masolo cites at least two 
poignant examples—the Maasai and their spear and Egyptian mummification—to illustrate 
what is scientific and technological about African systems of thought and practices and 
according to whom. Both are examples of myths and spirituality as abstractions and anchors, 
inspirations, drivers, and structures of scientific reason, illustrations of “the curiosity of the 
human mind” and the dynamism and adaptability of African modes of knowledge and mate-
rial production.
I explore this interlocking of spirituality, communality, innovation, and knowledge pro-
duction in chapter 2 on chimurenga, the arts of war derived from Murenga, or Mwari, god 
of vedzimbahwe (or “Shona” people) of Zimbabwe. I show that chimurenga is an innovative 
transformation of surroundings (caves, mountains, rivers, pools, valleys, forests, animals, 
and trees) into military assets and infrastructure, with or without physical modification. Pre-
vious studies reduce chimurenga to two historical events: the anticolonial wars of 1896–1897 
and of the 1970s. Instead, I see chimurenga as a time-transcendent philosophy of security 
dating back to the migrations of vedzimbahwe from the North into Southern Africa. Chimurenga 
is one of many indigenous spaces from which to make critical interventions into the ques-
tion of the scientific, the technological, and the innovative, from which African reasons and 
reasoning do not have to be true or false according to outsiders’ standards but must be valid 
on their own merits. I explore the creative labors relating specifically to biological and chem-
ical warfare, which serve as exemplars of a spiritually anchored and inspired creativity. 
Through chimurenga, the everyday or day to day (zuva nezuva) becomes a vast laboratory (site 
of creative labors), with ordinary people (vanhuwo zvavo) as experimenters and intellectuals 
in ways specific to their needs and desires and ordinariness no longer equated with 
simpleton-hood but a normal state of things.
Shadreck Chirikure extends this conversation to African metallurgy in chapter 3, ques-
tioning why Africa should be tethered to a Western idea of a laboratory as a built-in space, 
which undergirds understandings of STI. Such Western-centric conception marginalizes 
other sites of knowledge production in regions of the Global South such as Africa. Chirikure 
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casts precolonial African “laboratories” as places of work, experimentation, and improvisa-
tion. Contrary to Western notions of the laboratory, Africa’s were not fixed-site installations 
but included various nodes from “the homestead to the forest, from the cultural to the nat-
ural, and from the living to the dead.” Chirikure shows that “sites of knowledge production 
were transient and never fixed on one point,” fluid not just spatially but also in their techni-
cal and symbolic practices. Metal- and pottery-making sites in particular were “laboratories 
without buildings.” Being temporary allows flexibility and experimentation in terms of fur-
nace design and energy availability across different regions and time spans. With pottery, 
Chirikure proposes the idea of the homestead as a laboratory, involving the use of clay to 
form objects according to required shapes and heating them to high temperatures. This pro-
cess removed water and increased strength. Metal-making was a male vocation, but 
pottery-making was exclusive to women and could be done indoors to ensure the right 
degree of heat or cold and the right air or wind conditions, thus preventing cracking. Collec-
tion, mixing, molding, drying, firing, and polishing are described in meticulous detail, with 
hints toward the taboos that governed practice.
Geri Augusto’s chapter 4 extends the conversation beyond the physical shores of Africa, 
emphasizing the role of enslaved Africans not only as STI transferors but also as innovators 
acting upon this carried knowledge, synthesizing it with knowledge found in the “New 
World” and creating something entirely new. Augusto points out that the growing literature 
does not treat the knowledge of enslaved Africans and their descendants as “an integral part 
of a truly globalized history of science and technology.” As she says, there must be room to 
treat human societies and knowledges as “coeval without having to be judged commensu-
rate,” a “different history of science and technology, emphasizing what was creative, inven-
tive, and put together differently.” The effort it takes the enslaved to rehumanize themselves 
after the slaver has relegated them to positions as nonhumans incapable of thought—and 
thus not technological but the technology themselves—is one of the most poignant exam-
ples of innovation in human existence. Thus, through what she calls plants of bondage, 
Augusto returns to enslavement and colonialism with a focus not merely on the sweat, blood, 
and tears of the enslaved and the colonized, but the enterprise and inventiveness that is 
required to keep “body and soul together” under circumstances that are supposed to rip one 
apart from the other. Indeed, one can extend this perspective to the present and turn upside 
down the negative portrait of Africa as riven with crises—disease, poverty, wars—and, wher-
ever they exist, look at how people innovate survival.
Located in the present, Katrien Pype’s chapter 5 on Kinshasa speaks to that very dynamic. 
Like Mavhunga and Augusto, Pype draws her definitions of innovation from indigenous Afri-
can words, in her case kosikola, “to innovate” in Lingala, the dominant language of ba Kinois, 
the inhabitants of Kinshasa, DR Congo’s capital. Kosikola also translates into “to choose” and 
“to deliver” from evil spirits, suggesting that innovation derives from the spirits; it is spiritual 
knowledge. Thus, “to know” is also koyeba or kozala na mayele, “to be with knowledge” or 
“wisdom” (hence smartness) derived from experience rather than formal schooling. Kozala 
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na mayele becomes a theoretical standpoint to challenge most studies casting smart cities as 
out of place in Africa and as outcomes of Western technology transfer and African use. On 
the contrary, there are other way of being smart that Western-centric scholarship does not 
cover. Thus, Pype proposes to approach “smartness” from below, as ba Kinois see it, and 
addresses their ways of being innovative and technological in this bustling Africa city. Smart-
ness is the capability of one who is possessed by a nkisi ndoki (an ancestral or wandering spirit) 
and therefore a ndoki, one who practices not just witchcraft or kunda (sorcery), performing 
either malevolent magic (kindoki kia dia, usually by night) or benevolent magic (kindoki kia 
lunda, by day). Incoming things like motorcars, airplanes, kitchen robots, mobile phones, 
and computers, Pype shows, are all examples of what ba Kinois call kindoki ya mindele (“witch-
craft of the white men”), distinct from kindoki ya biso (our witchcraft). The white man’s 
witchcraft is subjected successfully to “our witchcraft.”
The propensity of indigenous traditions to adapt to new circumstances so that they are 
part of the equation of everyday life today is illustrated clearly in Ron Eglash and Ellen K. 
Foster’s chapter 6. Although there are many makerspaces in America, Eglash and Foster focus 
on their African counterparts, which continue to multiply and gain popularity across the 
continent. They are locally and culturally situated, their fixer mentality deeply indigenous in 
its orientation, as opposed to simply aping European or American maker cultures. The 
authors cite Senegal’s Colobane market and the collective ethos deeply embedded in spiritu-
ality; “fixing” is a power given by God himself to the Senegalese people, according to one 
maker. Meanwhile, in Ghana, street vendors sell new wares while also fixing cell phones, 
printers, and other electronics with complex circuitry. “They learn their highly refined skills 
through attachments (or internships),” Eglash and Foster say, with the goal of owning their 
own shops. They creatively reuse what is otherwise waste: “They are simultaneously pulling 
the warp of innovation geared toward the future while also weaving in the weft of repair 
practices already deeply entrenched in their cultures.” In Lagos, the hackerspace WoeLab is 
now renowned worldwide for creating a 3-D printer out of e-waste, and in downtown Accra 
creative makers meet up and work on their projects in the shared tools, shared space called 
iSpace. These are just a few of several examples of Africa engaged in creative work at the 
interface between indigenous traditions and incoming (often invited) things and ideas. 
Eglash and Foster end where they began: by urging Africa to look into itself for inspiration 
instead of taking the easy road of importing other people’s cultural values.
In chapter 7, Toluwalogo Odumosu asks how, in spite of the self-disadvantaging legal 
framework Africa has imposed upon itself, Africa’s citizens are still able to make mobile tech-
nology African. “Can we recognize the African mobile as distinctly African? And if so, what 
is the nature of its sociotechnical assemblage?” he wonders. “What does it mean to examine 
how mobiles are being made African?” In answer, he says that Africans are not appropriating 
merely to use and throw away without adding anything, but are engaged in what he 
calls constitutive appropriation, wherein the act of appropriating is simultaneously one of con-
stituting something into being. Besides the amazing point-of-use innovation that goes 
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hand-in-hand with mastery of the lingo and the artifacts and services it denotes, Odumosu 
speaks to the reality that in most parts of Africa no “wired” telephone infrastructure even 
existed to prelude the “wireless.” Thus, the celebration of Africa as having skipped wiring 
(technological leapfrogging) en route to wireless assumes this was a deliberate choice and is 
based on the privileging of the experiences of wealthy countries. Nigerian engineers were not 
simply “rolling out” universally operative systems but “determined that a fully functional 
Nigerian network has to take into account real users and their particular use practices.” Only 
after that could they engineer a Nigerian mobile. The lesson? “New challenges and practices 
inspire new designs and innovative solutions (overdimensioning) that are then folded into the 
upstream design process in tangible and substantial ways.”
Garrick E. Louis, Neda Nazemi, and Scott Remer mount a robust critique of Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) and multiple other innovation and development programs that 
depend on official development assistance without accountability to Africans in chapter 8. 
Such foreign aid benefits Western think tanks, banks, NGOs, farmers, and transport compa-
nies, and, in the case of the United States, such foundations to “help” Africa are actually 
hygienic projects that help ex-presidents clean up their images in the eyes of the American 
people. Deploying what they call an innovation for development approach, the authors settle 
on a simplified definition of innovation as “the creation or enhancement of artifacts to 
improve the human condition.” Africa must establish an innovation strategy that “builds 
upon and leverages domestic capacity.” In that way, official development aid (ODA) could be 
synthesized with these local repertoires and resources to build an Africa-defined, Africa-driven, 
and Africa-benefiting strategy. The authors thus propose a two-part strategy for national 
development that prioritizes basic human needs (a la Maslow) as prerequisites for building 
capability for secondary and other higher-order needs. This commonsense approach holds 
that “it is not possible to sustain higher-order development processes like manufacturing 
without reliable basic services, such as water and sanitation.” Can’t we do both, one may ask? 
The danger lies in possibly stretching resources too thin and playing to Africa’s weaknesses, 
not its strengths, others say.
The authors make a powerful case for Africans not only as innovative originators of things 
from scratch. They seek to show the centrality of human needs—the basic ones any human 
being or living organism cannot do without—and the kind of means and ways Africans seek 
and deploy to meet these needs. It is here that the authors bring in innovation as strategic 
targeting of potentially resourceful things “out there” that can be deployed locally to answer 
these needs. The lazy or arrogant analyst may view such strategic targeting and deployment 
as merely “use” or even user innovation, when in fact, viewed from Africa, it constitutes a 
fecund scene of originality. In other words, the authors are saying that innovation developed 
outside Africa or by non-Africans can, in the innovative hands and minds of Africans (pro-
vided they are given the space), contribute to the betterment of living conditions and facili-
tate other forms of innovation in Africa by Africans. Another way of putting this is that when 
Africans speak of Marx, Maslow, Kuhn, or Einstein or use a smartphone, computer, or drone, 
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analysis misses the point when it only marvels at what these things are doing that makes 
them technological (problem-solving instruments) in their specific African contexts. Instead, 
the most important and beneficial question to consider both for Africans and outsiders look-
ing in is this: What are Africans doing to, with, and through these things? This is a strategic 
targeting and deployment question. It has to be asked, especially as a means test for investing 
intellect, time, and money in Africa, and, more importantly, it is a question that Africans 
themselves need to ask whenever the continent’s policymakers look outward for potential 
algorithms to address local problems.
Chux Daniels’s chapter 9 closes the book with sobering reflections on official approaches 
to STI policies in Africa. How is it that an R&D-centric approach can be allowed to guide STI 
policy in a continent “in which empirical evidence shows that substantial innovation activ-
ities occur in the informal economy and significant indigenous knowledge resides in the 
traditional and rural settings?” Daniels asks. In doing so, he returns us to Masolo’s explora-
tion of the origins of the European colonizer’s school as “true knowledge” and the homefront 
as an informalized, even knowledgeless space. He calls for a reconceptualization and expan-
sion of STI to account for “the larger variety of innovative activity in Africa and to address 
social needs peculiar to the continent.” This is an urgent task if the “basic needs” that chapter 
8 maps are going to be met. Pan-continental bodies like the African Ministerial Council on 
Science and Technology (AMCOST) and the mother body, the African Union (AU), recognize 
the need for STI as a driver of development, but their borrowed definitions of STI are too 
narrow. How does one exclude street vendors in any narrative of innovation in Africa, for 
example, when they are a feature of every city on the continent? How can one possibly 
exclude Nollywood from Nigeria’s innovation when it is the fastest-growing economic sector 
and industry? To illustrate just how Western-centric African measures of STI are, Kenya’s 
M-Pesa is always cited as an example because it is “S&T-based, technology-driven, and 
prompts product innovation.” As Daniels sees it, wherever possible, Africa must be willing to 
chart a different STI and development trajectory and devise its own measurement, rather 
than slavishly following the Oslo or Frascati manuals, which Latin American countries have 
left behind in favor of their own Bogota manual.
The reader is invited to explore what we believe is the beginning of a long walk to the 
freedom to think from a different place about concepts that we often take for granted and 
generate new meanings. We no longer look merely at proposing a new perspective to pro-
mote a new perception of Africa, but explore African self-perception as a compass from which 
to plot new futures—futures that are already happening. We just need to open our eyes to 
see them.

1
The Place of Science and Technology in Our Lives:  
Making Sense of Possibilities
D. A. Masolo
Those of us who have the relative advantage of age will remember that in the early years of 
formal school in Africa we were taught a subject under the general rubric of “domestic arti-
sanry,” in which we were taught to carve cooking sticks and to weave baskets and other little 
utility tools familiar to all of us from their regular household uses. These lessons were regu-
larly taught at a time in the school day calendar when it was considered that the “important” 
subjects, such as math, English, European history, and European literature, had been learned. 
“Domestic artisanry” was taught alongside the vernacular, and both soon gave way as the 
number or depth of “important” disciplines became more demanding. The temporal and 
incremental trajectory of the separation between the local and the “new and important” 
knowledge became a visible process of mental and finally also social “dépaysement.” Home 
and school gradually became two vastly different worlds: one ruled by important knowledge 
about a world that was distant physically, socially, and theoretically and the other by an array 
of knowledge regarded to be simple and domestic. The disconnect between these two realms 
has defined how many of us have grown to classify knowledge, claiming sometimes that 
indeed they are and ought to be kept apart. The recent controversy over the concept of eth-
nophilosophy or whether the indigenous can incubate and produce philosophy stems at least 
in significant part from the heredity of this dichotomization between domestic and simple 
on the one hand and new and sophisticated on the other. One needs a quantum leap to 
transition from the former to the latter.
In his controversial essay “Le Décollage conceptuel: conditions d’une philosophie ban-
toue” (1965), Franz Crahay suggested as much—that in order to transition to philosophy, 
African thought required a takeoff or aerial lift from the mundane and familiar realm of 
myth to a flight into the higher echelons of abstraction. Whether in philosophy or in the 
everyday making of tools and other forms of transforming the material world, knowledge is 
a mental characterization of the sense and usefulness of the familiar for the management of 
the complex world value. From a pragmatic point of view, mind is an extension of nature; 
hence, its growth is commensurate with the exigencies of adjustment to the variety and 
changing character of the environment. In other words, mind is always part of place. Hence, 
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in a significant correction of Crahay, while remaining faithful to keeping the “indigenous” 
and the “scientific” separate in the ensuing pejorative characterization of ethnophilosophy, 
Paulin Hountondji rightly pointed out that myths are already forms of abstraction—
suggesting that the difference between the philosophical and the nonphilosophical had to be 
sought elsewhere other than in differences between abstraction and nonabstraction. That is, 
thought of any kind, including the construction of myth, is always an abstraction (Houn-
tondji 1970). Hountondji’s charge, in turn, was that indigenous modes of thought were not 
philosophical for two major reasons: First, philosophy is a mode of thought that is individu-
ally owned, which is quite distinct from the anonymous and shared beliefs of ethnic commu-
nities as exposed only in the works of the authors who describe them. Second, and perhaps 
even more importantly, philosophy is a body of knowledge that is driven solely by critical 
considerations of thought. Due to this second characteristic, philosophy is a kind of thought 
that is always changing, meaning it is expanding and growing in understanding, and this 
implies that philosophy is about thought, and therefore general—it supersedes communal 
acceptance—in its character.
In the years subsequent to the Crahay-Hountondji debate over the philosophical rele-
vance of indigenous modes of thought, and as the idea of modernity and its relation to 
indigenous knowledge systems grew, the debate over ethnophilosophy extended beyond 
philosophy. Despite sharp opposition, Hountondji’s point about growth driven by critique as 
the character of philosophical knowledge has spawned new critical considerations of the 
nature of knowledge at indigenous levels. As intimated earlier, the fresh looks pose critical 
questions, including whether or not indigenous knowledge systems lack capacity for innova-
tion and growth or whether, as brought into question in the idioms of the separation between 
the domain of modern school and that of home, indigenous knowledge has any place in 
contemporary society.
Indigenous Knowledge and Innovation
More recently, Hountondji (2009b) has softened his critique of indigenous knowledge sys-
tems as stagnant, perhaps realizing that no human knowledge bears that description. From a 
purely pragmatic view, toward which his recent stand has shifted, the human mind as an 
adaptive tool transforms commensurably with the transformations in the rest of nature 
around it, thus suggesting a plurality of applications to varieties of contexts in the place of a 
universalistic and conservative notion of truth, such as is espoused in the mid-twentieth-cen-
tury analytic tradition (Hountondji 2009b, 13–15). Not only do people adjust their principles 
of rights in relation to changing circumstances of availability of resources, they also adjust 
them in relation to changing conditions of foreign relations, meaning that when encounters 
with people from other ethnicities or distant lands occur, they demand redrawing of bound-
aries to allow access to basic resources like water for pastoralists. Settlement of such issues 
may not always come easily, nor does it occur quickly enough for all involved, but it does 
occur as part of social dynamics. Continued land or boundary reclamations and sometimes 
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conflicts around the continent are some of the indications of matters not settled by past 
agreements, at least not to the satisfaction of everyone affected. In light of these and other 
considerations, Hountondji now thinks that the more enlightening approach to understand-
ing indigenous knowledge is to ask how today differs from yesterday, meaning the past in 
general, or how the manner of doing things today differs from how they were done 
yesterday—meaning in the past, the ever-recessing dimension of time.
Here is an example: The Maasai, the proud pastoralist people who inhabit the plains of 
East Africa (southern Kenya and northern mainland Tanzania), are admired for, among other 
things, some of their material cultural possessions, especially the spear that most adult men 
carry almost ubiquitously. The spear is the symbol of adulthood among the Maasai and is a 
major protective weapon. Although the spear is a widely used tool across Africa, the Maasai 
spear occupies a special place by itself for its fame. The most famous among an assortment of 
types (see figure 1.1) is the variety known as the “Lion spear” (figure 1.2), and a well-made 
Figure 1.1
A display of Maasai spear designs. The first three on the left are the everyday spears that the Moran 
(warriors) and elders carry at all times. The rest are different ceremonial spears designed for different age 
groups. The last two on the right are generally carried by elders, while the long-bladed ones in the middle 
are carried by younger adults.
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one is a visual beauty. On one end is a double-sided, shiny, razor-sharp blade that usually 
measures at least three feet long and about two inches wide. It is both decorative and func-
tional (figure 1.3). It is mounted on a wooden handle measuring between one and one and a 
half feet long, and on the end opposite the blade a differently shaped spear of roughly the 
same length as the blade is mounted, but with a long, round, and pointed end.
The Maasai have not always had this variety of spear. Historians and archeologists date its 
appearance to the mid-twentieth century or perhaps a little earlier. One would be led to 
believe from this dating that its appearance coincided with the sudden abundance of iron 
and other metals as a result of building the East African railway lines across Kenya and main-
land Tanganyika during this period. Thus, although the Maasai had probably limited the 
production of spears and other metal-based tools to cultural needs, relative excess of avail-
ability of iron—usually obtained in raids on the field depots of the railway-building 
company—drove many a smith’s imagination to new and innovative styles that became 
symbols of status in the community. The uses of these aesthetically rather than functionally 
driven objects became part of the occasional or periodic social gatherings at which individu-
als showed off what they could afford as a result of their large holdings of cattle.
Maasai culture has been especially exposed to tourist observation as well as commodifica-
tion, partly due to Maasai territorial habitation of lands that generally border some of Africa’s 
plains rich in wide-ranging wildlife. Cordoned off as national game-viewing national parks, 
the status of these vast territories as tourist destinations has exposed Maasai culture to tour-
ists who have to pass through Maasai manyattas (homes or villages) en route to the parks. 
This exposure and the foreigners’ curiosity that accompanies it has pushed Maasai smiths to 
Figure 1.2
The ceremonial spear with a short handle in the middle, a long blade on the one end, and a long, sharp 
rounded other side.
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produce partly for the relatively lucrative tourist market. This, argues Sidney Littlefield Kasfir 
(2007), is only one aspect of the constant variation of the Maasai spear design that reflects 
the generational succession of age groups and the egalitarian set the specific design symbol-
izes and also distinguishes them by rank (younger or older) from other age groups. Her point 
applies more to the functional rather than the decorative (Lion) spear. Also, her study ana-
lyzes the spear tradition among the Samburu, a more northern (Mount Kenya) group that is 
also a Maa-speaking group related to the group conventionally referred to as Maasai to the 
south. For most practically comparative purposes, except in dialect and other details 
Figure 1.3
A young adult from the Elgon Maasai community along the western Kenyan border in ceremonial gear. 
He is holding the ceremonial spear and a decorated buffalo hide shield, and he wears special ceremonial 
headgear.
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unnoticeable to the outsider, Samburu and Maasai are nearly identical, including in their 
spear traditions.
The making and social role (age grading) of the spear among the Maa-speaking peoples of 
East Africa are marks of ideas central to the general concept of innovation related to material 
culture. Because it is constantly modified to suit the role of symbolizing time and social iden-
tity of different age-based subgroups, the Maasai spear evinces innovative imagination across 
time in the ethnic history of the Maasai. Beyond this, the dynamics in the design appear-
ances and variations evince the presence of communal concurrence following possibly pro-
tracted debates on design choices that do not repeat the past. In other words, the process 
involves a dialogue between individual citizens whose proposals are critically discussed on 
the way toward a selection that reflects agreement on a communal identity in its transition 
through time.
But the drawing of the symbols of a collective historical progression is not the only factor 
that stands out in the example of the Maasai spear stylistics and design. In addition to the 
imaginations and symbolizations of time, the management of the history of the spear in its 
relation to the history of the community is built on the sustainability of the process itself. 
Driven by an endogenous sense of value and of goals, the community marshals available 
resources, or seeks their supply, in service of their endogenously defined goals. In other 
words, because the goals are not imposed from the outside, they can be managed—changed, 
modified—from within the community itself based on the prevailing circumstances and 
challenges of any time.
It would be misleading to suggest that the view of the spear as depicted thus far is not 
without its own discontent. Like every tool, the spear or the notion of technology in its gen-
eral sense is created to reflect a society’s more complex view of value, within which the valu-
ation and focus given to a specific object finds its own position in the complete puzzle of 
things. Not only am I trying to say here that technology is not amoral, I am also saying that 
the morals under which a technological implement finds its acceptance are neither necessar-
ily nor always unquestionable. The Maasai, for example, are a male-dominated society in 
which the image of society is designed to appear through the image of its male members. 
Women do not handle the spear—something that applies to most spear-wielding communi-
ties across the continent—the most important and visible symbol of the community’s public 
identity. Through an intricately defined curriculum vitae, the male is expected to go through 
stages that will finally lead him to be proclaimed a moran (warrior) of his community. This is 
the ultimate goal and image of every Maasai male child; it is the social rank he aspires to. A 
moran is expected to be fit and fierce, the ultimate protector or defender of the manyatta and 
finally the entire community. Carrying a spear (for adult males) and a round-headed wooden 
rungu (club) completes the outward appearance of a Maasai male, and every male child grows 
up learning and absorbing the values of these characteristics—that they represent the secu-
rity and integrity of the manyatta and community at large. Their collective duty is to protect 
their people and their sacred possessions—the cattle. Given the predator-infested nature of 
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their traditional territory, it is the duty of Maasai morans to take their cattle to pastures, and 
there was a time when killing a lion was part of a boys’ rite of passage to mark entry into 
adulthood or rank of moran. This resolute sense of identity has made it possible for members 
of the Maasai community to proudly withstand the influences of newcomers while the unity 
that it spawns made it possible for the Maasai to ward off any challenges of the more numer-
ous neighboring communities.
By contrast, Maasai women, trusting their sense of safety to the unquestioned loyalty of 
the men to the integrity and values of their community, need to carry no more than a stick 
with which to shoo goats or other young domestic animals (sheep, calves, etc.) in a desired 
direction or to shoo a snake during an undesired encounter. The duties of women include the 
construction and taking care of the manyatta as well as taking care of other domestic needs, 
such as fetching water and firewood. As issues related to gender parity or disparity in how 
access to resources and distribution of roles and responsibility in society have risen and dom-
inated how people analyze and assess social progress as a global discourse, they have influ-
enced an increase in Maasai women’s participation in socially visible activities, including 
serving in roles that include participation in local and national leadership and in profes-
sional fields.
The case of the Maasai serves two purposes here: First, it provides a path to understanding 
an important aspect of the Maasai’s material culture independently as it relates to innovation 
understood as a constant modification of tools. Second, it serves as a microwindow for 
identifying, on a more general and broader scale of development and planning goals, what 
African governments have persistently failed to appreciate and do—that the everyday per-
son, the ordinary folks, both understand technology and know selectively what kind of tech-
nology can be positively incorporated into their value systems. The Maasai, and any or all 
other peoples or communities who use art or other form of product as markers of specific 
information in social history and structural arrangements, have shown, as evidenced by the 
history of their use and constant modification of technology, that they are capable of answer-
ing the question of what it means for anything to be good. However, governments mandate 
policies that work with imported concepts of development that are implemented on a 
top-down basis with little or no input by those to be affected by the specific program imple-
mentations. Also, the government places itself into a position as a victim of the proverbial 
saying that “the person who holds the bone controls the dog’s tail wagging and drooling.” 
The dependence of African governments on foreign donors for aid or capital reduces the 
degree of their autonomy in defining and paving their own development agenda. As a result, 
African governments have failed to be innovative in their definitions and approaches to 
development as they are restricted to following the agenda as set by the international lending 
institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, or by the single lend-
ing governments in bilateral lending/borrowing agreements. The result is that African paths 
to development imitate those of the West irrespective of their relevance to the needs of Afri-
can peoples.
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Going back to the beginning of this narrative and the idiomatic but also historically real 
separation between a modern world represented by the school and its cognitive world on the 
one hand and the world of home that is quickly relegated to the rank of irrelevance and triv-
iality on the other, one sees an important explanation—albeit one among possibly many 
others—for why African governments persistently struggle to define and consequently fail to 
achieve development goals. To be more precise, unlike the Maasai, they pursue what they 
have not defined and often have no endogenous visions and means to attain them. By con-
trast, innovation is borne of freely thinking citizens who, as part of their own communities, 
identify with the values, directional goals, and challenges and struggles that stand as obsta-
cles to these ends. In other words, innovation comes out of different levels of participatory 
discourse about prevailing needs and about available local human and material capacity to 
tackle them. Innovation is not about breaking Guinness records; it is about novel means to 
tackle persistent problems as they affect all (local, national, or, where applicable, regional) 
levels of community and its projections. The Maasai’s relative resistance to the influence of 
“foreign” values is a living example.
Africans’ adaptation of the cell phone into their social world is a much-discussed example 
of adaptation of technology. Innovation does not equate to invention. Ingenuity includes 
intellectual perceptivity that allows one to see possible adaptations of a tool already in exis-
tence elsewhere, and Africans’ use of the cell phone to sustain and better manage what was 
once referred to by critics of Africans’ belief in or practice of distribution of wealth among 
members of extended families as part of “taking care of each other as based on no other fac-
tor than ‘love thy kin’” is an excellent example. I first heard and witnessed telephone bank-
ing among villagers in my home country of Kenya long before it became a feature of cell 
phone use in America. Terminology like M-Pesa, Sambaza, and much more I have not been 
able to catch up with signals innovative transformations and adaptations of technological 
tools built elsewhere but given completely new, different, and culture-specific uses. In these 
and other senses, the cell phone has become an African technological tool. Most Kenyans, 
including my octogenarian mother who can neither read sentences nor write (but who is an 
excellent historian and mathematician and serves as the treasurer of the several village wom-
en’s organizations she belongs to), perform almost all of their financial transactions via cell 
phone, including payment of bills, local and international money transfers, and making 
purchases in the marketplace. From this cultural perspective, foreign is an originatory adjec-
tive that describes non-Maasai origin, even if a value so described is from a neighboring 
ethnic community.
The Egyptian Mummification Saga
Innovation is spawned by the needs and imaginations of the world. We all know the origins 
of what has become one of the most widely practiced funerary rituals outside Muslim 
burials—namely, embalmment of a dead body. The uncontested origins of this 
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contemporary science are to be found in the ancient Egyptian myth of the “other world” to 
which people were believed to cross once their time in this one ended. Either because 
ancient Egyptians believed that one had to be prepared for this journey in meticulous detail 
over several days or because funeral rites took so long that the body would decompose 
rather fast while exposed to high heat of the sun and be odorous to mourners, the body was 
“cleaned” of the organs and entrails that produced fluids and caused stench. In addition, the 
body was treated with natron, which dried it to such levels that decomposition was delayed 
for a long time. It is still not clear to scientists exactly how ancient Egyptians discovered 
natron, but it is no surprise that the exigencies of culture must have led to a search for a 
solution, and it does not matter whether it was a concoction arrived at by accident or an 
imported item from a distant land. Elsewhere, wherever it may have been procured from, it 
did not have an impact similar to the one it had on ancient Egyptians and their culture. The 
peoples who inhabit the region adjoining Lake Natron along the western border of main-
land Tanzania do not show any records of practicing embalmment despite the saturation 
of this chemical in the lake. In any event, the history of Egyptian mummification predated 
the migration and settlement of the current inhabitants around Lake Natron by several 
millennia.
In a recent, spectacular publication (African Cosmos, Stellar Arts), Christine Mullen Kreamer, 
deputy director and chief curator of the National Museum of African Art at the Smithsonian 
Institution, captures a glowing synthesis and interaction of African cultural astronomy and 
the arts as a contributing part of the long history of the human endeavor in the creation and 
sharing of knowledge (Kraemer 2012). As Johnnetta B. Cole, director of the National Museum 
of African Art at the Smithsonian Institution, states in her foreword to the book, Kreamer’s 
“passionate commitment to the peoples and cultures of Africa and an understanding that 
works of art dating from ancient to contemporary times are powerful vehicles for engaging 
scholars, connoisseurs, and the general public in understanding Africa’s role in the produc-
tion of knowledge as part of global intellectual history” (Cole 2012, 8).
Long before the refinement and practice of theoretical reason as we know it today, African 
societies, like most human groups around the world, already had embedded in their cultures 
expressions of their relationship with reality: with the stars in the firmament above, with the 
material world around them, and with what they understood to be the mediating connec-
tions between these polar points of reality and how their own situations figured within the 
expanse. They had narratives to account for duration, such as sizing themselves up against 
the material world that appeared not to change as fast as their own relatively short lives. 
These narratives often include accounts of origin, of the meaning of being in the midst of a 
vast world, and of the human transitions between them.
Thus, myths and imaginings about the cosmos make up some of the most fascinating and 
inspiring indicators of the curiosity of the human mind. Noting the shifting positions of 
heavenly bodies above and relating them to climatic changes in their own worlds, commu-
nities learned to use these relational events to regulate their own travel and their agricultural 
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and ritual practices. To this extent, cultural astronomy traverses multiple domains of life: 
science in seasonal planning in relation to economic production; religion in relation to ritu-
als aimed at acknowledging and honoring the deities who are sometimes associated with the 
powers and significance attributed to some celestial bodies and their believed causal relations 
with the cycles of life and (re)production; the expressive cultures in the visual and perform-
ing arts as humans symbolize in sculpture and adornment or reenact and celebrate their 
relations with the deities, through mask and dance, respectively.
As is more discernible from the treatment of the dead, including choice of place and 
modality of interment, than from oral or written treatises on human nature, the idea of the 
meaning or purpose of human life is a crucial subject of early human thought. However the 
deity was conceived, these seminal thoughts of humankind led to other ideas, not only about 
the nature of the deity itself, but also about the implications of recognizing its existence and 
relations with humankind. Ideas erupted in human imagination, especially about social 
order, about moral codes through which humans would regulate their conduct not only with 
each other but also with the deity itself and with the world at large.
Observation of the regularity of death and inferring its inevitability for biological organ-
isms led humans to questions about the end, especially for humans; for example, think of a 
curious child talking to her mom by the fireplace a few days after her sibling, Aloo, dies. 
Oblivious of the pain engulfing her grieving family, she poses the question: “Mother, where 
do people go when they die?” “They go very far,” the mother responds, hoping the little 
child will stop. But she goes on: “Can I also go there? And will you too? Why do people have 
to go there? Why can’t they just stay here? And why did Aloo not go there? Will Aloo come 
back?” To the last two questions, the mother answers, first with some difficulty, “No, people 
don’t come back after they go there; it is too far.” And then, with her own question, the 
mother asks the child: “And how do you know she didn’t go there?” The response: “Because 
she was buried in that large hole in the back of our home. I don’t want to go!” To avoid fur-
ther suffering the pain of a mother’s grief, the mother gets up and starts to busy herself with 
ensuring that all the chickens have come in as night falls.
Out of innocence, the little girl has asked the big questions adults have never been able to 
provide satisfactory answers for, at least not yet, or not conclusively enough to stop their 
asking. Ideas in human imagination have often led to or justified specific religious, social, 
and moral practices and the making of artifacts around where humans live. The handling of 
the bodies of the dead, the places of burial, types of grave, adornment of grave interiors, the 
coverings over them, and how the surroundings of the graves are kept all depend on how 
people define human beings and their lives, and what death and the afterlife mean. Archeo-
logical digs and scholarship have revealed the depth of human imagination in the realm of 
life and immortality, and no group surpasses the Egyptian people of antiquity and their rich 
civilization when it comes to the mix of science and religion in the futuristic projection of 
life beyond its worldly limitations and shortfalls. As if to give answers to the questions of the 
inquisitive fictional child discussed earlier, ancient Egyptians were believers in human 
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immortality—not just in spiritual terms, as came to constitute the core of Christian faith and 
philosophy, but immortality of the complete human being, almost as she or he had existed 
in this world.
Among the questions that remain vaguely treated by believers of immortality is whether 
the dead retain or shed the social status they had in their worldly lives. The trichamber edi-
fice erected in Christian imagery reflected a belief in the capacity of embodied life to affect 
the purity of the soul as a sign of obedience to God, thus determining where one’s soul went 
after the death of the body or the termination of the worldly life and ultimately following 
the final judgment. Like Christians, Muslims believe in God’s creation of seven heavens, of 
which the Garden of Eden is the highest, or Paradise. For both systems, this is where God 
placed Adam and Eve, the primal ancestors of humans in their respective cosmologies. In 
both systems, transgression of God’s commands by humans or their ancestors occasion the 
onset of evil to which humans become susceptible. God’s messengers over time culminate in 
one chief messenger, whose teachings become ultimate and second to none but those of 
God. To Christians, this messenger is the Son of God himself, Christ or Savior. To Muslims, it 
is Mohammed, the Chief Prophet. At the end of time, there is resurrection of the dead and a 
final judgment for the living and the dead. Those judged good in the eyes of God go to 
Heaven, whereas the wicked descend to Hell. Henceforth, each group endures its fate for 
eternity.
Long before the Christian and Islamic traditions and probably like people in other civili-
zations, Egyptians thought of otherworldly life as reflective of one’s status in this life, so they 
prepared the bodies of the dead in accordance to what they believed would fit their needs in 
the next life, commensurate with their social status in this life. They held their kings, histor-
ically known as the pharaohs, in the highest regard among humans. They gave these rulers 
special attention in death as they had done in life. The imaginations of ancient people 
regarding the transitions between earthly and other life played crucial roles in how ancient 
Egyptians designed, constructed, and adorned tombs in line with a dead person’s rank in his 
or her social life.
As modern archeology shows, preservation of bodies under natural conditions has 
occurred in many parts of the world where favorable climatic and other nondestructive con-
ditions allowed, and this may have been the case in Egypt too in some respect (Dunand and 
Lichtenberg 2006). Contemporary fascination with body preservation in ancient Egypt exists 
because it was a deliberate process linked to a cultural cosmology that regarded the cosmos 
as a span of transitions in which humans were believed to transition from one province to 
another in as lifelike an appearance as was possible. The practice of body preservation sounds 
even more spectacular when considered as a process that was aimed at providing an alterna-
tive form of preservation to the effects of the warm sand. It has been suggested that deeper 
graves and underground chambers were adopted to counter exhumation by wild animals 
and grave raiders, thus leading to the use of embalmment methods to preserve bodies at the 
greater and chambered depths. The result, says Robert B. Partridge, is that “we can look 
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directly into the actual faces of the long-dead Ancient Egyptians. We can learn a great deal 
from their bodies about how they lived, what diseases and ailments they suffered during life 
and sometimes how they died” (Partridge 1994, 1). In addition, with modern medical inves-
tigative technology like the X-ray and detailed tissue examination techniques, scientists and 
interested members of the general public now also can learn about the dietary and general 
health of Ancient Egyptians (David 2008).1
The practice of mummification reveals the ingenuity of ancient people, not only in 
responding to their cosmogonic representations but also in minimizing the repulsive conse-
quences of having a dead and decomposing body present for a prolonged time while burial 
preparations were underway. To perform mummification with considerable success, knowl-
edge of human anatomy was crucial. Early techniques included removal of internal body 
organs—a process called evisceration—to minimize swelling caused by bacterial gases along 
with detailed bandaging of the entire body, sometimes with a layer of plaster over the ban-
daging to prevent direct skin contact with air. Internal organs—except the heart, which 
Egyptians believed to be the center of life and intelligence—were removed to prevent bloat-
ing and unpleasant smell. They believed that the dead would need their hearts in the next 
world. Later, Egyptians used natron2 to perfect the embalming process.
Accounts of when the use of natron might have been introduced into Egyptian funerary 
practices or how Ancient Egyptians discovered it are sparse. What is obvious is that its use 
reveals an ancient people’s environmental knowledge and classification of ecological items 
by their composition and uses. The same could be said of the now-famed knowledge and use 
of the highly poisonous plant sap benge by the Azande of Southwestern Sudan for one of 
their oracles.3 What appears clear is that both the preparation of permanent tombs and 
waterways influence how people shape their lives and especially how they organize their 
productive activities, like agriculture and pastoral life. The Nile gave Egyptians the advantage 
of a resource that enabled them to produce alimentary needs. Cradling along the Nile Valley 
precipitated migrations from afar and led to the formation of permanent settlements over 
time, thus leading to the adoption of a sophisticated social organization with the Pharaohs 
as rulers. Further south was the kingdom of Nuba, which was flourishing in agriculture and 
trade. Its citizens might have been travelers down the Nile who would market their products 
and interact with people farther down the valley. Because the limestone with which the pyr-
amids were constructed was natural to the region of the Nuba kingdom, their participation 
in the making of the civilization that came to be identified with Egypt has continued to 
intrigue historians. Under these circumstances, the Nile might have precipitated a sense of 
“immortal nourishment and continuity and richness of life in the imagination of those who 
settled along its rich valley” (Harman 2008; Goldschmidt 2008).
The simplest form of belief in the future life was that of the continued existence of the 
soul in the tomb and about the cemetery. As a result, Egyptians left a small hole in a dead 
person’s tomb chamber to allow in-and-out movements of the soul, which was believed to 
wander around the cemetery compound. Sometimes, family members of the dead would 
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make visits to the tomb, during which they would lift the small covering in order to have a 
conversation with their deceased kin. Often, people made funeral offerings of food, water 
and wine, and sometimes also favorite ornaments of the dead, which were placed in the 
tomb for their use. For a king’s tomb, it was not unusual to find it divided into separate 
chambers furnished with kingly possessions.
Egyptians looked upon the world beyond as a replica of life on earth. In that world, Osiris 
ruled firmly, because all dead belonged to him. Souls labored just as people in this life did, 
reaping the yield of their farm labor, the main occupation around the Nile delta. Because 
Osiris’s kingdom was thought to be separate from this world and life, both visually and in 
imagination, its location constantly shifted from the increasingly familiar to the distant hori-
zons that living humans could access only in their minds.
According to another view of the future, souls went to join the sun god Ra in the distant 
West, where they prayed to be allowed to enter the eternal light that triumphed over dark-
ness. No longer associated with occupations, this system presented the solemnity of divine 
companionship as a sufficient goal for the soul. This shift in imagining the future resulted in 
changes in the furnishing of the tombs as well, because all the souls would need were boats 
to facilitate sailing to the setting sun in the West. Hence, either model boats or pictures of 
boats were placed in the tomb instead of the farm tools provided in previous systems.
So elaborate was the Egyptian deistic galaxy that scholars have preferred to exercise 
restraint when it comes to the count of ancient Egyptian gods, because each city appears to 
have had its own set of deities. Some of the most amazing artifacts of ancient Egypt include 
the temples built by successive Egyptian civilizations and kingly dynasties to honor these 
deities. Privileged by the status of location of human origin, Africa would be a natural pick to 
bear some of the oldest civilizational landmarks of human history, like the Egyptian pyra-
mids that present as much architectural wonder in stonework and masonry as they do ana-
tomical knowledge of the human body and preservative techniques, without ignoring the 
religious imaginings associated with mummification. Architecturally, the skills noticeable in 
the work on the pyramids is visible also in the shaping and erection of the stelae (pillars) in 
the region of the ancient kingdom of Axum farther south, in what is present-day northeast-
ern Ethiopia.
Technological innovations that become significant aspects of cultural beliefs and practices 
or cultural beliefs that spur innovations as communities adapt to their different environmen-
tal conditions are found everywhere. Sometimes, social conditions of living side by side 
bounded by conflicting territorial claims may force communities to find solutions for living 
with the physical conditions that are present. Many nomadic communities that live in hot 
weather conditions across Africa have invented ways to manage their food supplies. The 
saying “necessity is the mother of innovation” applies to all human communities. People 
look for what they need. If they do not already have it, they try to borrow it, and if no one 
in the neighborhood has it, then they have to find a way. That is the spirit of human inno-
vation everywhere and throughout time. Traders trekking across the now-famed trans-Saharan 
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routes depended on animals that could persevere in desert conditions with little water and 
vegetation and deep-sand terrain due to their adaptable physical makeup. As a result, camels 
and goats became the traditional livestock, with donkeys kept principally for carrying loads. 
It is no surprise that camels and goats are common among all nomadic communities across 
the continent, from the Tuaregs and the Fulani of West Africa to the Somali, Rendille, and the 
majority of Oromo-speaking peaking peoples of East Africa. In addition, the innovation of 
instruments for storage and transportation of drinking water for humans is common and 
shared knowledge and a shared technique among these communities. Carefully sewn sacks 
made out of animal hide are common and perfect instruments for carrying water while keep-
ing it cool for a long time. The Rendille of East Africa learned long ago to dry their milk into 
powder, which enables them to keep it safe, easy to store, and able to be carried long dis-
tances. In addition, they use ghee from camel milk as a skin oil for protection from sunburn 
and insect bites. The point here is to note the manifest innovative cultural knowledge forms 
and practices and technological adaptation to environmental conditions as communities 
manage their lives in sync with the changes and regenerative cycles of the environments 
around them. When Francis Bacon wrote the now-famous phrase to the effect that “knowl-
edge is power,” he described human taming of nature throughout history, an accomplish-
ment achieved by designing and implementing techniques to reach goals that are sometimes 
cultural and merely practical at other times.
Innovation and the Dangers of Internationalization: ICIPE
Let’s return to the present. In other fora, I have mentioned the birth of institutions the mis-
sions and scientific objectives of which have been driven by concerns about local needs. One 
such institution is the International Center for Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE), 
founded in 1970 by the late Kenyan biochemist Dr. Thomas Odhiambo. Founded to educate 
rural folk on the benefits and menaces of insects with which humans share their habitat and 
headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya, but now with subcenters in twenty-four African countries, 
ICIPE educates people to know about and to be able to distinguish between beneficial and 
harmful insects in their different ecological settings, thus empowering them with knowledge 
of how mosquitos and other insect vectors of tropical diseases carry and transmit such dis-
eases as malaria, the sleeping sickness, or the river blindness and how some of these maladies 
are harmful also to their cattle. Thus, people are empowered to take measures to protect 
themselves and their economically crucial resources and therefore increase their capacity to 
be more productive and improve their health and quality of life.
In addition to human health, ICIPE also educates people on the “culture and social sys-
tems” of menacing insects such as termites so that those people can be empowered to control 
their empires and destructive effects on crops and human abodes while receiving training 
to farm or use wild silk worms for the production of silk and increasing their bee-keeping 
activities for the production of honey. In 1987, ICIPE received a new charter under the 
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Stockholm Convention that established it as an international center for the study of 
insects—a Stockholm Convention Regional Center in Kenya—which essentially made it part 
of the United Nations Environmental Program. Today, besides working alongside indigenous 
experts in the areas covered by its mission in order to strengthen their capacity in agricultural 
production and preservation of crops and harvests as well as to build new ones, ICIPE also 
trains scientists at both the doctoral and master’s degree levels as a means to expand its ser-
vice to people.
Again, as noted previously in the discussion of the negative effects of aid on local innova-
tive capacities, ICIPE is likely to be perceived by local communities as something too grand 
to be locally meaningful as far as the freedom of local folks to think creatively about their 
needs is concerned. With international control over their heads, organizations like ICIPE are 
more likely to depend on imported tools of their trade like industrial chemicals than to 
empower local people to expand use of local, environmentally recycled or chemical byprod-
ucts and therefore use more readily available control methods and means.
Conclusion, or in Lieu Thereof
There is enough scientific and technological capacity to sustain most conditions of life every-
where and anywhere. As the world faces threats from overuses of industrial products, the 
age-tested methods of communal management of the environment suddenly appear to be 
more appealing and safer avenues to follow. However, pursuing such avenues will not hap-
pen soon enough unless African governments learn to resist the pressures from aid donors to 
define and push development practices from the viewpoint of the donors’ world. To reverse 
this already harmful trend, there needs to be a thorough decentralization of development 
management and encouragement of more involvement from local communities in the defi-
nition of development goals, because this is likely to encourage innovative thinking, and an 
aim to limit goals to use available resources or those that can be procured with little or no 
pressure from conducting development from a beggar’s position; in contrast to the Maasai 
model described earlier, “the person who holds the bone controls the dog’s tail wagging 
and drooling.”
There is another lesson to learn from the Maasai: They are proud people who could not 
care less about what, for lack of a better term, is called modernity. Individuals from the Maasai 
community have infiltrated all sectors of contemporary lifestyles on the strength of educa-
tion at all levels, and, like all other citizens, they hold all kinds of positions made possible by 
modern economy. However, Maasai lands outside urban centers are not experiencing loss of 
habitat at the fast pace common in other parts of the country. Despite a vibrant economy 
from their cattle and tourism, the Maasai people interact with modernity on their own terms, 
preferring to proudly adorn themselves in traditional garb anywhere they go and teaching all 
of us that small is beautiful and that tradition and modernity are not as oppositional as the 
enemies of African traditions and customs have waged a cultural war to make them seem.
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Notes
1. The University of Manchester in the United Kingdom is host to the now world-renowned Mummy 
Project that applies biomedical research techniques to the study of Egyptian mummies.
2. Natron is a natural product, a mixture of sodium carbonate decahydrate or soda ash and sodium 
bicarbonate. It preserves by absorbing all fluids or moisture from the body, thus leaving it in its intact 
state. Lake Natron within the Great Rift Valley in northern Tanzania is named for its highly concen-
trated levels of this chemical mixture, which petrifies all birds and animals that fall into it, occasionally 
including the versatile flamingo, with its long legs, wide wingspan, and slender body.
3. Popularized by the British social anthropologist Sir E. E. Evans-Pritchard in his widely studied Witch-
craft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande (1937), the chemical composition of the sap may not have 
concerned the Azande as much as what they used it for—namely, the conduct of the oracular proce-
dures to determine the guilt or innocence of persons accused of causing the death of others by witch-
craft. Thus, also, the practical desired results in preparing bodies for arrival in the next world must have 
been the goal and interest of Egyptians’ practice of culture in ancient times rather than the scientific or 
chemical composition of the materials (now known to have included Natron as a key ingredient) used 
in attaining the results. Many examples can be cited to show the innovative minds of everyday folks as 
they searched, procured, and used materials in their habitats toward the attainment of ideals defined in 
their cultural knowledge and imaginations. Knowledge of poisonous saps extracted from plants and 
used on arrow heads in hunting by many communities, or knowledge by the Turkana people of north-
eastern Kenya of the powerful and deadly poisonous nature of crocodile bile that made them expert 
handlers of crocodile carcasses or dealers in crocodile bile-poison are just a few such examples of taxo-
nomic knowledge of the natural habitat that African communities have but remain untapped for gain-
ful uses by other people. Thus, it did not matter whether the preparation of bodies for arrival in the 
next world could not have been norms without a sense of stability in social structures and expectations. 
The same cannot be said of much of the rest of the continent at the time. This stability suggests that 
migrations into ancient Egypt introduced peoples with different cultural backgrounds, thus leading to 
great diversity of culturally based skills that would require organization to channel into productive 
activities in response to needs that were changing in both volume and variety. This would suggest, as is 
widely believed by historians, that influx into Egypt from as far away as Mesopotamia started prior to 
the 5,000 B.C.E. mark, when the Pharaohs first came into existence as the world’s earliest advanced 
form of ruler.
2
The Language of Science, Technology, and Innovation: A Chimurenga Way 
of Seeing from Dzimbahwe
Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga
Why Chimurenga Now?
Chimurenga refers to means and ways of defending or fighting among vedzimbahwe (those of 
the houses of stone, dzimba dzemabwe or dzimbahwe), who since colonial times have been 
called the Shona. Dzimbahwe (or dzimbabwe, single imba yebwe [house of stone]) are the struc-
ture after which the country Zimbabwe (a big house of stone) is named, in homage to Great 
Zimbabwe, the biggest such complex.
Since the 1970s, Zimbabweans have used the term chimurenga to refer to the 1896–1897 
and 1960s–1970s wars of independence against the British settlers, but I argue that the con-
cept has a much deeper meaning. This chapter addresses at least three defining features of 
chimurenga. First, it refers to the arts of war derived from Murenga, hence chiMurenga, the 
way of Murenga, or spiritually guided warfare. Murenga is another name for Mwari (God). 
Figure 2.1
Great Zimbabwe, or Dzimbahwe, the largest of the houses of stone after which the Republic of Zimbabwe 
is named.
Source: Wikipedia Creative Commons.
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Second, it is an approach to war involving the whole community, not just those carrying 
lethal arms. Third, chimurenga is an innovative transformation of zvakatikomberedza (sur-
roundings; caves, mountains, rivers, pools, valleys, forests, animals, and trees) into military 
assets and infrastructure, with or without physically modifying them.
The spiritual aspects of chimurenga have received treatment only with respect to the 
1896–1897 and 1960s–1970s wars (Ranger 1967, 1985, 1999; Lan 1985; Daneel 1995). How-
ever, analysis is historically tethered to its specific milieu; this chapter takes chimurenga as a 
space from which a different, African story of ruzivo (knowledge), kugadzira (making), and 
kusika (creating) might be told. Read carefully, there seems no need to burden chimurenga with 
externally assembled theoretical frameworks that render it illegible; chimurenga speaks for 
itself from multiple indigenous archives of deep chidzimbahwe that are also philosophies.
The politics of writing chimurenga is such that one has to refuse to accept chidzimbahwe 
as a secondary language whose principal concepts must simply be translated into English 
and consigned to a glossary. On the one hand, the anonymous reviewers (to whom I owe 
an unpayable debt of gratitude) felt the reader might get lost if the translations were only 
one-offs. On the other hand, as the author, I rejected outright consigning chidzimbahwe 
concepts to the glossary and remain with a completely English text. After all, the audience 
of this text is not just Westerners who may feel that the vernacular names are slowing them 
down and therefore prefer a glossary. The readers are also Africans whose languages are 
often expunged from the science and technology narrative in the conventional editorial 
processes and narrative styles. I did not want to give the impression that my native lan-
guage is secondary and that English trumps every other language. After all, writers whose 
native tongue is not English are always being asked to write and read in English without 
English language speakers and writers being ever required to do the same with African 
languages.
To return to chimurenga—the description and location of the vernacular registers constitu-
tive of chimurenga are intended to explain the latter from the perspective of its originators 
and heirs. None of the literature on chimurenga grapples much with chimurenga as idea and 
laboratory. Instead, it is treated as a specific historical episode (the 1960s–1970s war) in which 
a few—politicians—liberated everyone else. Thus in these politicians’ eyes, the ordinary peo-
ple are ungrateful beneficiaries rather than combatants who fought using other weapons. 
How easy it is to forget that without these non-gun-wielding combatants the ammunition 
would have been damp and the gun would not have fired the colonizer out of power. But in 
the politicians’ and guerrilla commanders’ autobiographies, only they fought the war; the 
whole concept of who is a hero, who is compensated for their sacrifices in the war of libera-
tion, is confined to political prisoners and guerrillas (Chung 2006; Tekere 2007; Bhebe 2004; 
Mhanda 2011; Mutambara 2014; Sadomba 2011).
By talking about hondo yekuzvisunungura (war of self-liberation), ordinary people insert 
themselves as agents in their own emancipation, reminding the elites about their own hefty 
sacrifices. Nobody was just sitting there while these heroic, selfless messiahs were busy fight-
ing to liberate them. Thus, hondo yekuzvisunungura restores the idea of chimurenga as 
The Language of Science, Technology, and Innovation 47
communal struggle involving the ancestral spirits, the people, the guerrillas, and a leadership 
deriving its legitimacy from the spirits. The politicians never came to liberate the people; 
they came to liberate power for themselves and fooled the people using the verbiage and 
spirit of chimurenga into believing the ends were as communal as the means. Perhaps that is 
why it was so easy for the politicians to betray the values their comrades died believing, and 
which perhaps they themselves at one point believed: values of communality in struggle, of 
hunhu, the philosophy that when one is hurting, everybody feels the pain, that the happiness 
of one amid a community in mourning is the antithesis of chimurenga.
From the perspective of the Rhodesians (white settlers of Rhodesia and their descendants), 
both as a legitimate anticolonial struggle and a historical genealogy chimurenga did not 
exist. The Rhodesians can’t even accept that the black person has a brain, and our politicians’ 
departure from the ethics of communal knowledge, purpose, and action that undergirded 
chimurenga has helped “prove” their point. To these Rhodesians the 1960s–1970s war was 
simply a “bush war”—a war in the bush. It was not even a civil conflict. Only whites were 
civil; blacks were “savages” that did not think, so they were “communist terrorists, or CTs,” 
puppets of the Soviet Union and China. By recusing them from a capacity to think and call-
ing nationalist guerrillas simply magandanga (bandits) or terrorists, the Rhodesians have 
reduced the entire project of chimurenga to terrorism (Smith 1997).
If the economy was booming, freedoms of expression, association, and assembly flourish-
ing, and the communality of purpose that chimurenga promised in rhetoric the order of the 
day, the Rhodesians would be quite ashamed. Instead, they’re saying, “We told you this 
whole chimurenga thing was hot air.” Ordinary people are cast as victims—of colonial tyr-
anny yesterday, black tyranny now (Chan 2003; Meredith 2002; Norman 2004, 2008; Hill 
2003, 2005; Arnold and Wiener 2008). Chimurenga is trivialized as rhetoric that political elites 
and men with guns used to turn the ordinary people into ladders to power, often willingly, 
by force if needed (Kriger 1992).
This chapter is not a one-man mission to rescue chimurenga from ignominy but an enquiry 
into whether there is in chimurenga an idea or a philosophy worth rescuing to start with. For 
that rescue to be informative, chimurenga has to be liberated from its perversion by opportun-
ists. In other words, chimurenga must be repositioned for enquiry as a site of creative work 
that did not start in 1896 or in the 1960s. Seen as such, it becomes an interesting space from 
which to make some critical interventions into the question of innovation. This chapter’s 
terms of reference are therefore twofold: first, to explore chimurenga as laboratory (a site 
where creative work takes place), focusing on African modes of biological warfare; second, to 
place such innovation within the context of ancestral spirituality, which acts as an anchor 
and inspiration for all creativity.
Spiritually Guided Warfare
Recorded traditions say vedzimbahwe (the Shona’s) ancestors came from Guruhuswa (the 
place of tall grass), referencing either the Nile valley (Egypt-Sudan) and later possibly the 
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Niger-Congo region, or Tanzania (Hodza 1979, 217, 240–244; Diop 1974; M’Imanyara 1992). 
The exact location of Guruhuswa is still a matter of debate, but archeologists have carbon-dated 
pottery and other remnants and corroborated this evidence with linguistics, and they agree 
that this movement southward began around 1000 BCE. Two waves—one from the east 
(Tanzania), another from the Niger-Congo—arrived in dzimbahwe (lands of the Shona) 
around the fifth or sixth century CE and began establishing farming communities in areas 
like Ziwa and Gokomere, displacing the indigenous San inhabitants (Ehret and Posnansky 
1982; Ehret 2002). The settlements emerged into a state system with prominent capitals or 
cities at Mapungubwe (eleventh to twelfth century), Dzimbahwe or Great Zimbabwe (thir-
teenth to fifteenth century), and Kame (1450–1683). Later prominent dynasties include 
vaRozvi (1684–1834), Mutapa (1430–1760), and many other subordinate or independent 
chiefdoms in between (Pikirayi 2001; Pwiti 1996; Mudenge 1988).
Murenga
The historical genealogies of vaRozvi in particular are explicit about the role of Murenga in 
guiding these immigrants from Guruhuswa to Dzimbahwe. They say a voice called Tovela 
“led them on their way, keeping them safe from dangerous places, feeding them. The voice 
could speak from any object,” from grass, trees, infants, even stones. It was the voice of “the 
founding father of the clan,” “the first person ever to be created,” that guided every single 
group out of Guruhuswa in many different directions (Hodza 1979, 217).
When the Rozvi were famished and knelt under the tree of the ancestral spirits, pots of 
sadza (ground sorghum or millet meal), and calabashes of milk, and honey appeared from 
the ground. When enemies closed in on them, Tovela gave them medicines that rendered 
them invisible to their enemies. In time, Tovela, master-guide of the journey, on foot, of 
life, would come to be known by many names: as Mwari, god of all his people; Manyusa, the 
one who caused food to emerge from the ground; Muwanikwa, the one who was found; 
Mutangakugara, the first to exist; Mupawose, generous giver to all; Samasimba, owner and 
source of all power; Chidzivachepo, the original pool; and Murenga, in whose name the people 
shouted upon sighting an animal, “Komborera, Murenga!” (“Bless, Tall One/God!”), as they 
closed in for the kill. War was guided mobility. Nothing could be done without informing the 
ancestors first. Vedzimbahwe would place the ancestors in front just as they would in all jour-
neys. After all, the soil the living walked on belonged to the ancestors (Shumba 1983, 84). All 
masimba (strength or power) came from the ancestors, who in turn asked for it from the 
mhondoro (clan spirits), and them from Mwari, on the living’s behalf (Chinyowa 1983, 93).
In vedzimbahwe’s ritualized representation and enactment of nzvimbo (space) and nguva 
(time), there were moments when the human and animal realms were divisible and rigidly 
enforced and others when they were indivisible. The kingdom of humanity and that of ani-
mals had one sovereign, the mhondoro, who was at once a real lion, king of the forest, and the 
most senior ancestral spirit (mudzimu; plural midzimu), a deceased chief or clan founder who 
returned in spirit after death to look after the living. It was the mhondoro and the mhondoro 
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alone who could intercede between Mwari (god) and the living. This senior spirit manifested 
and spoke to the living via his human medium, the svikiro (port of arrival), growling like a 
lion before and between words (Posselt 1935, 82). To see a real lion was, therefore, to see the 
clan spirit. Inevitably, the human domain (the village) and the animal domain (the forest) 
converged upon the mhondoro. Vedzimbahwe generally believed that mhondoro had power 
over all zvisikwa (creations)—humanity included. The leading nineteenth-century mhondoro 
of vedzimbahwe, Sekuru Chaminuka, was widely acclaimed to have “unlimited power over 
animals of all kinds. He could call the python into his hut—he could send out his natives [sic, 
African subjects] to catch a lion and the lion would not hurt them. If he sent them for any 
particular game, they would always bring it back” (Taberer 1905, 318). Along with Nehanda, 
Kaguvi, and Mukwati, Chaminuka was one of the key mhondoro of the 1896–1897 war.
Mbonga
As the keeper of makona (the clan’s war medicines), zimbuya guru (great ancestress), popularly 
known as mbonga or sviba, was the most important person in the community after the chief. 
The gona (medicine horn) was usually an elephant tusk or kudu, duiker, or buffalo horn filled 
with medicines; hence, its other names were runyanga (horn) and gona rezhou (horn of ele-
phant). The medicine was “a mixture of ground-nut oil, and herbs, and sometimes even 
limbs or internal organs of a human being” (Garbutt 1909, 537). The power of the chief and 
security of the whole dzinza (clan) was in the safety of the gona and its keeper, especially the 
winning or losing of wars. To consecrate a mbonga, a virgin princess of the clan was supposed 
to sleep with her brother, the chief, to arm and sustain the power of the gona. Incest was 
otherwise taboo and severely punishable; arming gona and consecrating mbonga was the 
exception (Hodza 1979, 139). Once installed, the mbonga took charge of the medicines of the 
dzinza and kept them out of harm’s way. There were two taboos that she was to keep for 
the rest of her life: One, she was never to have sex, consensual or forced, ever again as long 
as she lived. Two, she was never to be captured or killed by the enemy, for it heralded the 
certain defeat—and demise—of the community.
The mbonga was the most prized target during war; kill, have intercourse with, or kidnap 
her and the entire security system became powerless, all weapons useless (Hodza 1979, 
269n10). One of the most famed mbonga in the history of vaHota was called vaNyemba. It is 
said that she kept female black dogs that were, like her, not allowed to mate and that slept by 
her side. Nor were ordinary female dogs—that is, those that mated with the village’s male 
canines—ever to enter the mbonga’s hut, lest they defile her (144n32). VaNyemba remained 
at home with the clan medicines, her dogs, and her attendants while her brothers went to 
war or to hunt. She beat her drum “to call and communicate with her clan, e.g. in answer to 
her brothers’ hunting-call (mupumhi), to direct them to [their hunting] camp” (149n3) One 
day, vaHota’s arch enemy, Gunguwo, chief of vaShawasha, attacked while the brothers were 
out hunting and overpowered and raped vaNyemba. Tradition says that by this act, 
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Gunguwo “robbed her, and the clan medicines, of power to safeguard her brothers and to 
ensure their success in hunting” and war (149n3).
The mbonga played a critical role during migrations from Guruhuswa, especially when 
crossing big rivers like the Congo and Zambezi with their livestock. She would be in front 
and would strike the waters; when they parted, the people and the livestock would then cross 
(Hodza 1979, 253n7). The role of women in river crossing is clear in praises to the daughters 
of vaMhani. Their traditions say that when crossing the Zambezi, the clan’s mbonga, Mwenda, 
struck the waters with her shashiko (a skin underskirt covering her loins, or loincloth) and 
they parted to allow the people and their livestock to cross south (242). VaMhani were not 
alone; vaNhohwe too paid homage to their mbonga, Nyamita, “Mubvakure, makabuda nomum-
vura, nehwai dzikapera [One who came from far away, who came out through the waters, 
losing all her sheep in the process]” (252, my translation). VaTsunga traditions say that 
when their own mbonga, Biri, struck the water’s surface with her shashiko, it parted to form 
a mukana (pass) with two hills on either side, and the people walked forward on solid 
ground (273).
Sacred Animals
In the presence of the mbonga, mhondoro, and Murenga/Mwari, the animals—four legged, six 
legged, or slithering legless—cannot be seen simply as nature, fauna, or species. They have 
spiritual meaning and place in vedzimbahwe’s lives.
The hungwe or chapungu (bateleur eagle) was the bird of Mwari; its movements and sounds, 
when interpreted by mediums of the mhondoro—like Chaminuka—was Mwari’s pronounce-
ment to his people. It is the bird that Shona sculptors carved, which archeologists subse-
quently found at Dzimbahwe (Great Zimbabwe). Those closely associated with it are the 
people of Chasura (the one who farts), foreigners in the domains of vaMhari of Chivi, in what 
is now Masvingo (Hodza 1979, 263). Laced with allusions to sex and male virility, theirs is 
one of the most seductive of Zimbabwean clan praises. Chapungu is different from an owl in 
that it defends life, whereas the owl is a witch’s instrument that brings death and illness. 
When one sees chapungu, one sees vasekuru (grandfather), the ancestor. When chapungu cir-
cles above the home of a person struck by illness, the person recovers, a sign that the ances-
tors have refused to accept his spirit into nyikadzimu (the land of the departed ancestors) just 
yet (Nyevera 1983, 26, 29). In its mobilities and acoustics is a message—a wing-flap express-
ing happiness, a twisting somersault and flyaway warning of danger, or a sad, dejected shriek 
that portends one’s death or that of family (Hodza 1979, 265n6). Chapungu usually appeared 
during—and was indeed the bird of—chimurenga. By its flight pattern, it warned warriors of 
danger or assured them, and it strengthened their resolve in combat.
Mbuyamuderere (praying mantis; literally grandmother in okra) was regarded as the great 
female ancestor or muchembere (grandmother) paying a visit to her vazukuru (grandchildren). 
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Whoever spotted it took a small string or piece of cloth and placed it on top of the insect—an 
act of kufukidza muchembere (clothing grandmother), for this was the role society expected 
a well-groomed muzukuru (nephew/niece, grandson/granddaughter) to play. This insect 
mobility was a sign that the ancestors were ever-present and happy with the living (Nyevera 
1983, 29).
Altogether, chapungu, mhondoro, and mbuyamuderere (along with shato the python) were 
carriers, embodiments, and messengers of the ancestral spirits. Theirs was not a faunal pres-
ence but a confirmation that the ancestors were present. Reconnoiters of the path ahead, 
repellants of dangers-in-waiting, the ancestors smoothed the path of all obstacles. To go 
alone into combat as mere mortals was umbimbindoga (reckless individualism); chimurenga 
was mushandirapamwe (communality of purpose) between vari kumhepo (those in the air; 
the deeper term for ancestors) and venyama (those of the flesh/mortals; Nyevera 1983, 
19). Among other things, the ability to fight, to be a warrior, involved not only zvidobi 
(skills) or ruzivo or zivo (knowledge). It required a shavé (spirit; plural mashavé), specifi-
cally shavé remangoromera (fighting spirit), which did not substitute for training but acti-
vated skills into action; the one that shavé possessed fought like a lion (Mavhunga 2014, 
chaps. 1–2).
Zvombo Zvemurume
Of course, the ancestors protected those that took physical steps to protect themselves; they 
armed the weapons of those that were armed. Each man was supposed to have certain weap-
ons, zvombo zvemurume (weapons of a man). The same weapons for home defense were the 
ones that each man took into battle as a warrior at the sanction of the headman, chief, or 
king. These weapons included two types of axes obtained from the mhizha (metalworker): the 
dimuro (chopper or cleaver) and the demo (felling axe), both used to cut wood, meat, and 
bones. To the bira (ceremonial dances of the ancestors), a man carried mbadzo (ceremonial 
dancing axe).
On journeys, women carried tsomho (small axes), while men took ukano (medium-sized 
axe), pfumo (spear), and mubhadha (staff). A man carried a large axe called huhwa, which was 
used mainly in elephant hunting. For combat, the gano (battle axe) and ngwangwa (large, 
broad-bladed axe) were considered most ideal (Hodza 1979, 354–355). A man could also carry 
or use, when times demanded, a bakatwa or munòndó (sword or bayonet), ùtá (bow), museve 
(arrow), dáti (quiver), nhovo (shield), tsvimbo (club), mvaisi (slingshot), pfumo (spear or asse-
gai; plural mapfumo), gano (battle or hunting axe; plural makano), muteyo or musungo (snare, 
to trap or tie), muchetura (poison; literally, to cut; plural michetura), hunza (pit traps), dhibhura 
(gin trap for large animals; plural dhibhura), riva (gin trap for mice and birds; plural mariva), 
and rusvingo (fortification; plural, svingo). The making of these weapons has been described 
elsewhere and needs no further mention here (see, e.g., Mavhunga 2014, chap. 1; Daneel 
1995, 50–53).
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Chimurenga as Laboratory: Chemical and Biological Weapons in Dzimbahwe?
One of the most interesting features of the precolonial vedzimbahwe concerns their tendency 
to build their homesteads on hilltops and to fight their enemies from the rocks. The arming 
of mountains was born out of thorough knowledge of the locale. Passes, caves, and highest 
points were known, with ambush positions carefully prepared in the camouflaged cliff over-
hangs overlooking the passes below. The caves were turned into bunkers, stashed with provi-
sions to sustain the occupants for several moons if necessary. The high points were turned 
into sentinel positions to spot the enemy from afar. It was a common chidzimbahwe practice 
for chiefs or kings to settle their most trusted vassals—or cowards—on strategic hilltop settle-
ments and near likely enemy approach routes to act as nharirire (sentinels).
The nharirire located on hilltops used three types of resources to signal approaching 
danger to the next hill: smoke during the day, a bonfire at night, and blowing a kudu horn 
where neither were visible. Upon sighting an enemy, a nharirire immediately blew his hwa-
manda (trumpet made out of kudu horn), alerting the one located on the next hill, who 
blew his to alert the one on the hill beyond, until entire communities near and far got the 
message, whereupon all men armed themselves and reported to their chief’s court (if time 
allowed) or went straight into combat if the enemy was already nigh (Mtetwa 1976; Bhila 
1978). We can therefore begin a conversation about a chimurenga communication signal 
system dating to long before contemporary modes of military signal equipment, codes, and 
procedures.
As able-bodied men jostled into combat positions among the hill stockades, the women, 
children, and elderly drove the cattle, goats, and other stock into the mountain passes or 
even caves. These stockades would have been prepared in peacetime with granaries of food 
and large pots of water stowed away to sustain people and livestock for long periods of siege. 
Vedzimbahwe’s security was community security, the division of labor paramount.
The communal spirit, the use of mountains and caves as infrastructures of defense, 
and the tactics that vedzimbahwe’s hostile neighbors the Ndebele called ukutshona (going 
under) were derived significantly from the vedzimbahwe’s observation of animals. Take 
mbeva (mouse), for example, the wild rodent that lives in mapani (valleys) and that vedzim-
bahwe trap, dig up, and eat. This widespread practice of kuchera mbeva—catching mice by 
digging up their mwena (burrows), which are very circuitous—served both as education 
about a potential defensive system and as a process of harvesting meat in the dry winter 
months. When digging, they were taken first to garingiro (sleeping area of the mice) where 
they saw mambuze-mbuze (bedding composed of fir, feathers, and other softitudes), and 
then marishe (granary), where mice stash pilferings from fields and forests. From this 
underground store, one or more mbudo (escape holes) lead to the surface; if one option to 
leave (getting out through the main entrance) fails, mice always have another. Before exer-
cising that option, the mice proceed to diziro, another hole impregnable to diggers that 
mice dig and close (kutsindira; Mavhunga 2014; Mazarire 2005). A dzimbahwe proverb says 
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that “mbeva haicheri mwena usine mbudo” (“a mouse does not dig its underground tunnels 
without an escape hole”). It always has an exit strategy. Vedzimbahwe also knew that mice 
prepare well in advance of the lean months ahead, hence, “tsenzi inogara yadziya” (“a cane 
rat rests only after all reeds are cut down”). The traditions of the people of Chihuri warn 
against the poverty of a strategy of “kuhwanda mutumbi sembende inohwanda ichisiya muswe 
kunze” (“hiding the body like the greybacked gerbil mouse that hides while leaving its tail 
outside”; Hodza 1979, 287). It will be discovered.
The second example of strategy learned from observation and developed out of a thorough 
understanding of animals in the process of utilizing them for food comes from makurwe (the 
edible type of crickets). Gurwe (singular) is a type of cricket that cuts down and feeds on young 
crops. In dzimbahwe, what Europeans called a cricket could be one of a lot of things with very 
different taxonomies. For instance, it could mean many different insects vedzimbahwe con-
sider inedible, like chikudyu (also called chikorokodzi or humbi), a black cricket that usually lives 
near water bodies or in houses. The Nyanja have a proverb: “Tsokonombwe anatha dziko ndiku-
lumpha” (“The tsokonombwe finished the earth by jumping”). This is in reference to the insect’s 
impressive leap, which makes it an elusive quarry (Gray 1944, 110). Ndororo, chinyamunjororo, 
njororo, or chikororo is a type of cricket that lives on the edges of the pools and loves water; it 
can be seen especially when digging up nyongorosi (worms for fishing).
When people talk about crickets today, they are exclusively talking about the edible type, 
called gurwe, so-called because it cuts (kugura) crops and weeds and carries them underneath 
the soil to feed in its carefully but laboriously dug barrows. A dzimbahwe adage mocks the 
baboon and praises gurwe thus: “Urombo hwamatede kunayiwa nemvura makurwe ari mum-
hatso” (“The poverty of baboons, to be lashed by rain while the crickets are in the house”). 
Gurwe is also known as jenere, huruze, gurene, and njurwe. Makurwe start appearing a few days 
after the first summer rains—which allows them to hatch and start developing into matum-
buzenene or matumburufufu (wingless crickets). A gurwe that has not yet grown wings is called 
dumburufufu or dumbuzenene (singular; dumbu [stomach]; zenene or rufufu [exposed]). It is 
called dumbuzenene because in its early stages it is similar to the real dumbuzenene (also called 
shuwishuwi, tutwa, tagutapadare, chizen’enene, chidhenene, chidumbuzenene, dundira, dundiravaz-
vere, or fufura), an adult insect that looks like gurwe, with a big stomach and a hard head and 
abdomen.
There are two types of makurwe (plural). One is chinyamutsavava or nyaruzanda (literally 
nyaru, the owner or container of, and zanda, egg), or simply the female cricket. Its stomach 
is fat with eggs, and its outer wings are smooth black and cannot produce a shrill, vibrating, 
or rattling sound, called kurira. The other type is mombe (cattle; specifically, bull) or gurwe-
mombe (bull cricket), signifying its male status. Its outer wings are rough and uneven, the 
source of kurira or kukiriridza, that shrill sound typifying early summer nights in Zimbabwe. 
One riddle states: “Chikomana chinoridza ngoma nekuseri” (“The fellow who beats the drum 
from behind”). My maternal ancestors, aNgoni of Malawi, observed and interacted with gur-
wemombe (which they call nkhululu) well, hence another riddle: “Nyamata wanga woyimba 
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lingaka ndi kumbuyo” (“My servant who plays the kettle with its back”). Alternatively, they 
say: “Anyamata a ku Mlanje aimbira ng’oma kumbuyo” (“The boys from Mlanje [a district in 
Nyasaland] play the drum behind”). One riddle likens the small of the cricket’s back to lin-
gaka, a small drum slung around the neck and played, the other to ng’oma, the bigger, heavier 
drum that you must sit down to play. Usually, we know that makurwe are ripe for eating when 
gurwemombe starts kukuriridza; that is, when its wings are fully developed enough to be able 
to make that sound. As a rule, all immature makurwe (at the pre-kukiriridza stage) are consid-
ered inedible.
Gurwe digs and lives in a mwena (tunnel) in the ground, away from areas prone to 
waterlogging. Chidé or mbudyo (mbudo) is the second tunnel that gurwe and mbeva dig and 
seal, for use as an escape route when danger approaches from the main entrance. The other 
tunnel leads to garingidya (also called garingizha or garingiro), a big tunnel or bunker that the 
cricket makes and stashes food in. The soil gurwe excavates is called duto (mound). The 
ancestors’ thorough knowledge of kuchera mwena yemakurwe nembeva (tunnels of crickets 
and mice) is shown in the following adage: “mufaro mwena, kuchera unoguma” (“happiness 
is a tunnel; when dug it comes to an end”). It is easy to tell whether the gurwe inside is 
mombe or nyaruzanda by just looking at the duto. Gurwemombe usually excavates a plat-
form we call chidumbati (doorstep) to a depth that leaves its body flush with the ground, 
with its long twin antennae extended outward, so that it is not seen by predators on the 
ground, usually snakes, dogs, cats, mice, frogs, and owls. It uses its antennae and its eyes 
to detect any suspicious movement, to see without being seen; soldiers call this being in 
defilade position. At the first sign of trouble, it can dash inside and head toward mbudyoo. 
Hence the riddle: “gomana rinoridza mumhanzi rakafedemara” (“the big boy that plays music 
while stretching its wings”). The adage “muchiri kumatutu isu tatova kuzvidé” (“you are still 
at the entrance when we are already at the exit”) is an acknowledgment of vedzimbahwe’s 
experience of being flummoxed by the cricket and mouse when digging for them. As a 
rule, gurwemombe always engages in kukiriridza with its head facing the entrance, never 
outward.
Mice and crickets were not unique as sources of valuable lessons to vedzimbahwe. From 
watching baboons post sentinels on treetops and hills while the rest of the troop devoured 
crops in people’s fields and seeing their careful stalking of animal prey spoiled by a warning 
“bho-o ho-o!” bark from such nharirire, vedzimbahwe coined the proverb “chati homu chareva” 
(“that which has barked has said something”). Animals did not just make “noise” or “sound”; 
they communicated, spoke a language to each other. They managed risk to themselves 
through posting sentinels and calling out warnings. The ostrich, for example, used its height 
to warn unsuspecting springbuck of an approaching hunter, the buck passing on the message 
to other animals with its snorts and dartings-about (Millais 1895, 24, 81).
Other animals also “taught” vedzimbahwe to evade their enemies through camouflage. 
They did it in a subtle, subterfuge kind of way, behaving and looking opposite to what they 
were actually doing. Deception was the essence of the adage “kusekerera nezino repamusoro 
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wakaruma repasi” (“to laugh with the upper tooth while hiding the lower one”). Indeed, 
“zino irema, rinosekerera nemuvengi waro” (“the tooth is a fool; it smiles even at its enemy”). 
This camouflage was one of two of the chameleon’s potent weapons, immortalized in the 
adage “kungwara kwerwavhi kusandura mavara arwo” (“the cleverness of chameleon to change 
its colors” [and blend in with its surroundings]). Whereupon the chameleon became invisi-
ble to its prey, got behind a fly, remained motionless, then slowly advanced; when within 
reach, it darted out its tongue with astonishing speed. The fly vanished. There was no other 
teacher in the execution of speed and surprise in war, except perhaps shato (python), mes-
merizing with its variegated body colors, getting closer all the time, then—hla!—the victim 
was gone.
Vedzimbahwe learned risk-management strategy from confrontations with a number of 
animals and immortalized them in language. From encounters with the leopard they learned 
the art of collective or communal responsibility and the consequences of individualism and 
selfishness. Tragedy taught them the folly of confronting the leopard or walking through 
leopard-infested areas alone. Out of this experience came the concept of chirwirangwe (fight-
ing as one against the leopard). Its spirit is summarized in the tsumo (proverb) “kuita muoner-
apamwe chuma chemuzukuru” (“teamwork, the ethos of weaving the nephew or grandchild’s 
beads”) or simply mushandirapamwe (the ethos of working together). Even in a team, unco-
ordinated action was virtual suicide, for as vaMbari knew too well, “mbada, ine mavara, isaka-
nanzva ichisiya rimwe vara, haiti iri idema, iri idzvuku. Inonanzva ose, mavara ayo” (“the leopard, 
it has spots, it does not lick some and leave others, it does not say this is black, this one red, 
it licks all, for all are its spots”; Hodza 1979, 284).
If one person angered it, ingwe or mbada the leopard spared nobody, because all humans 
were the same; to defeat it, everyone had to own the problem before them. This antipathy 
toward selfish, individual actions with consequences to the community is born out in the 
detembo (poem) “Kutunhwa kwaDerere,” in which the poet says: “Chaipa chaipira sango. Chi-
ramba wasara muno mumusha! Ngatiendei tindopera tose!”; this is deep chidzimbahwe (chi-
Shona) for “What is bad is bad for the forest. Let no one remain behind at home! Let us all 
go and perish to a man!” Translated into surface chidzimbahwe, it means “A danger for one 
endangers the whole. ... What harms one [person] harms the whole clan, both living and 
dead” (Hodza 1979, 344–346n10). Shangwa (famine), magutsa (years of plentiful harvest), 
urwere (affliction), utano (wellness), ndufu (deaths), runyararo (peace), hondo (war)—all these 
were partaken collectively (Nyevera 1983, 34).
Thus when somebody acting out of individualism got himself into trouble and rescue 
might gravely imperil the community, he was on his own. One such combat involved chid-
embo the skunk, which defended itself by sending its enemies into gas-dazed flight. If anyone 
ever deliberately picked a fight with chidembo, he or she had to deal with his or her problem 
and not call others to help, hence the adage: “adenha chidembo ndechake” (“if one angers the 
skunk it is his”). And another: “chidembo hachivhiyirwe pane vanhu” (“a skunk is not skinned 
among people”).
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“Hot pursuit” wasn’t always a wise military tactic; in fact, it could be a very stupid move. 
Vedzimbahwe knew too well that chapinda kamwe hachiteverwi (what has entered once and 
never returned cannot be followed). That is something that everybody who has encountered 
mhungu (black cobra) and its nyamafingu (banded cobra variant) knows all too well. I encoun-
tered it myself—during my boyhood, traversing Nyatsime River in Chihota from one dziva 
(pool) and zambuko (drift) to another, while fishing, while trapping birds with hurimbo (bird-
lime), and during kufudza mombe (cattle herding). I had countless confrontations with the 
snake. That is how I discovered that upon entering a hole, the extremely venomous snake 
immediately turns its head outward, ready to defend itself, as the rest of its body slithers 
down into the hole through sheer muscular contraction and expansion. For snakes, holes in 
the ground (normally abandoned clay caverns created by termites, openings between rocks, 
and hollows in thick tree trunks) are fortresses when fighting an enemy.
Of course, snakes are also a source of muchetura (poison; literally that which cuts to pieces); 
in fact, most poisons used in Southern Africa contained a snake-poison component. Mhungu 
and chiva (puff adder)—indeed, any large poisonous snake—was fair game for poison. Some-
times, the entire snake was pounded into a pulp and smeared onto arrows, but the most 
common formula was to cut the snake’s head off, extract the poison glands, dry them, and 
pound them into dust. The powder was then placed either in an eggshell or the breastbone 
of an ostrich, the juice of the mukonde (euphorbia) then poured over it. The concoction was 
stirred and boiled into a thick brownish-red jelly, usually in summer when snakes were roam-
ing about; it was kept in reserve for use during winter when the snakes were hibernating and 
impossible to find (Schapera 1925, 202–203).
To return to lessons, what is said of snakes is also true of matsvinyu (lizards; singular dzvi-
nyu), as in the adage “dzvinyu kuzambira zuva huona mwena” (“when a lizard basks in the sun 
it is because it sees that a hole is nearby”). It was this tendency of the reptile to always forage 
within the proximity of its refuge that made it open to two interpretations. First, with regards 
to married women, the lizard was the source of a powerful charm to pacify philandering or 
violent husbands. The reptile was appropriately called chipotanemadziro, the one that never 
strays far from the walls of the house. Thus dzvinyu—or more appropriately, its tail—was cut 
off while the poor thing was alive, dried, and ground into a potent mupfuhwira (charm) to 
tame a troublesome husband (Hodza 1979, 19). For men, the custodians of community secu-
rity against enemy attack, the lizard was a good teacher of defensive strategy; its lesson to 
them was never to fight the aggressor outside one’s stockade and preprepared defensive 
position.
North toward the Zambezi River lay the lands of Neshangwe under Chief Chihunduro, 
whose political powers traditions say were based on “the war medicine and magic tail he 
possessed.” Chihunduro was known to use “fierce bees [he kept] in a calabash,” which he 
unleashed upon his enemies, vaRozvi, the dominant power in dzimbahwe, before the 
Ndebele arrived. Every time he was embarking on a military expedition, Chihunduro 
“consulted the tail, which stood erect if success were in store” and lay prostrate if the 
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campaign might result in defeat. Both the powers of the tail and the bees were disarmed 
when his wife, given to him by his vaRozvi rivals as a peace-building gesture, returned to her 
people and disclosed her husband’s secrets (Posselt 1935, 141).
VaTsunga praise their clan as “vanofamba namago panyanga” (“those who travel around 
with wasps on their horns”; Hodza 1979, 275). Mago (wasps; singular igo) were not just 
charms of war, but actual wasps carried in a horn. They would already be riled by all the 
bumpiness of journeying, and vaTsunga cranked the venomous insects’ ire even higher by 
shaking up their containers. Then they offloaded them among their enemies. I know how 
it feels; I cannot recall how many times mago stung me. There are three types of wasps in 
Zimbabwe, each known according to its size and habitat. Magomombe (cattle wasps) are 
very big, brown, elongated ones and are usually found near cattle pens. Magodanda (log 
wasps) are shorter, thicker, and gray in color and are found underneath hanging branches, 
especially dead ones. The third type is magombudzi (tiny goat wasps), which hardly sting, 
and when they do, cause little harm. VaTsunga hardly would have bothered with the last 
type.
Then there was chinyavada the scorpion. Also called mhani, this black variety is a delicacy 
for gudo the baboon, despite it knowing all about the insect’s painful, even deadly, sting. The 
particular type found in the Hwedza to Nyanga-Mutare (east) area and south into the lowveld 
stretching from Mwenezi into Mozambique toward the coast is usually the mhanimhani 
(ordinary short scorpions; Hodza 1979, 198n31). It was in homage to the presence of this 
insect that the eastern mountain range of Chimhanimhani (short scorpion), corrupted into 
Chimanimani by British colonizers, is named. Vedzimbahwe observed the baboon patriarch 
to have all rights to the scorpion, “just as the Shona chief, muridzi wapasi [owner of the 
ground/land], has a right to the pangolin” or the ground tusk (Hodza 1979, 199n44). The 
scorpion was a weapon in war, a six-legged biochemical weapon. Lamentations to vaMhani’s 
ancestors speak of scorpions being thrown at people as a chitsinga (debilitating spell): “Chits-
inga chamandindindi chinopisa chinovava chinoshunya chinoregerera waruma nyimo kwete mufemi, 
chinomonyorotsa pfungwa nendangariro, chinovava senduru yakarungwa mhiripiri” (“A tough 
spell that burns and itches and pinches, that also lets go of one who has bitten the cowpea 
[died], not the one who still breathes, that churns the mind and memory, sour and hot like 
bile marinated with peppers”; Chirombe 1983, 285).
The use of insects to deliberately spread affliction, to win wars, and as instruments for 
torturing captives to extract intelligence has been documented in other parts of the world 
(Ahuja 2011; Hamblin 2010, 2013; McNeill 2010). Indeed, so prominent is the role of insects 
in the history of warfare that Jeffrey Lockwood called them “six-legged soldiers.” At different 
times in history, the Romans, the Vietcong, Japanese, North Koreans, and indigenous Amer-
icans alike have used such arthropods as flies, scorpions, potato bugs, nyuchi (bees), and 
hornets to decide battles (Lockwood 2011, 127–149). Historian Lansiné Kaba tells the story 
of the army of Songhai, the most powerful West African kingdom of its time, which in 1591 
tactically drew its Moroccan enemies into the mosquito- and tsetse-infested swamps of 
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Tondibi on the Niger River. There it held the invaders off while the insects worked on them 
and their horses. The casualties were staggering (Kaba 1981, 466).
Equally stunning are examples from recent history. During the Second World War, the 
British authorities sensationally accused locusts of aiding and abating their enemy, Adolf 
Hitler and the Germans. Following the outbreak of hostilities, the British administrators 
charged that the locusts had “joined the Nazis as enemies of humanity,” justifying “cam-
paigns” to be launched against them “from North Africa to India.” The biggest “offensive” 
against this Nazi “ally” was in Kenya from 1943 to 1947. It involved “13 drives, the 4th 
involving 4,000 troops, 33,000 labourers, 750 cars, and 3,000 tons of poison bait in one oper-
ation” (Uvarov 1951, 67).
Discussion: Some Implications for the Concept of Innovation
Therefore, chimurenga or Murenga’s way of fighting becomes a laboratory—a space replete 
with experimentation, application of ideas to practice, and practice generative of new ideas. 
Vedzimbahwe are not simply receiving knowledge from animals; they are engaged in a cogni-
tive and productive process. Observation, experience, encounter, and testing the (in)efficacy 
of various techniques. Trial and error might involve observing birds feeding on fruits, mean-
ing the latter were not poisonous, and so people tried them. Animals going about their every-
day lives became subjects of experiment, the equivalent of lab animals or test herds—guinea 
pigs—except without people touching them. Dissection of carcasses and understanding their 
anatomy occurred during the hunt or when slaughtering livestock, specifically during the 
killing, skinning, cutting, and distribution of meat, each part given to a person according to 
his or her position within the extended family or clan.
To that extent, one finds in chimurenga the communalism, universalism, disinterested-
ness, originality, and skepticism (CUDOS) that Robert Merton discusses ([1942] 1973, 268). 
Another author whose ideas seem applicable is Ludwig Fleck ([1935] 1979) and his notion of 
thought collectives; he argued that “scientific facts” were active constructions shaped by 
sociopsychological attitudes shared by collective cognitive entities. Am I saying, as Paul Fey-
erabend (1975) did, that there is no such thing as scientific method, that “anything goes”? 
No. I am saying it can’t be the case that Western science is the only one that has a method 
and that all others must be false because the Western one is correct. If dzimbahwe knowledge 
is false, it must be false on its own terms or on neutral grounds, not on the terms of other 
traditions of knowledge production. I might ask if a neutral ground exists—but I digress. My 
point was to show that proverbs and tales demonstrate clearly that these were not just casual 
or one-off observations by individuals.
Knowledge individualized was dead. Vedzimbahwe did not write on paper; orality, lan-
guage, practice, and communality are what brought and kept information alive from gener-
ation to generation. Communality also became the mhenenguro (peer review) process through 
which wongororo (observations) and mashoko or mazwi (words; deep chidzimbahwe for 
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statements) were interrogated, corroborated, and canonized as tsomé or ruzivo (knowledge) or 
chokwadi (truth). Proverbs, tales, riddles, and other forms of dzimbahwe communication 
media were all outcomes of communal verifications and disproof over long periods of time. 
Experiences in real life, outcomes of encounters—some individual, others group experiences— 
were shared through conversations at nzvimbo dzedzidziso (sites of education) like padare 
(men’s fireplace; this also means community court), pachoto (women’s fireplace), kuhuni (fire-
wood gathering), kuvhima (hunting), and so on. Vadzidzisi vetsika, tsomé, namagariro echinya-
kare (teachers of customs, knowledge, and ways of living of the olden times) are what I have 
called the professoriate of indigenous knowledge in Transient Workspaces (Mavhunga 2014).
The sites, practices, and ethics of communal action and responsibility offer two interest-
ing contrasts. First, Western scientific practices and capitalist society, which celebrate and 
reward individualism, even selfishness (Popper [1934] 1992, 102), became even more pro-
nounced after passage of the Bay-Dole Act (1980) in the United States , the act that shaped 
the international patent system. Second, with respect to Soviet, North Korean, Chinese, and 
Cuban versions of socialism and communism, which abhor the individual and celebrate the 
collective, but nonetheless turn to collective action (socialism, communism) to address con-
tradictions arising out of an individualistic and materialistic system: capitalism. Both the 
Western and Soviet system start with the individual and move toward the collective (class), 
whereas vedzimbahwe start from community or the communal, hence the sayings: “A person 
is not a person without others” and “It takes a village to raise a child.”
Vedzimbahwe exhibited humility to learn from animals big and small. To them, animals 
were no mere fauna or species but indivisible from the human. The lion, bird, or praying 
mantis was the vehicle in which the ancestor traveled, the medium and form through which 
the ancestor spoke. Here was human intelligence thoroughly dependent upon the presence 
of and interaction with other animals. In vedzimbahwe’s experience we see the animal as an 
intellectual being, not just imbued with but imparting reason. In other words, vedzimbahwe 
showed the humility to be students to the animal. Seeing animals as agents or teachers and 
people as students or respondents to them shows the communality of zvisikwa zvaMwari 
(god’s creations).
Did vedzimbahwe derive kutora mhuka sevanhu (treating animals as people; anthropomor-
phism in Western parlance) from the animals themselves, or did they map human character-
istics specific to their society (or dzimbahwe anthropomorphism, if one may) onto animals? 
It seems the answer is both. In any case, respect for the animal as a person or humanizing 
other creations was much better than kubata vamwe vanhu semhuka (treating other human 
beings as animals)—the worst form of inhumanity in chidzimbahwe—and the project of Euro-
pean colonialism was exactly that! This suggests that it is impossible to reckon with the 
human or animal separate from each other. What happened when animals were taken away 
through arbitrary European colonial laws creating game reserves in twentieth-century Rho-
desia? Perhaps that’s why vedzimbahwe’s descendants have produced no new animal-based 
vocabularies ever since. A whole conversation between people and animals died.
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Encounters with animals were teachable moments in another sense: They served as 
moments for the acquisition through experience of empirical evidence that vedzimbahwe 
later abstracted into a general statement regarding the animal—and most tsumo (proverbs) 
and zvirahwe (riddles) were general statements about specific animal species. A single encoun-
ter did not constitute general knowledge; various encounters did. They may be seen as spaces 
in which statements about the behavior of an animal were generated and/or confirmed. The 
more the encounters and the more similar the experience of many people in different places 
and situations, the more a general statement was made about the animal’s behavior. Then, 
through similes, proverbs, and tales, the animal’s behavior and encounters with it were 
turned into general statements—theory.
The discussion of snake, scorpion, and other poisons invites us to begin a serious con-
versation on African modes of chemistry. In Transient Workspaces (Mavhunga 2014), I deal 
with plant poisons among vedzimbahwe and maHlengwe. In an ongoing research project 
titled “African Chemistry,” I extend the enquiry beyond animal- and plant-based poisons 
to pyrotechnology. If fire-making, pottery, metalworking, and explosive-making force us 
to reckon with African mhando (modes), pfungwa (ideas), and maitirwo (practices) of Afri-
can physics, then plant- and animal-based poisons take African chemistry toward the 
realm of African biology. The poisons affect uropi (brain) as matter and pfungwa (mind, 
thinking, or thought), mutyairi wehupenyu (the driver of life); they affect mwoyo (heart), 
the command center of hupenyu (life); they also induce kugwamba kweropa (clotting of 
blood) in tsinga (veins); and they affect muzongozozo or muzongoza (nerve). The observation 
and capture of animals, the extraction and production of poisons, the reasoning behind 
and deployment of poisons as weapons, and their effects when seen within a calculus of 
strategic-tactical advantage speaks to the serious intellectual work of African biochemical 
warfare.
The work of weaponizing wasps, bees, scorpions, ants, and snakes through poison produc-
tion and consolidation into zvombo (weaponry; singular chombo) illustrates a rich history 
and philosophy of ruzivo (knowledge), nzira (ways, means), and kusika (creativity). The great-
est musiki (creator—and thus innovator) is Murenga himself, and chimurenga, the ways of 
Murenga, comes to mean the ways of the creator—that is, innovation. I do not mean innova-
tion in the narrowed sense of technological and commercial innovation that Western theo-
rists have confined it to as a consequence of their context-specific historical experiences 
(Godin 2009; Nye 1997, 2003; Long 2001; Hilaire-Perez 2000). Nor is technology itself purely 
reduced to artifacts (L. Marx 2010), so that innovation becomes merely summoning technol-
ogy and science to “the relief of the human condition” (Zagorin 2001, 390). Charms like 
chipotanemadziro (loiter around the house) can no longer be dismissed as myths based on 
built laboratory or bench science standards alone. They are outcomes of kudzamisa pfungwa 
(deep thinking or intellectual engagement) on kufamba nemaitiro emhuka (the mobilities and 
behaviors of animals) and zvakunoreva (their meanings). One cannot end with meanings. 
When a whole society believes that animal limbs mixed with other ingredients make potent 
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medicines and that such medicines can be deployed to affect human behavior, it provides an 
opportunity to begin an enquiry into African neuroscience.
Vedzimbahwe’s keen observation of animals big and small in their habitats demonstrates 
that knowledge is not only factual outcomes of experiments or something which when sub-
jected to Western science lab methods today yields “facts” as defined by Western science. 
Ruzivo or ruzivo rwechokwadi (true knowledge) according to vedzimbahwe depends upon com-
munality as a peer review mechanism to reveal what a community determines to be chokwadi 
(true).
Fewer people knew of what we now call asymmetrical warfare than vedzimbahwe. Moun-
tains could be weapons; a praying mantis was a teacher in military strategy; but war was 
always the last recourse. First, there was living in peace. One peace-building strategy was for 
a chief to give his daughter away in marriage to his fiercest rival; she became the bridge of 
peace between two warring communities. Simultaneously, this daughter given away in mar-
riage, consenting or not, became a weapon to disarm powerful rivals through intimacy, as 
bait, or soft power, women being seen among vedzimbahwe as gentle in heart and flesh and 
men hard. Being gentle was an attribute of a good woman and a useless man.
What then to make of the spiritual in a narrative of chimurenga as laboratory? We need to 
do more than what colonial writers used to do—namely, expunge the spiritual detail and 
subject vedzimbahwe’s so-called myths, fables, and black magic to Western laboratory units 
and standards of measure. Whatever “science” existed within such material had to be proven 
in Western-built laboratory experiments using procedures from Western scientific traditions. 
Chidzimbahwe protocols or mitemo (laws) under which this ruzivo had been created through 
kunzvera (close reading) of the surroundings or creations were now dismissed. The reason? 
The spiritual (faith) had no place in (the production of) facts.
As is now clear, it is impossible to account for vedzimbahwe’s close reading of animals 
without confronting the meanings of Murenga/Tovela and mbonga. Both resemble the expe-
riences of the Israelites from bondage in Egypt to Canaan—specifically, the famous parting 
of the waters as the armies of Pharaoh closed in. The only difference is that Moses uses his 
tsvimbo (staff), whereas mbonga beat the waters with her shashiko (loincloth). In Israelites’ 
journeying, there is a spiritual presence in the interactions between the people and their 
surroundings, especially animals. What then should be said of insects, birds, snakes, and 
lions in the context of vedzimbahwe’s abiding beliefs in ancestral spirits and Murenga as 
guide and inspiration in life, and mbonga as armorer of all weaponry, protector of all 
security?
Mbonga also presents a conundrum: a sister forced into incest and rendered a lifelong 
celibate to ensure her brother’s—and the dynasty’s—ascension to and remaining in power. 
She is at once a victim of male power and the most powerful woman in dzimbahwe. Knowing 
she is safe or has been captured determines the warrior’s mentality going into combat. 
Mbonga forces us to confront the relationship between spirituality and psychology—indeed, 
neuroscience—from a deep African perspective. In her, we see the use of sex as a weapon, a 
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solemn act, a spiritual procedure to arm weapons, to lend power to medicines—an entire 
adult life lived as a weapon of one’s brother and community. Not just any sex—sexual inter-
course that’s supposed to be chipini (abomination) because of miko (taboos) against it, but 
made an exception for royalty. Armed through intercourse, disarmed through intercourse, 
the one by a brother, the other by the community’s enemies. Mbonga forces us to confront 
the relationship between zvinechekuita nemuviri (matters of the body, or the bio) and nzira 
dzekuita nadzo zvinhu (ways and means of doing things, or the technological) from deep 
dzimbahwe pfungwa sezviito (thought as practice).
3
The Metalworker, the Potter, and the Pre-European African “Laboratory”
Shadreck Chirikure
Knowledge production has always played a pivotal role in the development of societies 
throughout time, regardless of place (Delanty 2001; Chirikure 2015). However, in the last 
two decades, an avalanche of information technology has transformed the world into a 
knowledge-based society, characterized by knowledge sharing using different digital plat-
forms. In this information and knowledge age, the laboratory occupies a colossal space, one 
that shapes and determines each and every aspect of society. According to the Merriam-Webster 
Online dictionary (www.merriam-webster.com), a laboratory is a place equipped for experi-
mental enquiry in a science; it is a place providing opportunity for experimentation, obser-
vation, or practice in a field of study. This definition vividly paints the image of a modern 
laboratory as a built environment in which scientists wear lab coats and operate sophisti-
cated equipment to conduct science and produce knowledge.
The “success” of the global west in transforming the rest of the world (more intensely) 
from the nineteenth century onward has entrenched science and the university as dominant 
and, in most Western cases, as the only way of knowing (Delanty 2001; Hall 2009). Indeed, 
science and laboratories lie at the heart of the relationship between the academy and capital-
ism. As such, top universities and global corporations invest trillions of dollars of funding 
into knowledge production through laboratory-based research and development. For exam-
ple, laboratories at universities such as Harvard, Cambridge, and Oxford, as well as those of 
global corporate giants such as Apple, are multibillion dollar facilities for which individual 
revenue and expenditure dwarfs by stunningly astronomical proportions the budgets of 
many third-world countries, such as Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi, and more. Such is the 
dominance of the laboratory and science, two of the most iconic attributes of the modern 
(Western) knowledge-production system.
The extension of the view that knowledge is science often contradicts the thinking in 
most non-Western societies that knowledge is culture (Delanty 2001). If knowledge is cul-
ture, then it can be produced wherever humanity works and performs quotidian and techni-
cal tasks.
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In Africa, as elsewhere in previously colonized parts of the globe, Western science and the 
Western laboratory were introduced at colonization. After its establishment, colonialism in 
Africa endured for more than half a century or more and was responsible for transforming 
the nature of knowledge production in the former colonies. Science and the Western labora-
tory entered Africa at the expense of local knowledge that was not only marginalized but also 
challenged for being unscientific. In postcolonial Africa, knowledge production and science 
and technology continued on the foundations established during the colonial period: those 
of science, the academy, and the laboratory (Hall 2009). The “success” of Western science and 
technology has often been accompanied by the erroneous and arrogant view that indigenous 
African sites of work and ways of knowing were inferior and unworthy of any detailed stud-
ies. As Holl (2000, 6) argued: “Throughout the colonial period, sub-Saharan Africa was con-
sidered a backward continent on the receiving end of technological innovations.” For 
example, technologies such as precolonial metal and pottery production, pursuits that were 
heavily set in rituals and symbolism, were viewed as retarded and derivative in origin (Chiri-
kure 2005, 2015). In fact, such a perception was an inheritance from European stereotypical 
views dating back to the early nineteenth century, if not before. Then, most Westerners 
believed that because of a different system of knowing and producing science, Africa had no 
history, no past, no technology, and no innovations (Killick 2015). Consequently, African 
societies and technologies such as iron working were thought to be in a “deep and perpetual 
slumber” without any advancement (Goody 1971).
Contra these views, this chapter argues that precolonial Africa—like many other previ-
ously colonized regions in Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere—had sites of work and knowl-
edge production at which innovations, inventions, and experimentation took place. Such 
sites of work were deeply wrapped up in the view that knowledge is culture. Therefore, they 
were not built environments or laboratories in the modern or Western sense, but they never-
theless played an important role in knowledge production that networked the world from 
early on (Chirikure 2015). Using the example of precolonial metallurgy and pottery making, 
this chapter showcases various innovations and instances of experimentation that took place 
in disparate parts of the African continent. The sites of work and knowledge production were 
often embedded in, and were eschewed for being in, the living space and the natural world. 
If we use the word laboratory to describe these processes, we find that these sites of knowledge 
production were transient and never fixed on one point (Mavhunga 2014). Furthermore, 
they were characterized by a great deal of fluidity involving not just spatial organization but 
also technical and symbolic practices. Just because such technology and how it was gener-
ated and applied differed from that of the West does not in any way suggest that it did not 
exist or that it must be ignored. As Hall (2009) eloquently expressed it, the modern academy 
and science should find ways of embracing other knowledge systems for the good of the 
world.
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Laboratories without Buildings: Sites of Indigenous Metal Production in Precolonial Africa
Metallurgy is one of the most important technologies of all time, heavily embedded both in 
science and in culture and history. However, its origins may not have had anything to do 
with science as we know it today. According to Smith (1981), the beginning of metallurgy in 
Eurasia circa 5000 BCE was all about colors and tonality of metals concerned. About ten 
thousand years before the present, some communities in the Middle East and adjacent 
regions were using colorful ores of copper such as malachite to manufacture bodily orna-
ments such as beads. Although the technology of metal production changed over time and 
was punctuated by context-specific innovations, it was only in the last three hundred years 
of Western history that this technology became heavily set in science. According to Hansen 
(1986), until the medieval period, ritual and symbolism were embedded in European tech-
nology such that the rejection of cultural beliefs as superstition only became common during 
the Enlightenment period. Even when it became a universal way of knowing in the West, 
science blended concepts from many regions such as the Middle East. This demonstrates that 
as a syncretic way of knowing, science should not marginalize other ways of knowing, but 
must rather incorporate them or be incorporated by them. According to Delanty (2001), the 
establishment of the view that knowledge is science in the West witnessed the importance of 
the academy as an important knowledge-production space in which the laboratory played an 
essential role. The laboratory, housed in custom-built buildings, became the principal site at 
which scientific facts and ideas were developed and validated before their application in sites 
of work such as industries.
In contrast to this, both the development of ideas and the execution of those ideas in 
Africa took place at sites of work where men and women often collaborated to produce 
metal. The evolution of indigenous African metallurgy, a millennia-old technology, provides 
a platform on which we can ruminate on these ideas and expose the fact that precolonial 
Africa had “laboratories” that combined experimentation with innovation to produce prod-
ucts and ideas in its own spatial, historical, and technological context. The technology of 
primary iron production in precolonial Africa was through the bloomery process, in which 
ores were reduced to metal in clay-built, charcoal-fueled furnaces to produce solid metal and 
waste products such as slag (Miller and Killick 2004; see figure 3.1). Despite the diversity of 
ores, the temperatures for reducing the ores of iron ranged between 1,100 and 1,200 degrees 
Celsius. According to Rehren et al. (2007), one of the most widely held misconceptions is 
that system-driven parameters dictated that human beings could do little to either influence 
or modify furnace operating systems, such that the product (metal) and waste materials (slag) 
were compositionally identical regardless of time and place. The available evidence from 
many corners of Africa shows that the bloomery technology was neither practiced in 
custom-made buildings nor laboratories (Cline 1937), but it was characterized by a great deal 
of experimentation, innovation, and adaptation, often by trial and error, which bequeathed 
a staggeringly rich inheritance of technological diversity.
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One of the major innovations associated with indigenous African metallurgy relates to the 
use of multiple furnace types across different regions and time spans. Three major furnace 
types—bowl, low-shaft, and high-shaft natural draft furnaces—were all still being used in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Cline 1937; van der Merwe 1980; Kense 1985). 
Bowl furnaces consisted of a semicircular depression in the ground lined with refractory mate-
rials (Chirikure, Burrett, and Haimann 2009). A variant of this type had a superimposed short 
shaft aimed at providing high volumes and better draft when compared to the ordinary bowl 
type (Miller and van der Merwe 1994). The low-shaft furnace type stood between one and 1.5 
meters above the ground; the diameter at the base varied (Kense 1985). The shaft acted as the 
combustion chamber and was insulating enough to promote heat retention during smelting. 
Further distinctions have been made of these low-shaft furnaces, between those that had a 
provision for slag tapping and those without this feature (van der Merwe 1980). Finally, 
high-shaft natural draft furnaces stood between 1.5 and four meters above the ground. In con-
trast to the bowl and low-shaft varieties that were operated by forced draft, these huge fur-
naces were universally powered by natural draft (van der Merwe 1980; Kense 1985; Chirikure, 
Burnett, and Heimann 2009).
Figure 3.1
Late nineteenth-century, low-shaft furnace from Nyanga, Eastern Zimbabwe. The makers and operators 
of this furnace are unknown. The furnace is decorated with female breasts and a waist belt mutimwi, 
worn by women to enhance their fertility. Despite these symbolic beliefs, the smelting process followed 
scientific principles such as reduction and thermodynamics, demonstrating that technology and culture 
were inseparable.
Source: Author.
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Although patchy, archeological research in many parts of Africa exposed a rough progres-
sion in the manner in which furnace types were developed as a consequence of experimen-
tation and or improvisation. The available evidence suggests that the earliest furnace types 
used in West, Central, and East Africa were the low-shaft and bowl furnaces. Natural draft 
furnaces, believed to be a unique African invention, only appeared after the middle of the 
first millennium CE (Robion-Brunner, Surneels, and Perret 2013). The chronological evolu-
tion of these very big furnaces in different parts of Africa is not well understood. In southern 
Africa, the earliest evidence seems to be the Tswapong Hills (Botswana) furnaces, which are 
characterized by tuyeres fused in multiples. Tswapong furnaces belong to a cultural period 
known as Zhizo, which flourished between 800 and 1200 CE (Huffman 2007). Dating back 
to the mid-fifteenth century CE, the Darwendale natural draft furnace excavated by Prender-
gast (1975) just outside Harare in Zimbabwe is one of the most-cited examples of similar 
furnace types in the region. Ndoro (1994) also identified natural draft furnaces through the 
presence of multiply fused tuyeres at Chigaramboni near Great Zimbabwe, but the furnaces 
have yet to be dated.
Although the archeological distribution of natural draft furnaces is not clear, ethnograph-
ically they are restricted to West, Central, and East Africa. Here, they are associated with dif-
ferent production contexts, from the small scale to the large scale. In the Bassar region of 
Togo, the tall natural draft furnaces (2 to 4 m in size) were used to exploit high-grade hema-
tite ores in large-scale production geared toward the external market (de Barros 2013). Yet in 
Malawi and adjacent regions, natural draft furnaces (1.5 to 2.5 m in size) were used to smelt 
very low-grade laterite ores in a two-stage process (Killick 1990). The smelting in Malawian 
natural draft furnaces produced slag and an iron-rich sintered matrix, which was further 
smelted in low-shaft furnaces to produce forgeable iron. As such, natural draft furnaces were 
a technological innovation developed for different environments and scales of production—
those with rich ores geared for the external market (Bassar, Togo) and those with low-grade 
types best for comparatively smaller scales (Phoka, Malawi)—demonstrating innovation, 
improvisation, and experimentation at work. All this was taking place, depending on con-
text, at sites of work inside and outside villages, as determined by the location of resources 
and by cultural and other considerations.
Besides furnace types, another major innovation associated with iron smelting in precolo-
nial Africa relates to slag tapping—the continuous removal of slag during reduction (van der 
Merwe 1980). Before the development of slag tapping, smelters allowed slag to solidify inside 
furnaces or in pits at the bottom of the furnaces. Once the furnace bottom was full, smelting 
could not proceed. Slag tapping provided a way of draining slag from the furnace as it formed 
to achieve more output (Cradock 1995). African smelters invented this innovation and 
applied it to all the known furnace types: bowl, low shaft, and natural draft. In the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, slag-tapping bowl furnaces were used (Ackerman et al. 1999), and 
Malawian natural draft furnaces also employed slag tapping. In the Nsukka region of Nigeria, 
there is a clear progression from non-slag-tapping low-shaft furnaces to slag-tapping low-shaft 
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furnaces in the Early (500 BCE–500 CE) and Late (500 CE–1700 CE) Iron Ages of the area 
(Okafor 1993). This shows that once invented techniques could be adapted through innova-
tion, improvisation, and/or experimentation to suit various furnace types.
A great deal of improvisation, likely through trial and error, was also employed in the use 
of various furnace types to smelt ores of different metals. For example, while iron was widely 
smelted in the three furnace types worked in precolonial Africa, tin and copper were mostly 
smelted in bowl and low-shaft furnaces, employing tapping and non-slag-tapping technolo-
gies. So far, there is only one documented but short-lived case of copper smelting in natural 
draft furnaces, at Kansanshi in Zambia (Bisson 2000). It appears that the experiment did not 
work, because the smelting of copper in natural draft furnaces was never attempted again at 
the site or elsewhere. There are technical reasons; smelting copper in natural draft furnaces 
reduces more iron, creating a low-utility iron-copper alloy tantamount to wasted effort 
(Chirikure and Bandama 2014; Craddock and Meeks 1987). If this experiment had worked, 
we would have seen more copper smelting in natural draft furnaces at the site well into the 
historical period. However, unlike iron, copper was smelted in crucibles often resembling 
normal pottery (Bisson 2000). The ethnographic survey conducted by Cline (1937) revealed 
that across Africa, neighboring groups had differing furnace types and smelting recipes and 
distant communities often possessed similar furnace types, creating a confusing mix. 
Undoubtedly, this indicates that different communities innovated and experimented with 
varying recipes that have bequeathed an amazing array of technological styles and reper-
toires. Most of these sites were open-air places with no custom-made buildings or fancy test-
ing equipment.
The variability that we see in furnace types was also accompanied by that of methods used 
to feed air into the furnaces during smelting. Air was essential for sustaining reduction. Eth-
nographically, two methods were used to introduce air into furnaces: pumping bellows or 
drawing air naturally using the principle of convection (Rehder 2000). Two types of bellows, 
bag and pot types, have been recorded historically and ethnographically in Africa (Cline 
1937). Bag bellows essentially consisted of a sack of softened animal skin; one end had a big 
vent to admit cool air, while the opposite end was connected to a nozzle that channeled the 
air into the furnace (Chirikure, Burrett, and Heimann 2009). Often, the base of the bellows 
and the nozzle were fastened to supports, making it easy to orient the blast into the combus-
tion zone of the furnace. In general, the intake valve was created by a pair of wooden planks 
sewn across the opposite sides of the large opening, with loops on them to hold the fingers 
and thumbs of the bellows operator. Historical and ethnographic evidence has shown that 
bag bellows were routinely utilized in pairs. The bellows operator was required to maintain 
the rhythm—when one was up, the other one was down (Dewey 1990). 
Pot or drum bellows consisted of a pot or wooden cylinder with a loose animal skin dia-
phragm covering the top (Chirikure, Burrett, and Heimann 2009). Typically, wooden sticks 
were fastened to the center of the diaphragm. Upward thrusts of the sticks drew air into the 
cylinder, while downward thrusts expelled the air into the nozzles. In the case of wood-carved 
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bellows, nozzles were an integrated part of the structure. Bellow nozzles were pointed into 
the funnel of a tuyere, a measure designed to prevent the intake phase from sucking lumines-
cent charcoal into the bellows. 
It has been proposed that the volume of air generated by pot and bag bellows was almost 
equal, but a lot depended on the skill of the operator (Merkel 1996; Chirikure, Burrett, and 
Heimann 2009). There is no clearly discernible pattern in the distribution of bag and pot 
bellows types in Africa. In general, drum or pot bellows and their variants are mainly distrib-
uted in West and Central Africa, with a minor presence in Africa south of the Zambezi. In 
contrast, bag bellows have a universal presence across Africa but seem to be the dominant 
type used in parts of South Africa and Zimbabwe. Sometimes, one group used both types of 
bellows, while others used only one type (Cline 1937). Also, it was common for neighboring 
groups to use different types of bellows, indicating that the decision to use one type over 
another could have been a result of cultural preferences. Because bag bellows are made of 
perishable materials, they rarely survive in the archeological record. Pot cylinders occasion-
ally have been found in situ with tuyeres that connected them to furnaces; for example, 
archeologists working at Meroe in the Sudan excavated a furnace with blow pipes and pot 
cylinders in their original position in 500 CE context (Shinnie 1985). On the whole, the poor 
survival rate of the archeological signatures for bellows implies that it is difficult to figure out 
the historical precedence of various types. What seems to be clear is that there was a great 
deal of improvisation and technological cross-borrowing within and between groups, and 
this probably explains the complex patterning of bellow types across Africa.
The production of metal took place in varying contexts that ranged from outside residen-
tial areas to within homesteads. In many cases, metal-working precincts were situated in 
close proximity to resources such as ore, water, and clay. A consideration of the available 
knowledge shows that most smelting precincts were not associated with any buildings. How-
ever, as we have seen, these open-air places were sites of experimentation and improvisation. 
As such, precolonial metallurgy was a user-defined science that contrasts significantly with 
laboratory-defined Western science. New furnaces were developed and introduced to exploit 
various ores in these open-air sites. This example demonstrates that laboratories in the mod-
ern sense are neither the only places for knowledge production nor the only places in which 
science can be conducted.
Primary metal production was associated with symbolism and rituals that were part of the 
technological and cultural repertoire. Ethnographically, indigenous iron smelting is meta-
phorically associated with human reproduction and copulation. Furnaces are considered to 
be symbolic of women who are impregnated by male smelters to produce a symbolic child—
iron. This belief is attested to in furnace designs such as the one shown in figure 3.1. The 
tuyeres that supplied air into the furnaces are known as nyengo in Shona (Ellert 1984). Often, 
sexual intercourse is known as kunyengana, making it explicit—particularly when considered 
in light of the female anatomy of the furnace—that iron smelting was symbolically viewed 
as a metaphor for human reproduction. Often, smelters in African societies were required to 
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practice sexual abstinence when smelting, because it was believed that adultery with their 
real wives would result in failed smelting. Fertility symbolism also pervaded indigenous iron 
production in India. Tripathi (2013) argues that among some Indian communities, iron 
smelting was metaphorically equated with human reproduction. This demonstrates that in 
non-Western worlds, science and technology were deeply embedded in society and culture.
Homesteads as Laboratories for Pottery Production in Africa
One of the most important technologies frequently used in pre- and postcolonial Africa is 
pottery production, which was essential in making utilitarian and ceremonial containers. 
According to the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), pottery refers to “all fired 
ceramic wares that contain clay when formed.” Pottery is made by forming a clay body into 
objects of a required shape and heating them to high temperatures, thereby removing all the 
water from the clay to precipitate reactions that increase the strength of the objects. Like the 
introduction of metallurgy, the beginning of pottery production in Africa remains poorly 
known, but it is possible that the oldest pottery in sub-Saharan Africa dates to circa 9500 BCE 
in Central Mali. It seems that pottery production evolved separately in multiple contexts, 
although not much work has been invested into researching this, which is not surprising 
given that culture history–oriented ceramic typology still remains the dominant way to study 
ceramics in much of Africa. Consequently, most of what we know about pottery production 
and use in the subcontinent comes from ethnography. It is also clear that African archeology 
has not been decolonized; it still religiously follows methodologies developed in the West 
without calibration to suit the local context.
In contrast to metallurgy, which was the domain of men, pottery making and ownership 
was mostly intimately associated with women (Lindahl and Matenga 1996). As a conse-
quence, pottery making in much of Africa took place inside houses. The knowledge of pot-
tery making was often transmitted from mother to daughter, although some potters could 
learn the craft on their own through experimentation. Ethnographically, participant obser-
vation indicated that the clay from the quarries was processed to remove unwanted materi-
als, and often temper was added to increase the clay’s plasticity. Alternatively, clay from 
different sources was mixed to achieve the desired strength (Lindahl and Matenga 1996). The 
right clay was mixed with water to make a fine paste, which was molded to produce pots of 
various sizes and types (figure 3.2). Once dry, the pots were fired in pits or open areas using 
different types of fuel, such as wood or dung. 
As an exclusively female craft, men were not allowed near clay sources, nor was their pres-
ence allowed during pottery firing. Violation of these taboos would result in pots cracking. 
Although seemingly simple, pottery production required a detailed knowledge of raw mate-
rials, particularly their behavior when wet and dry. As such, constant experimentation and 
innovation was the order of the day. Archaeological analyses of the mineralogy and chemical 
composition of archeological and ethnographic pottery reveal that potters prospected for 
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suitable clays that contained heat-resistant minerals such as kaolin and alumina (Chirikure, 
Hall, and Rehren 2015). However, because archeology and ethnoarchaeological (a very prob-
lematic, stigmatizing word) knowledge production have not been sufficiently decolonized, 
local names used for various clays, various tempers, and decorations that appear on African 
pots are mostly unrecorded. It appears that most archeological effort is aimed at describing 
processes from the universalizing view of the West, and in so doing it fails to critically open 
insights into African technosocial experiences.
Figure 3.2
Photograph of a woman making pottery in her house in Giyani, South Africa. The photograph was taken 
by archaeologists for illustrative purposes to aid in learning in class the way in which archaeological ce-
ramics were made. Because of the lack of decolonization alluded to previously, effort only was invested 
in recording processes and techniques such that, like in most colonial books, the name of the potter was 
not recorded, which anonymized this knowledge producer. This practice of not naming African knowl-
edge producers was common in the colonial period and still continues in some ethnoarchaeological 
works.
Source: F. Bandama (with the permission of the author).
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Ethnographic work demonstrated that different types of pots were used for a variety of 
purposes (Ndoro 1996). Studies of pottery made by the Karanga, a subgroup of the Shona 
people mainly distributed in Southern Zimbabwe, revealed that use and function were cor-
related. Bowls known as mbiya were used for serving food, whereas constricted pots called 
hadyana were used for cooking relish. Shouldered pots, shambakodzi, were used for cooking 
sadza. Bigger pots, rongo, were used for fetching water, while gambe, the biggest pot type, was 
used for beer storage. Other pot types include hodzeko, used for storing milk, and pfuko, used 
for keeping liquids such as mahewu. When broken, pots were recycled as chainga, used for 
roasting maize and ground nuts. The designs on some of these pots mirrored those on 
iron-smelting furnaces and other items of material culture, suggesting that fertility symbol-
ism was an integral feature of African quotidian and technical practice. Various pots could be 
used in multiple contexts, ranging from the mundane to the ritual and technical domains. 
Using ceramics from the Gokomere Tunnel site, Ndoro (1996) convincingly demonstrated 
that some of the Karanga pot shapes can be identified in archeological assemblages dating 
back to the early first millennium CE. A look at the archeology indicates the presence of pots 
that were used for multiple purposes, from storage to cooking and serving food. Some pots 
also were used in ritual circumstances. However, in Southern African archeology, local 
ceramic names and uses are hardly considered at all, resulting in the presentation of archeo-
logical pottery only as an analytical aid and not as a knowledge-production outcome that 
holds a reservoir of cultural and technical information.
Archaeologically, not many pottery production places have been recorded in sub-Saharan 
Africa, largely because potting took place inside houses. The firing of pottery did not take 
place in special kilns but rather in open fires, as well as in shallow pits. It is therefore perti-
nent to raise the following question: Are the houses where pottery making took place labo-
ratories, given that they were sites of knowledge production and experimentation? This is 
pertinent because ethnographic practice indicates that some types of clays, when used on 
their own, made pots that cracked upon drying due to lack of temper. Often, this situation 
was remedied by the addition of nonplastic materials known as temper or by mixing two 
different clays with different properties. The potters understood these issues and made tech-
nological interventions such as changing clay sources to achieve the best results. Thus, there 
was continuous innovation and adaptation across the process, from the house to the raw 
material source. These places and spaces where experimentation and production take place 
can hardly be regarded as laboratories in the modern sense, but they are associated with 
knowledge creating, sharing, and dissemination.
As with metallurgy, the production of pottery was associated with rituals, beliefs, and 
taboos. Among groups such as the Shona, pottery was the weapon and domain of women 
(Aschwanden 1982). Men were not permitted at clay quarries, just as they were forbidden 
from pottery-firing localities. Menstruating women too were barred from clay sources. Taboos 
were enforced in some cases, but in others they were relaxed, particularly in the context of 
use. Pottery made by women was used by men for eating, whereas metal made by men was 
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used by women for agriculture and digging clay used for making pots. These cross-craft over-
laps in taboos as well as in use make technologies such as metallurgy and pottery important 
for understanding gender relations in material production and use.
Discussion: Should Western Concepts Always Have African Equivalents?
In this chapter, an argument was made that although the Western world views knowledge as 
science produced by the academy, the non-Western world views knowledge as culture 
(Delanty 2001; Hall 2009). The non-Western view of knowledge is more holistic: It considers 
nonwalled sites of work such as the fields of Mexico, irrigation schemes in Papua New Guinea, 
and, as we have seen from the preceding case studies, sites of metallurgy and pottery making 
in Africa to be laboratories in which sustainable, sociotechnical solutions are generated. 
In Mexico, farmers recognized that various weed species are beneficial because they can be 
harvested for medicinal purposes and can be used as stock feed. Therefore, they knew that 
not every weed has a harmful effect. Mexican farmers continuously experimented in the 
fields, utilizing their indigenous knowledge in a way that promotes sustainable agricultural 
practices (Chambers and Gillespie 2000). Contra this, laboratories in the Western sense are 
buildings dedicated to scientists’ work; they are equipped with high-tech equipment essen-
tial for experimentation, production, and validation of facts and new knowledge. This model 
of science and laboratories as the keys to technological progress is contradicted by the phi-
losophy of knowledge production in the non-Western world, which in the case of African 
metallurgy and pottery making was often more communal than proprietary.
This philosophical difference may also be attributed to capitalism and its obsession with 
an almost unlimited desire to accumulate wealth, with the corollary that laboratories and 
production units are geared toward mass production. For the technologies of today to serve 
billions of people on earth, they have to be produced at the requisite level. It therefore is not 
surprising that when companies such as Google started, they were developed in the garage 
but then considerably increased in stature, building gigantic laboratories to become the 
global giants that they are today. When these generalities are considered in light of indige-
nous African technological practices, several fundamental points emerge. Because they were 
designed to effectively service comparatively smaller populations, indigenous African and 
other non-Western “laboratories” often were sited in spaces and places commensurate with 
serving smaller communities. Fields, homesteads, and houses were essential for various 
knowledge-production activities that were sustainably utilized. Therefore, although science 
has given humanity the capacity to produce on a large scale, it has also introduced challenges 
associated with sustainability, an integral factor for non-Western societies because of the 
holistic manner in which they treat knowledge, nature, and culture.
However, because of the integrated link between technology, nature, and culture, there 
was no need to make massive investments into infrastructure such as laboratories. In any 
case, technological acts were socially embedded, underpinning the relationship between 
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men and women, specialists and nonspecialists, and the young and the old. Specialization 
was also embedded within other aspects of society, unlike in the modern world in which 
laboratories specialize in different things to the extent that often there is no integration with 
negative consequences to the environment. 
Warnier and Fowler (1979) discuss the large-scale iron production among the Babungo of 
Cameroon, which took place in the context of increased demographic pressure. The sites of 
production became bigger and bigger, but still they remained fundamentally different from 
modern concepts of a laboratory. For example, symbolism, rituals, and taboos mentioned 
previously were part and parcel of this iron-production enterprise, but in modern laborato-
ries they are rejected for being “irrational.” In any case, a flashback to Europe’s past indicates 
more or less the same phenomena, whereby production was mostly outside houses and also 
was heavily set in ritual (Hansen 1986). This should not be surprising, because the domi-
nance of science and laboratories is only a recent phenomenon (seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries) that was in part fueled by industrialization and capitalism (Delanty 2001). As such, 
the laboratory is not the only way of producing knowledge; neither is it always the most 
effective, given that it promotes specialization, which disintegrates the parts making up an 
integrated whole. Rather, it presents a question of context and scale: Science and technology 
are innovations precipitated by the acquisitive desires of capitalists, the need to meet grow-
ing demand from growing populations and growing competition for increasingly scarce 
resources. As such, modern laboratories are ideologically designed for a completely different 
philosophical position compared to that of precolonial Africa.
The close consideration of precolonial metal and pottery production presented previously 
animates discussion on several points of interest about African sites of work and sites of 
knowledge production. The first point to consider is that precolonial Africa had many sites 
of knowledge production, such as smelting sites, which were often networked with raw mate-
rial sources, homesteads, and other places as society met its quotidian needs. Depending on 
how one looks at it, the beginning of pottery and metal production is one of the earliest 
scientific innovations in Africa’s recent past. As for metallurgy, a number of innovations in 
furnace types and methods of provisioning air into the furnaces evolved at various places of 
work in various regions. The Mafa smelting furnaces of Cameroon could produce cast iron 
using a technology known traditionally only to produce soft iron (van der Merwe 1980). 
Elsewhere in the world, cast iron was produced using blast furnaces in Chinese antiquity 
(Wagner 2008), and in Europe it was associated with the early beginnings of the industrial 
revolution. The Phoka smelters of Malawi were confronted with geology deficient in 
high-grade iron ores. In response to this, they developed a two-stage technology that initially 
beneficiated the low-grade laterite ores to create an iron-rich matrix, which was further pro-
cessed in low-shaft furnaces to produce iron. In modern-day South Africa, smelters developed 
a technology of adding sand during smelting to reduce titanium-rich magnetite ores, which 
cannot be processed in modern blast furnaces (Killick and Miller 2014). All of these innova-
tions demonstrate mastery within a local context of the furnace-operating conditions that 
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we explain today using principles from chemistry and thermodynamic theory. Indigenous 
Africans may not have had this knowledge, but, as far as products are concerned (cast iron 
and steel), they equaled what we can achieve today in modern laboratories and industries.
Reaching beyond pottery production and metallurgy to consider architecture, it becomes 
clear that various technological practices in precolonial Africa were integrated with each 
other. For example, although rituals excluded women from sites of metal smelting, the fur-
nace itself was symbolically a woman, such that women were conceptually present during 
smelting. Furthermore, men were not permitted near pottery production sites, some of which 
were in the household, a shared space between men and women. Taboos had to be relaxed in 
the homestead context for men and women to coexist, however. Shona pottery was made by 
women just as the plastering of houses (kudzura) and making of earthen floors (kurovera) 
were. In some cases, women used the labor of men. The decorations on houses often included 
female anatomical features such as breasts that were also present on furnaces and pottery, 
reflecting that fertility symbolism pervaded the Shona worldview; each sociotechnocultural 
activity was a miniature version of the general ideas that pervaded society. However, in 
today’s context, some of these interlinkages are now being replaced by the modern: Builders 
who are mostly male now construct houses and plaster and floor them using cement. This 
destroys cross-gender overlaps in labor provisioning and marginalizes some of the ideas asso-
ciated with households in indigenous African societies.
Although comparatively little archeological work has been performed with sites of African 
indigenous pottery production as a consequence of the lack of surviving evidence, it is clear 
that innovations and experimentation took place. It must be stated that most indigenous 
African communities did not have written literacy, so we do not know their names. Also, 
archeologists rarely use linguistic information to attempt to address this gap. In keeping with 
established (during the colonial period) archeological practice, African archeologists use the 
modern names of places to refer to these precolonial people whose names are unknown. The 
material culture used by such communities also is identified using modern place names. For 
example, pottery decorated with distinctive incisions was first found at Eiland near Tzaneen 
in northern South Africa. However, the pottery was found at many sites distributed across 
northern South Africa and adjacent regions of northeastern Botswana and southwestern 
Zimbabwe. Some of the communities making this Eiland pottery at Rooiberg in northern 
South Africa between 1200 and 1300 CE deliberately added ground broken potsherds (grog) 
to the clay as temper, which improved the performance characteristics of their pots (Ban-
dama, Hall, and Chirikure 2015). Grog has a beneficial effect in that it allows for better heat 
absorption. This technological solution of adding ground pottery as temper may have been 
cultural as well. This is reinforced by the fact that pottery that comes after Eiland, known as 
Madikwe by archeologists, has no such temper (Bandama, Hall, and Chirikure 2015).
The picture that exists archeologically is that throughout the two thousand–year history 
of pottery production and use, different indigenous groups made different types of pottery. 
Even today, the pottery made by the Venda people of South Africa is different from that used 
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by the Zulu and other groups in sub-Saharan Africa. However, archeology is not equipped to 
distinguish similar ceramics made by different groups of people. Be that as it may, that differ-
ent pottery types were used and continue to be used by neighboring and related groups in 
the last two thousand years of sub-Saharan history is a powerful indicator of local innova-
tion, improvisation, and/or experimentation. In all these cases, the site of knowledge pro-
duction was in the case of pottery the domestic space where people lived; this is where 
experimentation and improvisation took place. Similarly, with primary metal production, 
experimentation and innovation took place at smelting sites, some located inside villages but 
others outside (Chirikure 2015). Here, master smelters could impart knowledge to appren-
tices, who later modified existing knowledge within conventions to innovate through trial 
and error experimentation. Therefore, indigenous potters and metal producers constantly 
innovated, but clearly their sites of work are different from our conception of a laboratory in 
the modern sense of the word.
Although innovation, experimentation, and improvisation were permanent features of 
indigenous pyrotechnologies in Africa, the demographic context was intimately linked to 
the scale of production. For the very low-population densities characteristic of much of pre-
colonial Africa, the available technologies and ways of knowing were appropriate. Pottery 
and metal production were seasonal activities primarily handled outside of the normal agri-
cultural cycle. In contexts with high demand for metal, the organization of production was 
reorganized to suit this demand. For example, although iron working among many Shona 
groups in Zimbabwe was seasonal, the Njanja of Zimbabwe maintained a year-round iron 
industry to meet demand from neighboring groups and the Portuguese in Sena, Mozambique 
(Mackenzie 1975; Chirikure 2006). This industry located in the heart of the village was only 
interrupted by colonialism in the late nineteenth century. Similarly, Shaka Zulu employed 
full-time metalworkers, who smelted iron and made spears throughout the year using very 
small bowl furnaces that reduced the time required to produce metal (Maggs 1992).
What is clear from this information is that the activities that take place in today’s 
laboratory—experimentation, trial and error, and much more—took place at African sites of 
work such as smelting precincts and homesteads where pots were made. In fact, the labora-
tory was always with the people, be it in the agricultural fields of Mexico, the stone construc-
tion at Great Zimbabwe, or the irrigation in Papua New Guinea. These sites of work in 
precolonial Africa produced commodities that promoted local and regional interaction. 
Indeed, Southern African iron, gold, and copper were exported to the Indian Ocean rim 
region via the East African littoral (Summers 1969). Similarly, West African metal found itself 
in the Islamic world via the trans-Saharan trade. Moving to another category of material 
culture, pottery was also traded between and within groups, resulting in the imitation, 
improvisation, and admixture of styles that we see archeologically (Pikirayi 2007). One of the 
most important points to note about precolonial Africa is that no patenting was practiced, 
such that knowledge was communally owned. As such, inventors, innovators, and improvis-
ers worked not just for themselves but also for the community at large.
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Therefore, the African laboratory if we can talk of one was communally oriented but pro-
duced goods and commodities that satisfied not just local but also external needs. It is there-
fore a great misconception to think that the laboratory as conceptualized in a Western sense 
brought civilization, progress, and light to illuminate what was then a primitive, regressing, 
and Dark Continent Africa and a non-Western world (Mavhunga 2014). The truth is that for 
much of Africa’s history most people did not even care that the built laboratory existed. 
Instead, they had their own sites of experimentation and application of knowledge that ful-
filled their needs. As such, the European-established laboratory is the dominant laboratory 
today, but it displaced preexisting local ones. In a few areas where pottery is still being pro-
duced and scrap metal is forged in villages, the urban-based laboratory exists in complement 
with these rural and local ones.
Conclusion: Toward a Decolonized African Science, Technology, and Innovation Practice
“There are many ways to skin a cat,” says the cliché. Modern laboratories and science are one 
of the many interventions that humanity made and continues to make in order to meet 
routine necessities. The example of two pyrotechnologies, metallurgy and pottery, that were 
central to precolonial societies in Africa shows that innovations, improvisation, and experi-
mentation were hallmarks of this non-Western system. If laboratory refers to any place where 
knowledge is produced through experimentation, improvisation, and adaptation, then the 
many open-air sites and houses where metals were smelted and pots were made are laborato-
ries that sustained Africa’s growth. This holistic manner in which knowledge was produced 
was also a distinguishing feature of precolonial Mexican, Indian, and Papua New Guinean 
communities. If crop fields, workshops, or places of work are laboratories, then in their own 
context the non-Western parts of the globe such as Africa had their own unique ways of 
knowing, improving existing knowledge and applying it to solve different problems at hand 
in a sustainable and integrated way. The only problem is that we do not know much about 
technologies that sustained precolonial Africa, with many mistaking the absence of knowl-
edge in the present for an absence of knowledge in the deeper past. African archeology 
requires a major program of decolonizing theory and practice to place African ways of doing 
things, African terminologies, and African ways of knowing in the center of academic 
enquiry. The language of African archeology is largely Western, with no attempt to include 
more local concepts and ways of describing and understanding things. It is the locally spe-
cific that is lost in this universalizing way of learning about laboratories, technology, and 
innovation. Archaeologists must work with linguists and other specialists in African cultures 
to produce African-centered knowledges. Therefore, just as modern science and laboratories 
are suited to some modern contexts, African ways of knowing are and were suited to their 
own context, if only we invest more time in decolonizing and studying them.

4
Plants of Bondage, Limbo Plants, and Liberation Flora:  
Diasporic Reflections for STS in Africa and Africa in STS
Geri Augusto
Sou eu aquele que plantou
Os canaviais e cafezais
E os regou com suor e sangue ...
E nem a morte terá força
Para me fazer calar.1
—Carlos de Assumpção (1958), cited in de Camargo, Colina, and Rodrigues 1986, 53; italics in original
Whatever rocky soil she landed on, she turned into a garden.
—Alice Walker [1972] 1983, 271
I scattered seed enough to plant the land
in rows from Canada to Mexico
but for my reaping only what the hand
can hold at once is all that I can show.
—Arna Bontemps [1963] 2009, 95
African creativities are found in African mobilities.
—Chakanetsa Mavhunga
For some time, I have been interested in that often violent but also generative intersection of 
knowledge about plants among European colonizers, the indigenous peoples of Africa and 
the Americas, and black people enslaved in Europe’s vast colonies, particularly on planta-
tions in what the incoming occupiers at first deemed the “New World” (Augusto 2007, 2009). 
The literature about medico-botanical, agricultural, and other natural knowledge of indige-
nous peoples and of enslaved Africans and their descendants is growing, and these topics are 
now looked at through a variety of approaches, from anthropology to archeology, from envi-
ronment to medicine. However, this literature is still not an integral part of a truly globalized 
history of science and technology, one which takes the cognitively just position that human 
societies and knowledges are coeval without having to be judged commensurate or that 
genealogies of contemporary technological imagination and innovation are also to be found 
in Africa and its diasporas. That different history of science and technology, emphasizing 
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what was creative, inventive, and put together differently—assembled or reassembled—by 
enslaved Africans and their earliest descendants, needs to be more intentionally generated 
and more explicitly interrogated.
I will take a recent project of making, the creation of an object and of a specific space—a 
seed assemblage and a small symbolic slave garden, both of which I recently researched and 
designed for Brown University’s Center for the Study of Slavery and Justice (CSSJ)—as point 
of departure, a way of visualizing and remembering African diasporic botanical systems of 
knowledge and belief. I will use that work as a mediator in a conversation about knowledge 
and innovation from an angle less often considered, from the optic of persons once deemed 
not human. I will describe, discuss, and speculate about some of the spaces in which botan-
ical knowledge from Africa was transplanted, reimagined, reassembled—alone or together 
with other knowledge—reinvented, or reworked in new spaces and contexts by enslaved 
persons and suggest that these spaces might also be productive locations for thinking about 
innovation.2 With that aim in mind, I will posit some metaphorical plant categories. In 
doing so, I am informed by (but will not extensively rehearse here) a burgeoning set of 
archives about colonial sciences, indigenous knowledges, the material culture of plantations 
and of slavery, slave gardens, and maroon settlements (quilombos or palenques as they are 
known in Brazil and other parts of Latin America), as well as by Africana visual arts and liter-
ature. The latter references start right from the poetic epigrams with which this chapter 
begins, invoking what the enslaved wrought of fertile fields, rocky soil, and seeds with blood, 
ingenuity, and toil.
I am also impelled by the not easily describable pull of my ancestors and the experience 
of living in Angola (from whence came so many of the captive Africans brought to the Amer-
icas), as well as working in Southern Africa and Brazil. In these spaces, one African and one 
diasporic, I have taken many an epistemic walk through farms and botanical gardens first 
established under colonialism or its successor regimes.3 Most recently, my thoughts have 
been stimulated by some of the conversations already being generated by the assemblage and 
the CSSJ garden. Those exercises in collectively thinking with a tangible object and a sym-
bolic inscription in the ground, somewhat to my surprise, have taken off in multiple direc-
tions. Some have found them a touchstone for talking about the role of Native American 
crops and herbs in the early New England colonies. Others have been prompted to reflect on 
food heritage globally, on African and diasporic environmental ideas, on the relation between 
textiles and slavery, on the aesthetics of enslaved women’s headscarves, and of course about 
future directions in the historiography of slavery. But for the purposes of this chapter, my 
broad arguments will be limited to two. I will assert that the ways in which enslaved Africans 
and their descendants created, adapted, used, and thought about plant knowledge in the 
Americas, under the most coercive and traumatic of conditions, constitutes one possible 
alternative genealogy for innovation and for technological imagination. I will also argue, 
mainly by demonstration of just a few of the possibilities for doing so, that at the intersection 
of STS and the interdisciplinary field of Africana studies might lie some critical resources for 
Plants of Bondage, Limbo Plants, and Liberation Flora 81
reframing the knowledge of enslaved Africans and their earliest descendants in the diaspora 
as both ideas and practice, and we might arrive at novel ways to think about histories of 
technology that come from within a unique historical experience.
The terrains I will consider as spaces of knowledge and innovation in this chapter are 
threefold: first, those where enslaved Africans (and earlier also indigenous peoples) brought 
not just their muscles but also their expertise to the work of cultivating, harvesting, and pro-
cessing crops that I will call plants of bondage, those plantations and estates throughout the 
“New World” which generated vast wealth in the Americas and Europe. The conceptual term 
itself is almost self-explanatory, once one stops to think of its direct implication. It is com-
mon knowledge that bondswomen and men produced cotton, sugar, tobacco, indigo, rice, 
cacao, and coffee. As the incorrigible runaway and abolitionist Henry Bibb, editor of the 
newspaper Voice of the Fugitive, put it in an 1852 letter:
Now with all candour in answer to this proslavery logic, let me ask who is it that takes care of the slave 
holders and their families? Who is it that clears up the forest, cultivates the Land, manages the stock, 
husbands the grain, and prepares it for the table? Who is it that digs from the cotton, sugar, and rice 
fields the means with which to build southern Cities, Steam boats, School houses and churches? ... and 
yet they or their children are not permitted to enjoy any of the benefits of these Institutions. ... Oh! 
tell me not then Sir, that a man is happier and better off in a state of chattel bondage than in a state of 
freedom. (Blassingame [1977] 2002, 52)
What needs registering here is that bound up in perpetual servitude were knowledge and 
skills that sometimes resulted in new technological combinations for production of those 
plants of bondage. An exemplary and well-documented case is that of the tidal (mangrove) 
rice-growing system, the innovative creation of which on the West African coast dates back 
to the eleventh century (Fields-Black 2008). Centuries later, on Georgia’s coastal plain, one 
environmental historian notes: “Planters and their [West African] slaves molded the lands ... 
that had proved useless to the first colonists into formidable units of production” (Stewart 
[1996] 2002, 89). Carney and Rosomoff (2009, 153) famously go further, calling rice cultiva-
tion in the Carolinas “not only the transfer of African seed to the colony, but the simultane-
ous migration of an entire African agricultural and processing technology by enslaved African 
rice growers.” Future new histories on the other plants of bondage may disclose similar con-
tributions by the enslaved, not just to the transformation of botanical landscapes in the 
Americas, but also to the agricultural technologies involved in doing so.4
The second space to which I wish to direct attention, in connection with mobile creativity 
and reinvention, is that of the life-saving and in some cases astonishingly productive gardens 
in the interstices of the plantation—the dooryards and small plots of the slave quarters and 
the provision grounds at the margins of the masters’ estates, which Carney and Rosomoff 
(2009) have most aptly termed “botanical gardens of the dispossessed.” Here, the enslaved 
raised what I will call limbo plants. These were a mix of plants carried over from Africa, includ-
ing okra, black-eyed or cow peas, and sesame, among others; plants re-encountered in the 
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Americas after having already been adopted in Africa, such as cassava (mandioca) and corn 
(maize); and plants indigenous to the New World, nutritional or medicinal, and often at 
the same time simply aesthetically pleasing. More will be said of this category of limbo 
plants ahead.
Lastly, I limn those plants I have elsewhere called liberation flora (Augusto 2009), culti-
vated and developed in the free territory of maroon (quilombola, palenque) communities 
using the plant knowledge (especially agronomic) traditions and cultural templates of the 
enslaved, as well as those borrowed from the indigenous inhabitants of the region and from 
the plantation experience—the plants the enslaved could at last grow solely for their own 
provisioning, trade, and well-being as one concrete practice of self-liberation and resistance 
in landscapes they could refashion and control.
Clearly, these conceptual categories are not iron-clad; plants of bondage, such as sugar 
cane or rice, could and did show up as liberation flora in new free spaces, and limbo plants 
(e.g., tobacco or vegetables) likewise transgressed when relocated or sold for the slaves’ own 
purposes.5 Nor are they, as metaphoric notions, intended to erase now-indispensable scien-
tific botanical names and categories, and the units of environmental analysis that are hege-
monic in much of global knowledge practice. Rather, these concepts are used here to spark 
new ways of thinking about innovation, drawing from spaces where creativity was mobile 
and mutable by the hardest necessity and nonetheless connected to social life, human imag-
ination, spirituality, and the practices of (or at least aspiration to) freedom, even among those 
who have been called “socially dead” (Patterson 1982).
In doing so, I take Mavhunga’s (2014, 8) working definition of innovation: “The act of 
introducing something new, be it a method or a thing, either from scratch or from outside,” 
including the capacities of ordinary people “to import and deploy things coming from out-
side” and assign the “incoming thing” new meanings and purposes. However, I am working 
with a particular case here, one in which captive Africans themselves were “incoming” and 
“imported.” That requires us to think from a different directionality. Those captives carried 
their creativities internally across kalunga, the sea dividing the living from the dead in Kongo 
cosmology—mobility in the utmost sense. Besides this notion of mobile creativity, I also 
want to work here with a very old-fashioned understanding of invention—that is, Usher’s 
notion of it as the emergence of new things from an “act of insight” which results from 
“cumulative synthesis” (Ruttan 1959, 600–601)—and suggest that it is a concept that, along-
side innovation, might help further illuminate the plant knowledge created and practiced by 
enslaved Africans and their descendants. Invention, in this view, involves not just the intan-
gible results of imagination, but also invention of processes and technologies in a recombina-
tion of existing knowledges. I argue that such recombination or cumulative synthesis has been 
one of the hallmarks of African creativity in the Americas, including with respect to the cul-
tivation of plants in contexts rife with violence and threat, but also with the very human 
imperative to recreate, resist, and survive. We might conclude that trauma and resistance 
have also been the mothers of invention.
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In the sections that follow, I will use the artworks I referred to previously that I created 
for CSSJ to help suggest some of the ways in which the plant knowledge of the enslaved 
might generate reconsiderations about innovation, drawing on the humanities (anthropol-
ogy, history, art history, literature, cultural studies) and environmental studies for illumina-
tion. In my broader project, I am exploring further some of the newer research on the unique 
and underheralded contribution of key African plants to plantation economies, life, and 
culture in the Americas; recent studies of slave gardens and plots and other material culture 
on a few well-known, iconic US slave plantation sites; examples of plant knowledge that 
resulted from the interchange among enslaved Africans and the First Nations (Native Ameri-
can cultures) throughout the New World; and the historical records of plant knowledge 
in maroon/quilombola communities, particularly those analyzed in great depth under a ver-
itable explosion of new interdisciplinary Brazilian scholarship on slavery. In this chapter, 
there is only space to gesture at this ongoing, larger work. Throughout, gardens are a focal 
point, plants and the contexts of their cultivation the epistemic object, and rethinking gene-
alogies and notions of innovation from an African and Afro-descendant perspective the 
broad intent.
Performative Research and Visualized Knowledge: Cabinets, Gardens, and Patches
It will be useful to explicate briefly the assemblage constructed in an antique box for storing 
and displaying seeds and the symbolic slave garden. These were performative research, 
intended “not only to describe phenomena but also to enact possibilities” by attending to 
the ontological implications of doing and not just writing (Fisher et al. 2015). I wanted both 
the assemblage and garden to communicate differently from how a text might and to invite 
coproduction afterwards of the ideas and symbolic meanings they initially inscribe. To a 
great extent, this is what African and diasporic oral and artistic traditions do—a reverberat-
ing, imaginative, but space-effective flexibility that I would suggest is itself a facet of innova-
tion and worth reclaiming as such.
Both artworks-in-the-making were deliberately thought of, as well, in apposition and 
opposition to two of the most important techniques for visualizing and taking back to Europe 
scientific knowledge and diverse artifacts obtained by virtue of expansion into Asia, Africa, 
and the New World: (1) Wunderkammern or curiosity cabinets and (2) botanical gardens. By 
the seventeenth century, Cook (1996) notes, all world-class universities in Europe boasted 
both of these among their essential mechanisms for knowledge production (see figures 4.1 
and 4.2). Bleichmar (2006) argues in her work on Spanish imperial botanical expeditions to 
the Americas and the eighteenth-century botanical art of Jose Mutis that curiosity cabinets 
were a “conscious decision to present a pictorial alternative based on both scientific and 
artistic criteria.”
Botanical gardens and “dry” herbaria were extensively used in the studies of nature 
conducted by Europe’s “armchair botanists,” who, as Whitaker (1996), Schiebinger (2004), 
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and others point out, often conducted their visual examinations indoors in the comfort 
of private studies. Those gardens and herbaria, having incorporated plants detached from 
indigenous knowledge and contexts, generated countless dissertations and learned articles 
back in Europe (Augusto 2007). Moreover, some of the most famous collections of traveling 
scientists and physicians who returned home to consolidate fortunes accrued in the colonies 
not only graced their own private cabinets but also became the foundations of great museum 
collections of natural history. One of the best-known cases in point is that of the physician 
Hans Sloane’s Jamaica collection, which became the core of the British Museum (Delbourgo 
2010; Quilley and Kriz 2003).6 Cook (2007) ties all these ways to represent and circulate 
knowledge explicitly to the rise of new sciences in Europe, which were actually, he argues, 
produced by hosts of people all over the globe, thanks to the new global European trading 
companies.
Figure 4.1a
Natural history museum of Ferrante Imperato of Naples.
Source: Ferrante Imperato, Dell'Historia Naturale (Naples, 1599).
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In answer to the invitation to “make us something that will bring to life the knowledge 
of the enslaved” and my own wont to use plants as epistemic objects, I took the constraint 
of the CSSJ’s very small backyard space—with neither the climate nor the room to plant crops 
of food or fiber—as a fitting injunction to trouble those earlier scientific visualizations of 
plant knowledge, as well as to honor the “tiny plots” or “huck patches” of the cabin and hut 
dooryards, where the enslaved planted and tended vegetable and root gardens.7 Those 
patches supplemented a meager diet, even managing sometimes to yield a surplus sold at 
market, when slave-masters allowed, and were often bought up by the mistress for her 
own table (Heath and Bennett 2000; Heath 2001; Thomson 2008). In CSSJ’s tiny garden are 
a few of the multipurpose flowering plants and medicinal herbs—including dandelions 
in profusion—that enslaved Africans in New England and elsewhere learned about and 
adapted, largely from Native Americans but also from the European colonists. I surmise that 
even those small patches of land had meanings that were not just utilitarian, as will be 
Figure 4.1b
Cabinet of Curiosities, 1690s, Domenico Remps.
Source: Museo dell’Opificio delle Pietre Dure, Florence.
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Figure 4.2a
Padua Botanical Garden, 1545. 
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orto_botanico_di_Padova#/media/File:Orto_dei_semplici_PD_01 
.jpg.
elaborated upon ahead. Therefore, the garden harbors as well some objects resonating Afri-
can symbols and underlying cosmologies that enslaved persons reconfigured, in myriad 
open and clandestine ways, across the different natural and built environments of the Amer-
icas. Notable among the symbolic features of the garden are two which appear still, one 
way or another, in African-American yard art in the South: bottle trees and dikenga dia Kongo, 
the circular cosmogram of the once-powerful West Central African kingdom (Thompson 
1984; Fu-Kiau [1980] 2001; Martinez-Ruiz 2013; Cooksey, Poyor, and Vanhee 2013; Sills and 
Als 2010).
However, as I worked through how to visualize this subjugated plant knowledge born of 
trauma and duress, it seemed as well that additional aspects about the reinvention and reas-
sembly of knowledge around all three categories that I used to think with—plants of bond-
age, limbo plants, and liberation flora—might also be suggested in a piece of visual art.8 This 
I decided to attempt as an assemblage, using only seeds, pods, and grains plus a few objets 
trouvés on background panels of African cloth and fibers associated with plantation slavery 
(see figures 4.3 and 4.4 for more details).
“To Set Going Something New”: Assemblages, Visual Arts, and African Reinvention  
in the Americas
The leap of imagination from plantations and gardens of whatever type to an actual outside 
garden, symbolic or otherwise, is less a stretch of visualization technique than the seed 
assemblage, so it may be worthwhile to burrow into the thinking behind this choice. 
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Figure 4.2b
Interior of the Great Palm House, Kew Gardens, 1852.
Source: Illustrated London News, August 7, 1852.
Assemblage is, of course, one of the most generative of STS tropes (Deleuze and Guattari 1987) 
to describe heterogeneous things or pieces of things—material, discursive, or both—in asso-
ciation with one another in a single context. However, the very notion of assemblage is also 
inherent in how the enslaved created and used their knowledge in the Americas. By taking a 
brief digression through Africana literature and visual arts, we can still use the term in its STS 
iteration but also give it additional meanings that may point toward other ways of thinking 
and talking about innovation, ways that put Africa and the African diaspora at the center of 
how we might construe differently the histories of plant sciences and technologies.
In art, an assemblage is “a collage incorporating material or objects other than paper and 
fabric,” with objects predominating (Weiss 1979, 267). But for the artist Romare Bearden, a 
collage comprised “ritual or incantatory object[s],” extracting material from the world and 
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Figure 4.3
The seed assemblage “Plants of Bondage/Liberation Flora.”
Source: Author.
then transmuting it, “turning so many scraps of paper into a novel physical form” (DeLue 
2012, 11, 13). In assemblages that often invoke Haitian and African women’s power as well 
as “the pull of ancestral past and its subconscious memory,” the artist Betye Saars uses arti-
facts, found objects, and personal histories to create a visual dialogue in small spaces, giving 
these things changed meanings (Carpenter 2003, 28). Saar’s assemblages, she avers, are “a 
process of transposition and appropriation”—a notion that might also suggest another way 
to think about what the enslaved wrought and thought in their gardens. Seeds, then, with 
their power to imply both (1) the work of planting and cultivation and (2) generative, con-
tained energies opening up to the new turned out to make optimal objects for an assemblage 
of plant knowledge of the enslaved.
There are also older, African genealogies for the technique of assemblage as visualization 
of knowledge and memory practice, just as there are in many indigenous knowledge systems. 
A lukasa (memory board) made by the Luba people (in Central Africa, present-day Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo), for example, is an assemblage made of wood, beads, metal, shell 
... and thought (see figure 4.5). Indeed, it has been termed by art historians as “the mother-
board of Luba thought,” an organizer of data, a cosmogram, a history of sacred locales and 
much more, reinterpreted by trained court historians as they run their hands over the board 
in a tactile practice that reactivates memory in the presence of an audience (Roberts 2011, 
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Figure 4.4
Aspects of the CSSJ slave garden. 
Source: Author.
76). Mack (2003, 40–41) writes about lukasa as “thought retrieved from the intermediation 
of objects,” objects that “articulate acts of remembering.”
Notions of assembly and reassembly, acts of reinvention, translation, and innovation, 
abound in African diaspora literature and literary studies, as well as in discussions of African 
cosmological and sacred arts. This complex of ways to think about, make, and remake knowl-
edge, prototypically the work of enslaved Africans and their descendants in the diaspora, I 
think of as re/trans. From this optic, we might pose a question: What if an “innovation jour-
ney” (Van de Ven et al. 1999) began in the dark, nauseating hold of a ship? Does not the 
reinvention of self as human, after that experience, and the transformation of less-than-op-
timal spaces into possibilities of survival, and even later thriving, count as innovation? The 
Caribbean scholar and poet Kamau Brathwaite ([1971] 1981) seems to think so, arguing that 
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“the ex-African slaves and creole blacks in the Caribbean began from their first landings to 
adapt their African heritage to the new and changed conditions ... In the English islands at 
any rate, there was very little ‘European’ to adapt to” (6). It is important, Brathwaite contin-
ues, to study how enslaved Africans went about reconstructing lives from a “great tradition 
... using the available tools and memories of [their] traditional heritage to set going something 
new, something Caribbean, but something nevertheless recognizably African” (6–7; italics 
mine). From this view, the infamous Middle Passage might be seen as “a pathway or channel 
between this tradition and what is being evolved, on new soil, in the Caribbean” (7). Monique 
Allewaert’s (2013) provocative work of ecocriticism and “eco-poetics” on the ecological 
Figure 4.5
Lukasa.
Source: Eglash 1999, 166.
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personhoods created in plantation slavery and maroon/quilombola cultures suggests that 
assemblage allows for the crossing of temporalities and spaces and the combining of frag-
ments practiced by the enslaved or newly free, as well as their “modes of inhabiting the col-
onies and colonial histories that depart from the logic of colonialism and the modes of 
redress possible within it” (100).
In a similar vein, the prize-winning Guyanese novelist and theorist of the imagination 
Wilson Harris ([1970] 1995), in his classic text History, Fable and Myth in the Caribbean and 
Guianas, introduced a new usage of the quintessential Caribbean dance limbo, which myth 
has it first arose on the decks of the slave ships, interpreting it as “the renascence of a new 
corpus of sensibility that could translate and accommodate African and other legacies within 
a new architecture of cultures” (20). Elsewhere, Harris suggests metaphorically that limbo is 
a “novel re-assembly” arisen from “a state of cramp to articulate new growth ... a creative 
phenomenon of the first importance in the imagination of a people violated by economic 
fate” (20–21). This limbo assembly in the New World, Brathwaite argues, is African, but also 
incorporates “Amerindian features,” and draws on a veritable “syndrome of variables” of 
architecture and visual arts, but also of technologies, born of “a long duress of the imagina-
tion” (Brathwaite [1971] 1981, 29). Jamaican cultural studies scholar Stanley-Niaah (Osinubi 
2009, 179) links limbo to “new sensibilities of survivalism” and the reconfiguring of space 
under conditions of domination.
Hence it is from this Caribbean concept of limbo that I borrow the notion of limbo plants 
to describe those food and medicinal plants grown in the small slave gardens on plantations 
under colonial racial slavery. These were instances, anthropologist John Vlach (1993) argues, 
of the enslaved creating an alternative landscape and territory “beyond their master’s imme-
diate scrutiny, at the margins of the plantation”—a creative, if survivalist, response to their 
“assigned environments” in spaces “open to and characterized by movement” (13–14; italics 
mine). “Slave initiative” in their half-acre or less gardens, observers often remarked, was 
highly productive. Vlach goes on to recount: “The space around the slave cabins was highly 
charged with social symbolism. In their gardens, the part of the [slave] quarters for which 
they were most responsible, slaves were most effective in establishing a territorial claim 
within the plantation’s confines” (168). Often though, as some former slaves testified, a par-
ticularly productive patch simply was snatched away by the master, and another space had 
to be claimed and remade (Blassingame [1977] 2002). Yet through their own enterprise and 
inventiveness, the enslaved somehow “kept body and soul together.”
Irregular Rearrangement and Imagination: An “Aesthetics of Resistance and Identity”
Imagination, inventors and scientists from Albert Einstein to George Washington Carver 
have often asserted, counts as much as knowledge in innovation. The writer Alice Walker 
([1972] 1983) reminds us that for a long line of African American women, from slavery to 
now, gardens have been a space for giving rein to imagination and an urge to create beauty 
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otherwise suppressed under oppression. This is why, though it might at first seem counterin-
tuitive that enslaved persons also grew plants for reasons of aesthetics and the will for an 
inner life beyond the reach of the lash or endless linear rows of commodity crops, I thought 
it important to include flowering medicinal plants in the CSSJ slave garden. They stand for 
that suppressed but indomitable urge to create for reasons of one’s own. As art historian Les-
lie King-Hammond (2008) argues, in developing her notion of an “aesthetics of resistance 
and identity,” such an aesthetics played out, among other ways, in gardens that focused on 
food and medicine but also included flowers:
Surviving the American plantation system required enslaved Africans to locate spaces that were intimate 
and often obscure, where they could cultivate aesthetic sensibilities within and beyond the limitations 
of slavery. Enslaved Africans learned though ancestral memory, artistic innovation, and their own in-
tellectual genius to identify safe and sacred “spaces of blackness” in order to resist domination and to 
protect their new sense of identity in the new world ... Some of these spaces were in their environments: 
their homes, gardens, communities and grave sites. (58)
Archival research on slave life and newer archeological and other studies of plantation 
material culture also note that the enslaved grew flowering plants for a multitude of purposes 
(Egypt, Masuoka, and Johnson [1945] 1968; Heath and Bennett 2000).9 From the testimony 
of the enslaved in the WPA Alabama interviews, for example, it was clear that both vegetables 
and flowers were often planted in the slave patches. Tildy Collins, when contacted in 1937, 
was still living in her one-room cabin, with its “neat garden of vegetables and flowers com-
bined, with morning glories trained carefully over the fence nearly all the way around” (WPA 
1937, 83). The former slave Sam Aleckson testified that the crudely built cabins on the plan-
tation in which he lived “had flower gardens in front of them” (Blassingame [1977] 2002, 
255). Another ex-slave recalled poignantly from his childhood how each morning his mother, 
as she set out for an arduous day in the cotton fields, would let her eye linger a moment on 
her morning glory vines. It probably helped that some of the most useful plants for remedy-
ing illnesses, such as irises (“blue flags”), were also pleasing to the eye.
In his evocative introduction to a photographic essay on African American gardens across 
the US South, the swept yards in which they are often set, and the variety of containers they 
often feature, Lowry Pei traces these gardens back to those of the enslaved and their African 
ancestors. He goes on to describe their recurring “template” thusly: “Plants in containers as 
well as in the ground; used objects of all kinds, valued because they have been used and now 
appropriated for new purposes; circles; the color white; pipes, stones, shells; figures of human 
beings, animals, or birds; things that reflect or give off light, objects that refer somehow to 
wind, like chimes, pinwheels, and fans” (in Sills and Als 2010, xiv).
All of this, Pei continues, was built on irregular shapes, circles, and broken lines, forever 
open to rearrangement, “the opposite of formal European gardens,” and with an underlying 
form which is “a set of values, a worldview,” rather than a “perfectible product.” That worl-
dview, expressed on small plots of land, hearkens in part back to the mixed-crop polycultures 
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typical of African farming before colonial occupation and to a different type of environmen-
tal imagination now transplanted and reconfigured, under circumstances not of the enslaved 
persons’ own making or control. Yet they made of those plots things useful for survival, small 
constrained assemblages inscribed on unfree ground, but which sometimes helped lay the 
path to freedom.
Liberation Flora
Thus the enslaved Africans and their descendants drew on African concepts of how spaces for 
food crops and useful flowering plants should be set up, even under limbo conditions. How-
ever, they were able to give far fuller expression to those now-transplanted models when they 
escaped and created their own free communities in the very midst of the surrounding slave 
regimes in what were for them new, if somewhat familiar, environments. Some of the 
most admiring assessments of the flourishing, highly productive gardens and fields of 
African maroon communities (also known as palenques and quilombos in Spanish and 
Portuguese-speaking American societies) come from an unlikely source: the reports and 
drawings of colonial soldiers and military officers participating in the hard-fought assaults 
that finally succeeded in routing out and destroying them (Price and Price 1992; Reis and 
Gomes 1997; Corzo [1988] 2003; Augusto 2011).
These descriptions, time after time, depict richly polycropped, ingeniously defended, 
bountiful fields and gardens. These were spaces in which food and agricultural systems 
evinced that “hybridization and intermingling of planting methods and foods” (Carney and 
Rosomoff 2009, 112), based on the food and agricultural systems of both Amerindians and 
Africans, that would have first appeared as limbo plants on plantations. Maroons ate variedly 
and well by all available historical testaments. There is little research yet on whether or not 
new patterns of work and ownership emerged in the maroon communities, but some schol-
ars have already suggested (Ellis and Ginsburgh 2010) that this might have been another 
opportunity for re/trans—older templates and forms, adapted to new conditions, the hard 
experience of breaking bondage, and the opportunity to inhabit freedom.
New Genealogies of Invention and Innovation
Reflecting on the botanical knowledge and technologies of enslaved Africans and 
Afro-descendants through the novel conceptual categories of plants of bondage, limbo plants, 
and liberation flora, mediated by tangible artworks and some of the intellectual resources of 
Africana studies, allows us to rethink how innovation is in some cases shaped by a most 
peculiar set of historical circumstances and how the human impulse to resist also summons 
invention. For enslaved Africans and their descendants, survival, resistance, and freedom 
shaped how plants were known, cultivated, and used. They themselves were made mobile 
involuntarily under duress, and their knowledge traditions and cultural templates, and at 
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least a few critical seeds, came with them in a traumatic crossing of the waters. In the Amer-
icas, they developed new assemblages of knowledge and sowed them into differing land-
scapes, using knowledge practices we have captured here under the evocative rubric of re/
trans. Given the centrality of racialized chattel slavery to the remaking of the modern world, 
the epistemic settings and practices in the production and reproduction of plant knowledge 
briefly interpreted in this essay should, we may reasonably conclude, constitute a critical part 
of more global genealogies and histories of innovation.
Visualizing in more engaging ways the ideas, cultures, and practices around plants 
wrought and reworked in the African diaspora by enslaved persons may open up conversa-
tion about innovation under extreme material difficulty and about making and remaking 
on the move while fighting for recognition of one’s very humanity. That may be a good 
thing for the current generation of African and diasporic youth, who in many cases are fight-
ing for recognition as well. Novel explorations of agrobotanical knowledge of the enslaved 
that use intellectual resources common to STS alongside those of Africana studies may also 
constitute another route to making STS more central to the study of Africa and the diaspora, 
and may help impel African knowledges from the margins to the center of the field. When-
ever notions of creative mobility, assemblage, invention, and innovation are deployed in 
STS, shouldn’t the Africans who were enslaved in the diaspora spring immediately to the 
mind’s eye?
Notes
1. In this poem known in Brazil as the national hymn of the struggle for Black Consciousness, 
Assumpção writes, “I am the one who planted the fields of sugarcane and coffee, and watered them 
with sweat and blood ... And not even death will be strong enough to make me keep quiet” (my 
translation).
2. It must be stressed that I am not considering “Africa as a country,” and I am cognizant of the diverse 
origins, societies, and cultures from which the oceangoing slave trades drew. Explorations of that diver-
sity of plant knowledge more specifically by origin are not possible in this chapter, and such explora-
tions are not its intent.
3. I first coined the expression epistemic walk in two talks: a March 2004 conference presentation on the 
useful plants garden at Kirstenbosch at the first South African Academic Colloquium on Indigenous 
Knowledge Systems in Bloemfontein, South Africa, at the University of the Free State; and an Africana 
Studies Department senior capstone seminar at Brown University in February 2005, entitled “Xhosa Hut 
and Palm House: Africana Knowledges, Space and Methodology.”
4. Switching the directionality of African agronomic innovations back the other way for a moment, it is 
worth recalling the tremendous feat of adaptation and reinvention in technologies carried out with 
resounding success by African women farmers who took up the cultivation of the Amerindian plant 
maize, as McCann (2005) skillfully recounts.
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5. As the former slave John Anderson declared when interviewed in 1861 from his new home in 
Canada, when explaining what his patch-grown tobacco went toward: “And in this way some acquired 
sufficient means to purchase their freedom” (Blassingame [1977] 2002, 353).
6. Delbourgo (2010, 113) argue:
Strikingly, only in the last few years have scholars begun to examine the agency of the slave trade in circulating natural 
knowledge, suggesting the possibility of overcoming the long-standing notion that slavery and science had nothing 
to do with each other, and that the “social death” of enslavement denuded African migrants of all epistemic capacity. 
... Treating Africans as subjects and actors in early modern histories of natural knowledge is a recent development. 
Scholars have now begun to raise pressing questions about Africans as active carriers and producers of botanical and 
medical knowledges, as collectors, expert cultivators, keepers of provision grounds, and skilled poisoners. The link 
between institutional science and the slave trade, meanwhile, has always been hidden in plain view in the British case, 
as demonstrated by the overlooked career of Sloane—the future Royal Society president and British Museum founder 
who gathered specimens in Jamaica.
7. I am indebted to the offer from CSSJ Director Professor Anthony Bogues to use my imagination in 
this way, which made it possible for me to undertake gladly what I consider the fulfillment of an obliga-
tion (obrigacao, as they say in the African-derived Brazilian religion of candomble) to my enslaved 
ancestors.
8. This work originally carried only two of the concepts in its title; the third, the notion of limbo 
plants, emerged later in the essay drafted for the MIT workshop that led to the present volume.
9. This notion of plants as inherently multipurpose, escaping labels such as medicinal plants, has been 
retained in many contemporary indigenous medico-therapeutic knowledge systems in Africa; see, for 
example, Augusto 2004.

5
Smartness from Below: Variations on Technology and Creativity in 
Contemporary Kinshasa
Katrien Pype
What do innovation and creativity mean in Kinshasa, capital city of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo? What can a social exploration of innovators and creative Kinois (inhabitants of 
Kinshasa) tell us about Kinshasa’s society? What can an anthropological perspective add to 
our understanding of the dialectics among technology, culture, and society? In this chapter, 
I attempt to formulate an initial response to these questions. However, because Kinshasa is a 
complex city housing millions of people with their own desires, aspirations, and stances 
toward the future and the role of materials therein, my answers can only be partial, plural, 
and provisional.
This ethnographic complexity should not be taken as an obstacle, but should rather be 
approached as a challenge to the researcher to look for coherence, interfaces, and connec-
tions. To do this, I will explore the connections between different spheres of Kinois society 
(politics, education, healing cults, urban music, etc.), taking ideas and practices surrounding 
technological innovation and creativity as the main connectors between these spheres. As 
such, this chapter is a thought experiment as well as a methodological exercise. The goal is 
to show alternative modes of thinking about and handling technological objects. The mate-
rial presented here, informed by ethnographic research in Kinshasa from 2003 on, should be 
understood as an attempt to sketch the sociohistorical contours of advances in technology 
and various forms of engagement with tools, scientific knowledge, and technological exper-
tise in an African city.
My main entry into the topic is oriented by linguistic facts; language is an important point 
of entry for understanding societal phenomena. In line with an anthropological approach 
that looks for emic perspectives of cultural phenomena—that is, the perspectives of those 
who participate in the society—I take Lingala (Kinshasa’s lingua franca) and kiKinois (Kin-
shasa’s street language) to provide legitimate entry into the study of signification and mean-
ing production in technological worlds. The standard Lingala for to innovate, kosikola, has 
multiple meanings. It can also be translated as to choose, to select, and in a Pentecostal context 
the same verb denotes to deliver (from evil spirits). Linguistic evidence thus suggests that there 
is more to the notion of innovation than is commonly assumed in the scientific-technological 
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discourse that dominates academic understandings of technological worlds. Ontologically, 
these alternative meanings suggest that everything exists. The innovating agent knows 
which choices to make and pulls things from an invisible realm into the material world. 
Innovation then depends on knowledge—a spiritual knowledge or, in a more practical sense, 
a know-how deriving from invisible ontological worlds that tells the actor or agent which 
option or strategy to choose in order to attain a given goal. Furthermore, the verb to know can 
be translated as koyeba or as kozala na mayele—that is, to be with knowledge. Mayele, or knowl-
edge, is a highly polysemic word as well. A Lingala-French dictionary (Kawata 2003; my trans-
lation) defines mayele in the following ways:
1. Knowledge, intelligence, malice, prudence, wisdom
2. Artifice, astuteness, deception, bad intention, intrigue, ruse, trick
3. Manner, way, tactic, tact
4. Spirit, mentality
Mayele can thus mean at once the wisdom accumulated through experience and the intel-
ligence obtained through schooling. The second sense has a social meaning; it refers to 
aspects of deception, trickery, and fakery, all practices that involve victims. Here, the moral 
economy of mayele comes to the fore. Significantly, outside of the language of dictionaries 
but in kiKinois, a whole series of synonyms (mystique, na boule, smart) have become fashion-
able to highlight creative, inventive ways of living life in Kinshasa. As I elaborate throughout 
this chapter, each of these synonyms has gained currency within particular sociotechnologi-
cal worlds and carries its own connotations while embedded in different scales of reference.
Perhaps provocatively, I propose to take the semantic layers of the verb kosikola, the noun 
mayele, and the latter’s synonyms as models for the ethnographic exploration to follow. In a 
dictionary, the various denotations ascribed to a single signifier are related to one another in 
variable ways. In some cases, the associations are clear to many; in others, only a few might 
see the connections; and in some instances, even the native speaker is puzzled as to how a 
signifier can combine particular denotations. The arrangement of the ethnographic material 
in this chapter is composed in a way similar to a dictionary entry with multiple meanings. 
The various spheres of Kinois society that are brought together in this chapter should be read 
as different worlds of meaning that coexist in the extremely complex city of Kinshasa, where 
expectations about and practices of technological innovation and creativity carry particular 
meanings and denotations, but also connotations. Some of these worlds are more intimately 
linked than others and will express overlapping meanings. Above all, the worlds brought 
together in this chapter are connected by the linguistic forms described previously. This con-
nects with the epistemological challenge of this article. I contend that we must remain open 
to the polysemy of technology, innovation, and creativity and take a culturally sensitive 
approach to the closeness of meanings and practices in technology worlds. Attention to 
closeness, as resemblance of form, adjacency in value, or even collision of tools, is necessary 
if we want to understand how people live with technology, in Africa and elsewhere.
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My method, which can be summarized as exploring polysemy, will allow me to relate the 
various vernaculars of mayele (mystique, na boule, smart) to cultures of technology and urban 
sociality. The analysis will thus bring together urban anthropology and anthropology of 
technology from an African perspective. In recent years, the social study of urban Africa has 
gained a new breath. Authors like De Boeck (2011, 2015), Simone (2004), and Pieterse (2008) 
have drawn attention to the ways in which social infrastructures (kinship, religious associa-
tions, etc.) provide important safety nets for African urbanites to survive. These analyses 
describe the city’s infrastructure as a material space both frustrating city dwellers and provid-
ing new opportunities. By focusing explicitly on the lacking or malfunctioning hardware of 
the city that blocks or hampers residents in their daily lives and in their search for a better 
life (see Larkin 2008), the question of innovation becomes crucial. As Nowotny (2006) 
reminds us, technological innovations speak to issues of intentions, effects, and transforma-
tions. Innovations come about with particular goals, desires, frustrations, and problems in 
mind. I propose to explore these social contours of technological creativity through the 
rubric of smartness, a concept intimately tied to innovation. What does it mean to be smart 
in Kinshasa? Who is smart? Who is not? How does mastery over entering technologies relate 
to local repertoires of authority, power, and prestige?
I thus attempt to unsettle the ethnocentric assumptions of being smart in the city. A telling 
illustration of these postulations is Tim Smedley’s opening of an article in the Guardian on 
the “adaptation of smart cities for the Global South” (Smedley 2013). He quotes Pieter van 
Heyningen, programmes manager from the Stellenbosch Innovation District (SID) in South 
Africa, who argues: “Smart cities are very much a developed world concept.” Van Heyningen 
identifies the establishment of so-called smart governments, smart healthcare, smart build-
ings, smart mobility, smart infrastructure, and smart technology in African cities as huge 
market opportunities, until now scarcely seized upon by entrepreneurs. There are two pitfalls 
in this statement: First, it suggests that smart cities are out of place in Africa, yet urban 
authorities in Kigali, Nairobi, Harare, and Cairo are all negotiating with private entrepreneurs 
to “smarten” public transport, healthcare, and education. Furthermore, the qualifier smart 
(in English) is gaining ever-more currency in African cities, including in Franco- and Lingala-
phone Kinshasa, and is exploited by entrepreneurs, politicians, and cultural actors who 
appropriate the label and twist it to suit their own desires and goals. Second, the statement 
also suggests that if African cities become “smart,” it will be because of the usage of Western 
technologies and urban programs brought in from the “developed world.” Alternative ways 
of being or becoming smart are not imagined here.
I propose to approach “smartness” in Kinshasa, the capital city of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, from below—that is, through the ways in which Kinois deal with innovation, 
technology, and creativity and talk about ways of creating knowledge, tools, and practices 
necessary in urban life. As such, I set out to “examine the encounters of incoming technolo-
gies with local creativities, cultures, societies, and territorialities” (Mavhunga, Jeroen, and 
Pype 2016, 47). As I, together with Jeroen Cuvelier and Chakanetsa Mavhunga, argue, we 
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need to “break away from taken-for-granted assumptions about technology transfer, accord-
ing to which most technology travels from the Global North to the Global South, where it is 
adopted for the common good” (47).
The material derives from fieldwork in Kinshasa. Since 2003, I have conducted empirical 
research in the city, mainly on its popular cultures and media worlds. Since 2014 in particu-
lar, I have begun to think about technology infrastructures in the city, thus paying attention 
to the material sides of information and communication technologies. Observations, inter-
views, and media analysis form the basic methods of my research.
Innovations for the City
Kinshasa, home to more than ten million inhabitants, is one of Africa’s megalopolises. Its 
inception is connected to the railroad, established by the Belgian colonizers in 1898. The 
expansion of the area gradually incorporated the land of ethnic groups such as the Teke and 
Humbu people. During colonial times, the colonizers set up an impressive electricity grid and 
sanitation for the urban residents. During postcolonial times, these infrastructures have 
received scant renovation or even basic maintenance. In recent years, especially since 2006, 
current president Joseph Kabila has made the renewal and expansion of housing, health 
infrastructure, education, energy, and transport into the key components of his political 
campaign, summarized in the slogan La révolution de la modernité. For many Kinois, nice 
housing with running water and constant electricity remains but a promise (De Boeck 2011). 
The reality is that most people live with irregular power cuts, never knowing when electricity 
will return or if water will suddenly stop running. The state agencies for water and electricity 
provision (SNEL and Regideso) have become objects of mockery, attacks, and scorn in Kin-
shasa. Their agents are met with verbal abuse when they present their bills, and corruption 
appears to be the only way of lowering the amount one will be asked to pay.
Intimately tied to the (re)construction of infrastructures is the reactivation of local indus-
tries. Here, the French term innovation is an important concept on the political agenda. Since 
2013, the minister of small and medium enterprises and of industry organizes an annual 
Salon d’Innovation. This event, national in scope, relates to the imagination of the Congolese 
nation’s future, as indicated by the 2014 theme, “Young African, you have to believe in 
Africa, in yourself and in your country,” which relates to self-worth, African pride, and trust 
in the national government. Explicitly set within the president’s political campaign of La 
révolution de la modernité, the Salon is embedded within national politics and the elite’s imag-
ination of how Congo’s future should look.
The Salon d’Innovation also ties into a wider “global quest for innovation” (Nowotny 2006, 
5). From the beginning of the twenty-first century, as Nowotny shows, the quest for innova-
tion has achieved prominence and urgency all around the globe. In particular, a discursive 
focus on innovation is emerging, which, according to Nowotny, “fills a conceptual void in 
our collective imagining of the future” (5). Although she is not speaking directly about the 
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African continent, Nowotny’s ideas about the “culture of innovation” are also relevant for 
Kinshasa’s national space. Thinking about the future has become less mechanistic and naïve, 
Nowotny claims, and “questions have shifted toward knowledge of the actors imagining 
different kinds of futures” (5). She also diagnoses a changing relationship between the state 
and the market as a cause of the conceptual void. The Salon d’Innovation is embedded in 
renewed attempts by the Congolese government to stimulate economic growth and the local 
industry.
However, we can perceive disconnect in the various temporalities of innovation as they 
are evoked by state officials, by Kinois residents, and even by Kinois innovators. Despite the 
state’s emphasis on the future, Kinois are more interested in the possibility of immediate 
innovation solutions. This idea is illustrated by newspaper and street discourses on the 
inventions presented at the salon, which showcased a whole range of local and international 
inventions. Tellingly, a journalist’s report in the local newspaper Eco243 selected only the 
following two inventions:
In the minister’s tour of all the stands, we saw young innovators [innovateurs] presenting their creations, 
for example Matela Mandela Joseph has presented “an automatic electro-mechanical switch.” This in-
vention has the advantage of producing electricity, with 8 regular batteries that can operate a mobile 
telephone. And if we add a 12 Volt battery with approximately 120 or 90 amperes, then Mandela’s 
device can power a fridge or a television set. Mandela is also the inventor [inventeur] of “an automatic 
phase switch and temperature sensor” in a short circuit to prevent damage. (Ntangu Lihau 2014; au-
thor’s translation)1
Significantly, the news report ends with a short phrase merely stating that during the fair, 
mobile banking was explained to visitors. Other inventions presented at the fair are not even 
mentioned. With his urban readership in mind, the journalist’s selection suggests that inven-
tions concerning electricity are the most significant creations presented at the salon. As such, 
we get an indication of what Ntangu Lihau thinks innovation should be for: It needs to make 
life easier today. The major problems of the day are indeed power cuts—and the loss of elec-
tric goods due to the instability of electrical power.
Intelligent traffic robots were also presented at the salon. These robots were installed in 
Kinshasa in 2014 and operate on several central roads in the city center. Created by a female 
engineer at the ISTA (Institut Supérieur des Techniques Appliquées; Higher Institute of Applied 
Technologies) campus and a group of fellow engineers, these robots have made the headlines 
of major world newspapers, inspiring debates about gender, aesthetics, and technological 
creation. Most Kinois applaud the installation of these “intelligent traffic robots,” which take 
over the work of policemen, imitating the gestures of traffic police to control the flow of cars, 
trucks, and motorbikes. Powered by solar panels (without batteries to store energy), these 
robots mainly function during daytime.
The robots relate to an experience shared by African city dwellers. As most Kinois argue, 
the major gain of the robots de roulage intelligents is that these nonhuman traffic policemen 
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do not chase drivers with false accusations of, for example, having ignored their signs or 
having too many passengers in the car or not having used a turn signal. It is exactly these 
kinds of predicaments of urban life that push people to invent and to be creative with tech-
nology. Many of my interlocutors during the course of my research claimed that city author-
ities should invest in these robots and put them on all traffic hubs. Replacing corrupt 
policemen with smart traffic robots makes life in the city easier. These are the inventions for 
the everyday (Mavhunga 2014) that the population eagerly embraces.
Mystical Knowledge
Beyond the realm of creating something new, repairing is also a practice of creativity. The 
following story from fieldwork brings forth the meanings and materialities of expertise and 
technological appropriation in a nonpolitical locale: the city’s marketplace radio studios.
It was July 19, 2014, 14:25 pm. The evangelical radio station had been booming through 
the loudspeakers on Kinshasa’s Central Market. Suddenly, the speakers went dead. Instead of 
the familiar gospel rumba broadcast, the noises of vendors attracting their clients, manioc 
mills, and transistor radios took over. Pastor Jean and Pastor Enice, who had been preparing 
to collect money from the vendors supporting them, immediately knew that the problem 
with the electricity transmission was to be found in the tiny studio. The manioc mills also 
used electricity provided by SNEL (the national electricity company), but their noises let the 
pastors know that the mills had not stopped working.
Therefore, the two pastors, who spent six days a week in the market evangelizing via the 
market radio, started investigating each cable that connected the PA mixer amplifier (SSA 
160DP) with the mobile phone (Samsung E150) on which the gospel songs were stored. With 
great caution, they lifted the ventilator, which was laid upside down on the amplifier to pre-
vent it from overheating. The multisocket extension into which the other devices were 
plugged was investigated as well. The extension also fed the mobile phones of some people 
working in the market, who used the radio’s electricity to charge their batteries. The pastors 
quickly glanced at the cable that fed the socket extension and the loudspeakers. It is impos-
sible to say what order the verification happened in, as the movements of fingers, of arms 
following cables, and plugs being pulled out and then put back in happened rather quickly 
and seemingly outside of any logical order. It all happened in silence, until Pastor Enice dis-
covered that one of the mobile phones had slid from the windowsill. Patting his fingers on 
the socket while bending underneath the table to pick up the mobile phone, Pastor Enice 
asked out loud: “What do we have here?” After a few minutes, I noticed how Pastor Enice 
opened one of the cables again, on the outer end. He manipulated the electricity cables, 
plugged them as they were (without the body of the plugger, so just the two cables) into the 
socket, and the gospel music returned. Pastor Enice watched me watching him, smiled, and 
said, “Biloko ya mindele eza na bacaprices” (“The goods of the white men are capricious”).He 
continued: “All tools have their own whims. It is by blacksmithing that one becomes a 
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blacksmith.” He assumed that the vibrating function was activated when a call came in. This 
must have set some small movements in motion, with serious consequences for all the other 
apparatuses and cables.
The tools are “capricious,” Pastor Enice explained. The label capriciousness humanizes the 
inanimate. On the one hand, one could say that asociality is attributed to technology. Capri-
ciousness refers to an animated object (person, animal, energy, etc.) that is difficult to control 
and master. Just like a capricious girl leaves the house whenever she wants or does not carry 
out the chores her guardians order her to do, so too are cables very sensitive and have their 
own ways of working—or stopping work. Yet capricious behavior, just like other kinds of 
asocial attitudes and actions, is said to have spiritual origins (Pype 2015). Indeed, if humans 
are capricious, it is because the spirit world at large is whimsical. As most Kinois agree, spirits 
can become jealous or angry merely because of words, intentions, or laughs from human 
beings. Of course, Pastor Enice did not suggest that the cables had been moved by spiritual 
agents. Significant, however, is that the spiritual world bears symbolic relevance for the 
minor accident in the radio studio. This recourse to idioms about the spiritual should be 
taken seriously, even when studying a seemingly secular, rational, and highly technical 
event.
There are additional correlations between repairing faulty technology as Pastor Enice 
managed to do and the spiritual world. He is mystical (aza mystique) is a phrase Kinois express 
commonly—and often jokingly, but usually also in admiration—when a person has suc-
ceeded in getting a rusty television set, a broken radio, or a “dead” mobile phone to work 
again. The concept of mystical human beings pushes us into the domain of kindoki, secret 
knowledge, knowledge about the invisible powers that govern the material and the societal. 
In Kinois parlance, engines and electricity-powered technologies are usually defined as kin-
doki ya mindele, mystical knowledge of the white men. Examples include motorcars, air-
planes, kitchen robots, mobile phones, and the computer. African occult knowledge (kindoki ya 
biso, or our kindoki), by contrast, refers to the various magical practices that witches and 
so-called traditional healers set in motion. I have studied the embedding of communication 
technologies such as the television, radio, and mobile phone in bewitchment and healing 
practices elsewhere (Pype 2012, 2013). In these practices, emotions, expectations, and inten-
tions charge technology use with spiritual qualities that in turn impact individual users and 
receivers.
Although in emic understandings there might be clear distinctions between the two kinds 
of kindoki, in practice there is much overlap. Television and radio are embedded in divination 
and healing practices.2 Here we arrive at a first dimension in the cohabitation of new tech-
nologies and indigenous forms of knowledge production. Significantly, the possibility of 
confusion between human beings mastering technology and spiritual powers manifesting 
themselves through that same technology is something that colonizers enthusiastically 
exploited in order to discipline their subjects. Ramirez and Rolot (1985) describe how mis-
sionaries in Congo did not make an effort to demystify the workings of cinema. Behrend 
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(2003, 132), in the east African context, describes a similar contribution by colonizers in 
“convert[ing] technology into magic.” She writes: “Europeans—missionaries, colonial admin-
istrators, explorers, and travelers—also used the instruments actually intended for scientific 
research and documentation, especially the camera, to create ‘wonders,’ in order to astonish 
and terrify Africans.” Drawing on archival sources, Behrend shows how in the nineteenth 
century missionaries and colonizers presented themselves as medicine men, producing 
charms for Maasai warriors to become stronger and more successful in battle, or else used 
photography as proof that they possessed supernatural powers. The missionaries’ reports 
suggest that Europeans possessed (technical) knowledge that enabled them to magically daz-
zle others.
Blacksmiths and Engineer Students
The exact words Pastor Enice used when trying to find the origin of the market radio’s break-
down were technique nionso. The French technique refers to an amalgam of practices and 
know-how. The Greek root of technique, τέχνη, techne, denotes art, skill, and cunning of hand. 
Technique thus constitutes a craft, a collection of wisdom and knowledge for how to use tools. 
This emphasis on craft draws us to the associations between technology/technique and kin-
doki. As mentioned, in its basic sense, kindoki refers to a particular kind of knowledge, spiri-
tual knowledge. A ndoki possesses knowledge about the invisible worlds and knows how to 
effect change in the material world. A ndoki is closely connected to the nganga. In Lingala 
and kiKongo, the concept of nganga incorporates the priest, the doctor, and the professor. A 
nganga is an expert, has power, and possesses religious, medical, and/or scientific knowledge. 
According to this logic, experts in “the kindoki of the white men” are engineers, inventors, 
and those who master biology, physics, and chemistry. However, Pastor Enice himself, a man 
with deep knowledge and know-how about the sacred, had never studied electricity, and it 
was in what appeared to me to be a very improvisational way of readjusting the electricity 
wires that he managed to get the radio equipment functioning again. His expertise as a pastor 
did not help him at all.
However, adding that “while blacksmithing, one becomes a blacksmith,” Pastor Enice 
extended the idiom of spiritual knowledge. Surely, he did not identify himself as a black-
smith, nor did he claim that the repair work was anything similar to the work of a black-
smith. Yet Pastor Enice’s choice of the blacksmith was not incidental. Rather, his choice of 
words reveals an analogy, a closeness with the techne expert and the blacksmith regarding 
the transmission of knowledge (or even better, know-how) and the social positioning of 
both.
First, the idiom “while blacksmithing, one becomes a blacksmith” draws our attention to 
the role of apprenticeship in the transmission of techne. Apprenticeship is a mode of trans-
ferring knowledge and expertise through observation, imitation, and practice. Pastor Enice 
had not received formal schooling in which technology is explained to students. Rather, as a 
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man coming from Mbuji-Mayi, where he had been a journalism student, it was only when 
he started to evangelize through the medium of radio that he learned how to repair broad-
casting equipment. The head of the evangelizing radio stations organized a basic training 
session on how to handle the material. After this session, all radio hosts were to run their 
radio studios in teams of two. They were asked to repair the equipment based on their own 
know-how and experience. Due to their intimate knowledge of different cables, faulty sound 
systems, and mobile phones, the animateurs managed to repair the equipment time and 
again. Just as an nganga’s knowledge is embodied, tacit, and difficult to articulate, Pastor 
Enice could not really explain how he had managed to find the source of the problem. 
Rather, he speculated that an incoming call, triggering the vibration function on the mobile 
phone, might have set some changes in motion in the assemblage. He was not sure, though—
and in the end, it was not that important whether he was right or not. The reference to the 
spiritual world continues here. Just as the nganga’s explanations for afflictions might be 
ironic, ambiguous, and ambivalent (see Peek 1991), so Pastor Enice’s explanation could have 
been true, just as it might have been wrong. In both contexts, it is not so much the “real” 
origin of the failure that is relevant; rather, a possible cause should be voiced in order to allow 
a rationale for correction and repair to be set in motion. In the market’s radio studio, it was 
the functioning of the radio that mattered more than finding exactly what had caused the 
rupture. Again, it is important to emphasize that Pastor Eunice did not claim to be a diviner—
and the use of the blacksmithing training idiom should not be seen as an anachronistic 
interpretation of working with technology. Rather, the behavior that I observed bears many 
similarities to how one explains divination practices. Divination is a symbolic model for 
survival and life, with material infrastructure (De Boeck 2015) and (faulty) technology 
included.
Also, my approach to technological repair as an nganga’s way of reading signs and explain-
ing the world is by no means an attempt to confirm or reinstall Levi-Strauss’s infamous dis-
tinction between the bricoleur and the engineer. Rather, diviners and scientists alike, just like 
laymen, use the trial and error method in order to advance in their own domains. Similarly, 
Trovalla and Trovalla (2015, 332) have recently observed the ways in which residents of the 
Nigerian city of Jos live with faulty technological infrastructures. They write: “The infrastruc-
tural landscape is one that continually mutates and needs to be re-read and where getting 
access to services hinges on one’s prognostication skills.” The city’s infrastructure “is turned 
into a soothsaying device and its residents into diviners” (333).
Divination systems are open-ended dynamic systems of knowledge that allow for different 
experiences and interpretations to enter (see Peek 1991). To add to the openness and ambi-
guity of divination systems, the diviner often cannot bring forth a final diagnosis and action 
plan without the client’s presence (Peek 1991, 2). The divination is a dialogue: It is not the 
diviner himself who knows (or receives) all the right information; rather, the knowledge is 
co-constructed. The “expert” is not a know-it-all but rather depends on others to formulate 
routes for repair and solutions. Divination is collective construction of knowledge, obtained 
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through the handling of materials and communication with the otherworldly in the 
search for causes of failures. The analogy between divination and handling technology decen-
ters the technology user in our analysis of technology transfer. This decentering of the tech-
nology user allows us to bring other “agents” into the analysis of technology use (repair, 
instruction, etc.) by acknowledging the (symbolic) intervention of spirits, as well as the 
equipment itself (very much like Actor-Network theory). It also allows for indeterminacy, 
ambiguity, and the enigmatic in people’s handling of technology, a topic to which we will 
return to later.
It is worth pausing to consider the social positioning of blacksmiths—that other category 
of experts that Pastor Enice evoked when looking for a solution in the market radio studio. 
Blacksmiths are regarded ambiguously in Congolese society (as well as in Nigeria [Njoku 
1991], Zimbabwe [Mavhunga 2014], and Tanzania [Wright 2002]) because fire (moto) is at 
once a purifying tool in witchcraft eradication and a symbol of social reproduction (de 
Heusch 1956). Blacksmiths and chiefs are closely related within ethnic groups, which gives 
them a measure of political power (de Maret 1985; MacGaffey 1986). Furthermore, because 
blacksmiths provide tools for the nganga they also perform a fundamental role in healing 
cults. This all leads to a perception of blacksmiths as people with mystical powers. As a con-
sequence, just like nganga, blacksmiths are feared.3 Here, we arrive at another dimension of 
technology use: The display of expertise over materials can induce fear and awe, separate 
those “with knowledge” from those “without knowledge,” and introduce new dynamics of 
power, distinction, and authority.
In Kinois society, knowing too much about techne in general also induces fear. The excess 
of techne is more fully embodied in the lifeworlds of engineer students. The social position-
ing of these students perpetuates this dimension of what it means to master technology, in 
contemporary Kinshasa. As students, they are engaging in formal training to become experts 
in techne. In their liminal, betwixt and between position as students, their bodies become 
burdened with too much knowledge, which they have not yet learned to discipline. ISTA is 
one of the very few institutions at which engineers are formally schooled in Kinshasa. In 
contrast to students enrolled in other colleges and universities, ISTA students have a reputa-
tion for being violent and capricious. In particular, they are feared for their violent interven-
tions during funerals and their brutal punishing of individual and collective enemies. For 
example, ISTA students are known to burn houses down of fellow students studying on other 
campuses who have defied ISTA’s reputation. Many people can also tell the story of how ISTA 
students set fire to the rehearsal compound of one of Kinshasa’s most famous musicians after 
he insulted ISTA; students also are known to have burned down a football player’s parents’ 
house because he scored a goal against his team while playing with the national team.4 The 
brutality and force used by ISTA students is a major source of concern for police, who them-
selves do not interfere when, for instance, ISTA students take over traffic regulations; journal-
ists also self-censor their reports and do not cover ISTA students’ violence out of fear of 
retaliation.
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The impunity ISTA students enjoy derives not from the spiritual sources of their knowl-
edge but from an arrogance that can be associated with the capriciousness of technology. 
ISTA students are aware that modern society is literally built on their know-how, their man-
agement of infrastructure, housing, and electricity. Although not all engineers actually find 
a job, they possess a strong sense of self-worth and are aware of their profession’s necessity 
for Kinshasa’s future. This self-worth pushes them to distinguish themselves socially from 
others in their imagination, and thus it encourages them to situate themselves above the law 
and violate customary taboos (e.g., their interventions at funerals, where ISTA students chant 
songs insulting women and shout obscenities while driving stolen motor trucks). We can ask, 
in an ironic way, whether the “spirit of the capricious techne” is possessing the engineer 
students.
Experts of the City
Artists and cultural entrepreneurs constitute another type of experts in contemporary Kin-
shasa, experts who further unsettle the idea that innovation and expertise stem from labora-
tories and scientific engineering studies (see chapter 2, this volume). Continuing with 
material from the production of popular culture in contemporary Kinshasa, I want to draw 
attention to the ways in which elderly Kinois are presented to the city as nganga. In the sym-
bolic space of music TV shows, where elderly Kinois dance to 1950s and 1960s rumba music, 
the latter are designated as “experts” (nganga) of the earliest years of Kinois society (Pype 
2016a). Their expertise relies on their intimate, embodied knowledge of that era’s dance 
styles, of lyrics from the earliest Congolese modern songs, and on their close connections to 
the founding fathers of Congolese rumba music. Vedetis, fanatiques, ngembos, and boys who 
opened the dance floors were the first urban youth in Léopoldville, as Kinshasa was called 
during the colonial era. Presenting these people, who have become old in age, as nganga 
nowadays means acknowledging their value and knowledge of the origins of Kinois society. 
Yet the connections between expertise and popular culture go beyond knowledge of the city’s 
music history. Charismatic musicians who invent new music styles are called docteurs. Prob-
ably the best known docteur is Docteur Nico, a guitarist and composer belonging to the first 
generation of Congolese dance music creators (1950–1960). Although trained as a technical 
teacher, he devoted his life to the guitar and—even decades after his death—continues to 
enchant masses of rumba lovers. It is precisely his mesmerizing manipulation of the guitar 
that has led people to attribute the name docteur to him.5
Docteur Nico’s—or any other outstanding artist’s—nganga qualities express first and fore-
most the capability of artists to attract people’s attention. Fans of Docteur Nico’s finger play 
with guitar chords are physically pushed to start moving their bodies; similarly, television 
spectators cannot wait to watch the parts of serials starring Muyombe Gauche, for example. 
This power, a force often called charisma, is used differently than in a Weberian sense. In the 
Kinois context, charisme combines skills, knowledge, and occult powers. Rumors abound 
108 Chapter 5
about how successful artists have sacrificed relatives, band members, and sometimes even 
fans in exchange for popularity and material gain. Possessing charisme is the result of ties 
with invisible powers (White 2008). The same goes for ideas about innovation. Mystical is a 
term used to describe those artists and creators who have invented something. Here, I want 
to return to the concept of the mystique that I discussed earlier. Oza mystique is often said in 
admiration and jokingly, as the normal connotation of mysticality, and refers to the unheim-
liche, that which is “difficult to place, interpret and attribute meaning to” (De Boeck 2004, 
58). The elusiveness of those who manage to survive in the city, stand out, and even become 
rich is tied to the city’s continuous transformations. Its inhabitants are constantly trying to 
adapt to a morphing urban environment. In Christian speak, Kinois survive in miraculous 
ways (Persyn and Ladrière 2004); this does not so much suggest the genius, creativity, and 
resourcefulness of Kinois as the impossibility of interpreting how, despite a lack of money 
and work, people still manage to survive. Again, the terminology of a miracle is borrowed 
from the spiritual world. Yet because survival is seen as a positive result, a divine source is 
identified: Only God performs miracles. Bad spirits produce demonic, worldly, païen ways of 
surviving. From a Christian perspective, then, la débrouille (also known as Article 15), as a way 
of surviving in illicit, informal, and sometimes illegal and almost criminal ways, oscillates 
between the miraculous interventions of the divine and the demonic attempts of the devil to 
steal the souls of city dwellers.
Other types of experts of the city in Kinshasa are the Yankees, who in contrast to the Yuma 
refer to Kinshasa’s streetwise people; they know how to use violence, fraud, fakery, and intim-
idation in order to survive. As Kinois see it, a Yankee has boule (aza na boule; he is streetwise). 
According to Zacharie Bababaswe, one of Kinshasa’s main innovators in street language, 
boule means “the supreme phase of intelligence. A boule stands above all reflection. While 
reflections are limited, boule knows no intellectual limitation.”6 Boule refers to the drug hemp 
(chanvre), which is made into the shape of a nut before being consumed. Thus, boule leads us 
into the terrain of urban street culture, illegality, and trance. Bababaswe thus also hints at 
nonhuman spheres of intelligence and smartness. This unlawful, creative, and ingenious 
type of smartness is constitutive of urban life—not only in Kinshasa, but elsewhere too. New-
ell (2012, 12) describes how in Abidjan a gaou is “a fool, someone incapable of discerning his 
surroundings, and therefore someone easily duped.” A yere, by contrast, cannot be scammed, 
but will steal from others. Interestingly, Newell draws an explicit connection between the 
yere and the féticheur (a particular type of nganga; a witch doctor). To be a yere means to be 
able to see things clearly, just like a “féticheur’s ability to see into the mystical goings-on of 
the otherworld, where witches, spirits and jinnis are at work.” Yere then “refers to more than 
ordinary clarity of sight ... to see beyond the surfaces of things to the inverse, behind-the-
mask realm where potency exists” (12).
Probably the best example of the intimate connection between the city and the creation 
of specifically urban knowledge manifests in the nickname that inhabitants of Dar es 
Salaam have created for their city: Bongo.7 Derived from the Swahili ubongo, meaning brains, 
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Bongo, when applied to Dar es Salam, suggests the “brains” one needs to survive in that 
city. Bongo Flava, then, the genre indicating the hip hop culture of Dar es Salam suggests 
the close connections between gangsta style and urban skills. As Stroeken (2005) indicates, 
Tanzanian hip hop became a space of knowledge production. Bongo “originally referred to 
the cunning needed to live in a city like Dar es Salaam and to cope with the cynicism of 
wages so low they presuppose additional income from illicit schemes, informal economy ... 
or fanning at the periphery of town” (1). Interestingly, Stroeken (2) makes a distinction 
between Bongo and the Kinois laws of la débrouille. He argues that to boil the brains, in a Tan-
zanian context, includes knowing where the limits are; such limits are not inherent to Article 
15. One could approach Bababaswe’s interpretation of boule as intelligence beyond limits in 
a similar vein.
These stories about popular culture and music in Kinshasa, Abidjan, and Dar es Salam in 
connection with youth and elders show that ideas about expertise and knowledge can also 
be found in music and dance. The realms of popular culture, expertise, and science should 
not be kept apart. The appearance of the nganga and mystical qualities, attributed to those 
who produce captivating sounds and those who can survive in the city, connect these 
spheres. The polysemy of the word nganga allows for an understanding of how music, street 
culture, and healing cults are linguistically interconnected. These constitute coexisting 
spheres of world-making, agency, and creativity, each requiring particular forms of expertise 
and thriving on distinct (though sometimes overlapping) tools and techniques.
Being Smart
Alongside mystique, mayele, or boule, the English word smart is gaining ever-greater cur-
rency in Kinshasa. A website called Smart Congo and Facebook pages with the same title 
testify to this. Other African cities—and other nations—have also been “smartened.” In 
Rwanda, the social network Smart Rwanda Days was “born from a dream to boost a culture 
of literacy and a passion for excellence,” as its website says.8 Smart Rwanda is a cooperation 
between the Rwandese government and Ericson. The initiative also organizes networking 
days, called Smart Rwanda Days, “to connect, innovate and transform” Rwanda. Smart Africa 
is a South African entrepreneurial initiative that—as its website claims—wants to “promote 
South Africa to its rightful place as a region of excellence and to further establish South Africa 
as a recognized contributor to the international IT and software industry.”9 The cooperation 
between Congo-Brazzaville and India is called Smart Congo and is centered on the establish-
ment of a “smart public transport system.”10 In the DRC, “smart” initiatives are also being 
established; for example, a collaboration between various NGOs and high-tech enterprises 
has launched an interactive microsite freely available for use by anyone. Its goal is to provide 
alerts about elephant poaching in the DRC’s Garamba national park, thus helping park rang-
ers track ivory hunters via satellite imagery and predictive analysis.11 All of these initiatives 
operate either on the level of the nation-state or internationally, and they literally borrow 
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from the international language of smartness while also using cutting-edge digital, “high-tech” 
technologies.
From “below,” however, the word smart (used in its English form) has different connota-
tions, which evoke less explicitly the imagination of a future operated by highly advanced 
wireless technologies. Thus far, I have found two distinct ways that smart is used by Kinois. 
First, the smart label plays into the English connotation of beauty with the word smart. One 
example is the hashtag #SmartRDC that has been created early 2014 by Filip Kabeya, a thir-
tysomething IT practitioner living in Kinshasa, better known by his Internet pseudonym, 
Keyzer Soze. He set up the website kozangate.net in 2011, which was Kinshasa’s first elec-
tronic nightlife calendar. In 2015, Kabeya initiated a coworking space for tech professionals 
(www.mtechhub.cd) and created Facebook groups such as Emploi en RDC/Job in Congo, 
Sortir à Kinshasa, and Kinshasa Professional Network. Job announcements are posted by 
members; members also advertise online goods that they sell either from home or only vir-
tually (hair extensions, clothes, electronic devices). In the midst of these Internet activities, 
and crosscutting these various Internet platforms, Kabeya began using hashtags such as 
#ITPassion, #RDCTech and #allforDRC. The hashtag #smartRDC was inspired by concepts 
such as Smart Africa and Smart Rwanda,12 Regretting that Internet infrastructures are not yet 
in place in DRC to allow people to live “smart” in a high-tech way, Kabeya invites people to 
post pictures under this hashtag that “show an infinitely beautiful DR Congo.” By bending 
the English smart to indicate beautiful, Kabeya wants to instill a sense of pride among the 
Congolese by inviting them to construct a positive image of DRC.
Playing with the religious idea of knowledge and creativity, Kabeya claims that his pio-
neering initiatives in DRC’s virtual world are the consequence of a “gift” (likabu). Jokingly, 
Kabeya defines himself as a visionnaire, someone who sees things that others do not yet see; 
as he observes, “people do not understand him.”13 Kabeya’s inclination to contribute to a 
smart DRC is the outcome of his international involvement. After working for almost a 
decade with the German cooperation, Kabeya has lived in various African countries and trav-
eled extensively within the continent and to Europe. Impressed by the fast technological 
developments in Rwanda in particular, Kabeya assumed that this should also be possible in 
the DRC. He continues to travel, even making special visits to Kigali to learn from their 
expertise in situ, and he aims to create a network of like-minded people who all are passion-
ate about advanced technologies and want to live with them.
The second way Kinois define smart is illustrated by Hugo Kuva, a private Congolese entre-
preneur living Kinshasa but who often travels to the United States (Dallas, Texas, in particu-
lar, because of family ties). Kuva is not part of Kabeya’s circle, though he also plays around 
with the smart concept in the Congolese digital world. In October 2012, Kuva created a pri-
vate enterprise called Smart Congo. On the now expired website, Kuva explains to people the 
ways in which Smart Congo is smart:
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Smart Congo uses about 90% open source technologies in its web development. This practice allows the 
client to set himself free from paying additional license fees and utilize technologies in stable commu-
nities, thus allowing an easy-take over by a third developer. ...
A manager and former freelance web developer with a very long career, [Kuva] brings together 
know-how and experience obtained here and there [de gauche à droite] for developing the company. (my 
translation from the original French on www.smart-congo.com, expired at time of publication of this 
chapter)
Significantly, Kuva explicitly announces that he is using open-source, free software, com-
bining knowledge gathered “from here and from there.” Being smart here suggests being 
resourceful, taking advantage of opportunities that are around the corner, in contrast to 
having followed formal or specialist IT training or using advanced high-tech-software. Smart 
here refers to cleverness in the Yankee sense. Like the 419 scheme conmen and other scam-
mers (Apter 1999; Ndjilo 2008), Kuva cleverly uses the possibilities of the Internet to be an 
internaut and enrich himself. Although in contrast with Internet frauds, Kuva achieves this 
aim without transgressing moral codes.
The invention of the first African smartphone, Elikya, by IT specialist Verone Mankou is a 
similar way of being smart in the IT world while flirting with the line between the moral and 
the immoral. Mankou traveled to China, where he visited factories that produce parts for 
Samsung, Apple, Nokia, and the like. Mankou negotiated contracts with these factories, 
assembling a mobile phone that he later promoted as “the first African smartphone.” 
Although contestations have occurred regarding the Elikya’s exact “African” content, as well 
as its originality, the smartphone demonstrates resourceful ways of creating something new 
out of existing things, making big money, and becoming famous. Repackaging inventions 
made by others in an ingenious way turns Verone Mankou, the Internet scammers, and Kuva 
into tricksters. Tricksters in Congolese oral culture have always been male, young, cunning, 
and smart, and they often break social and moral rules temporarily. Ultimately, Kuva and 
Mankou are not breaking the rules—although they are flirting with the borders between 
originality, copying and piracy, and they are appropriating the concept of smart in a way that 
allows them to better achieve their goals. In a high-tech context, their usage of smart is closer 
to the second meaning of mayele (discussed at the beginning of this article) than to the 
English definition of smart.
Other examples of being smart with information and communications technology 
(ICT) is the constant juggling of multiple mobile phones, or mobile phones with multiple 
SIM cards, so that users do not lose too much money by making phone calls to other net-
works. Smart ways of circumventing political constraints within the mobile phone culture 
are also arising. In January 2015, the government shut down Internet traffic, thus making it 
impossible to communicate over social media with fellow Congolese or people abroad. This 
inconvenienced commerçants (merchants) in particular, who operate through telephone 
and email conversations with middlemen abroad. During the weeks that Internet traffic 
was blocked, one anonymous commerçant spent his mornings on a terrace close to the 
Congo River, where his smartphone picked up the signal of a cellular company of the other, 
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neighboring Congo. Similarly inventive ways of circumventing state blockage of electronic 
communication were also used in December 2011, when the state blocked text message com-
munications during the weeks before election results were announced. Congolese bought 
SIM cards for neighboring countries and sent international text messages to fellow Congolese 
(see Pype 2016b). These observations show how urban authorities are never fully in control 
over their citizenry and that technological spaces allow for slippage. Political control over the 
technoscientific is never total; citizens will find ways of dealing with limits imposed by 
authorities.
However, everyday smartness should not be read only as a reaction against economic or 
political constraints. Rather, as Steel (forthcoming) shows, gender-related forms of immobil-
ity can also be circumvented by using ICT in smart ways. Steel’s ethnography of married 
Muslim women in the city of Khartoum describes how these women carefully negotiate their 
reputations and economic independence in a society that strictly locates them within the 
domestic sphere. Selling goods online via social media platforms such as Facebook and 
Whatsapp is an activity that allows these women to maintain their social and moral integrity 
while also earning money and staying in the living room. These and the other ways described 
previously in which Kinois and others are smart are just some of the many ways in which 
residents of African cities counter the economic, social, and political limitations of their 
mobility.
Conclusion: Scales of Urban Smartness
In this chapter, I paid attention to technological practices and discursive utterances regarding 
smartness, intelligence, knowledge, creativity, and innovation. Taking a dictionary entry as 
an example of how meanings can coexist and explain the same phenomenon, I have explored 
linguistic forms and their connotations. A term such as mayele and its synonyms—all closely 
related if we think about the interactions between technology and society—circulate in dif-
ferent social circles, which are in turn connected to local and global worlds in varying ways. 
Such vocabularies express different scales of connectivity. As a result, I had to link discourses 
observed in Kinshasa with ethnographies about ethnic Congolese groups and with Kinois 
newspapers and websites managed in London and Johannesburg. This suggests that innova-
tion, smartness, and creativity are floating signifiers, filled in depending on who uses them, on 
the objects with which they are connected, and on their (imagined) users. This methodology 
allowed me to introduce a heterogeneous image of life in Kinshasa, and it has helped me 
unravel the various ways in which one can “be smart in a city,” with or without being wired 
or investing in high tech.
The first scale I identified was the international sphere, dominated by the West and appro-
priated by the Congolese state. The promotion of innovation and the encouragement to 
Congolese youth to “innovate for the future” are embedded within an international, 
Western-centric scale of high-tech speak from which states borrow. The usage of the French 
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innovation literally shows the international scale within which these activities should be 
situated. 
This chapter also concluded with the same international scale, now focusing on the con-
cept of being smart. However, here it seems that it is not only state officials but also Kinois 
themselves who appropriate what it means to be smart. Here, I referred not only to inter-
national, NGO, and tech companies, but also—and maybe especially—to ethnographies of 
urban sociality. The city itself, a postcolonial urban environment with its particular forms 
of sociality, has become a second scale of reference; it is a site that generates new forms of 
knowledge and technological enhancement. The Kinois usage of smart is closer to boule, 
which summarizes the informal, maybe even immoral type of street knowledge that urban 
livelihood in African cities demands. Yet as suggested by music TV shows, in which the 
elderly dance and speak about the origins of the city, smartness can also derive from the 
present-day currency of distant pasts. The scales crosscut the semantic fields of innovation 
and technology in Kinshasa, and thus stretch over space and over time.
Finally, understanding the logics of technology and the possession of a certain expertise 
over this technology through the idiom of kindoki unsettles received ideas about intellectual 
property, knowledge transmission, training, and even the social positioning of technology 
experts. But here also, the city as a scale in itself is imbued with this type of knowledge pro-
duction, because street smartness is close to the mayele of tricksters and diviners.
By bringing to the fore the heterogeneous ways in which Kinshasa’s residents deal with 
technological infrastructures and attach value and meanings to those who handle technolog-
ical equipment and by embedding these ways within discourses about knowledge, creativity, 
and urban skills, my goal was to rethink what it means to be smart in the city. As mentioned, 
the concept of smart cities seems to be reserved for global cities such as London, Singapore, 
and Melbourne. Although many cities in the global north are trying to become “smarter” by 
integrating more high-tech and wireless technological infrastructures into public services, 
the stereotype remains that African cities are not “smart.” Despite the emergence of a “smart 
village” in Cairo (see Mitchell 2002; Ghannam 2002), the plans for Konza Technology City 
in Nairobi, and similar initiatives elsewhere, it remains inconceivable to associate technolog-
ical innovation with African cities. Furthermore, these “smart centers” in Rwanda and Egypt 
are enclaves, dominated by Western ideas of infrastructural progress and futurities. In this 
chapter, I have taken the opposite perspective and attempted to see how in Kinshasa’s streets, 
households, markets, and hotels, Kinois engage with technologies, how they combine vari-
ous registers of expertise and creativity, and how these in turn combine to produce variegated 
ways of being smart in the city.
By listening attentively to one radio host’s ideas about techne and observing the social 
reputations of ISTA students, musicians, and IT developers in the city, a perspective of “smart-
ness from below” has emerged. Although the “amateur” radio practitioner on one hand and 
the engineer-in-training who has received formal schooling on the other might seem to 
occupy two poles on the continuum of expertise acquisition in the field of modern 
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technology (with those who use social media somewhere in the middle), both positions are 
embedded within local approaches to knowledge acquisition and information possession.
In addition, through this material I have shown that the study of technology transfer in 
Africa needs to take the socioreligious contours of innovation (kosikola, in verb form) and 
knowledge (mayele) into account (see also Mavhunga 2014; chapter 2, this volume). An anal-
ysis of what technologies such as radios, mobile phones, and television do in African societ-
ies should go beyond the study of social mobility, development, and change, or even 
“modernization.” Rather, we should try to understand how these technologies relate to 
indigenous knowledge. New types of experts, expertise, and authority come about with the 
appearance (transfer/production) of new tools, thus bringing about new dynamics in society. 
New forms of social distinction, competition, and experience emerge when novel material 
goods are introduced (by local producers or by brokers). Yet, however new these may be, such 
new types of knowledge and experts do not appear in a social vacuum devoid of other types 
of mastery, erudition, and skills. We need to situate these new “technology experts” among 
the other types of masters and specialists upon which they draw or with which they contest 
or compete. If we want to take technology in Africa seriously, then we need to study how 
doctors, professors, and healers (all nganga), as well as blacksmiths and radio practitioners, 
computer engineers, and robot experts, within the same society relate to their tools, acquire 
their skills, and converse with one another. This dialogue can be convivial, aggressive, or 
subtle and can go in all directions, leading to either collaboration or destruction among the 
various experts—yet cohabitation is found therein for sure.
The spatial and temporal coevalness of the various scales I describe is important. Taking 
up the model of the dictionary entry once again, we can think about how some denotations 
attributed to a word may sound archaic or anachronistic, whereas others may receive the 
label foreign. Yet the meanings explored in this chapter all come together when we think 
about smartness in relation to technology in contemporary Kinshasa. It takes a social scientist 
to carefully observe and listen to the gestures and words of those who are working with tech-
nology and to allow for semantic, social, and technological complexity, irreducible to one 
single form or meaning. In other words, the challenge is to remain attentive to the polysemy 
of technology, innovation, and creativity, as well as the contiguity of meaning, practices, and 
experts.
Notes
1. The original document contained a typographic error; it read “This invasion” instead of “This 
invention.”
2. Similar observations have been made elsewhere on the continent; for example, in Kasenaland (north-
ern Ghana) diviners’ bags, you can find batteries, audio tapes, covers of mobile phones, radio antennas, 
and the printed circuit boards of secret machinery (Cassiman 2013).
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3. Yet among certain Congolese groups, blacksmiths also are figures of reconciliation. Because their 
working space becomes a place where people gather, blacksmiths have knowledge of people’s griev-
ances. Such knowledge can be used to restore harmony among people.
4. In mid-August 2014, the house of a friend of mine was burned down by ISTA students. A few months 
before, an ISTA student had started going out with the girlfriend of my friend’s brother. His brother 
challenged the student by exclaiming: “Wait and see. He can’t get away with this just because he’s an 
ISTA student!” Unfortunately, his warning triggered the aforementioned violent reaction from the ISTA 
community. 
5. Interestingly, a Kenya-based website describes Docteur Nico as a guitar wizard: http://www.africa 
review.com/Arts-and-Culture/The-rise-and-fall-of-TP-OK-Jazz/-/979194/1416534/-/78ruxmz/-/index 
.html.
6. Facebook (Messenger) interview from May 14, 2015.
7. I thank David Kerr for reminding me of Dar es Salam’s nickname (personal communication, May 23, 
2015).
8. See http://smartrwandadays.rw.
9. See http://www.smart-africa.com.
10. See http://www.temoignages.re/international/monde/250-millions-de-dollars-de-l-inde-au-congo,67889 
.html, a remediated newspaper article dating from June 20, 2013.
11. See http://allafrica.com/stories/201501301227.html.
12. Facebook interview from May 14, 2015.
13. Facebook (Messenger) interview from April 25, 2015.
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On the Politics of Generative Justice: African Traditions and  
Maker Communities
Ron Eglash and Ellen K. Foster
Our understanding of political economy has been strongly influenced by two models: the 
free market economy of private ownership and the socialist vision of government ownership. 
The socialist vision is one that calls for distributive justice—the top-down redistribution of 
wealth. Its application in the USSR was a humanitarian and ecological disaster, so it is no 
surprise that African socialism did not fare any better. Similarly, the free market approach has 
resulted in the alarming acceleration of wealth inequality, unsustainable extraction of natu-
ral resources, and environmental disasters on a global scale. Rather than import these failed 
models from European roots, it is our contention that a better framework for egalitarian and 
ecologically sustainable societies lies in African indigenous traditions—a framework we refer 
to as generative justice. However, this is not to imply that Africa needs some sort of cultural 
purity; generative justice can be seen in many forms throughout the world. One of the pri-
mary exemplars for contemporary generative justice has been the maker movement, and for 
that reason we focus on African maker communities in this chapter.
The generative justice wiki defines generative justice in the following way: “The universal 
right to generate value and directly participate in its benefits; the rights of value generators 
to create their own conditions of production; and the rights of communities of value gener-
ation to nurture self-sustaining paths for its circulation.”1
Generative Justice in African Traditional Society
The concept of value generation is at the core of many African spiritual beliefs, where it takes 
the specific form of a self-generating or recursive flow of unalienated value. This is distinctly 
different from value generation in other frameworks. Capitalism mistakenly views money as 
a self-generating value form, as though two dollar bills left alone in a bank vault will sponta-
neously give birth to a baby dollar bill. We constantly use terminology like “your invest-
ments will grow” or “a thriving bank account” that reinforces this illusion. However, these 
are alienated forms of value extracted from elsewhere. Rejecting industry altogether and 
valorizing the “natural” over the “artificial” is no better. Consider, for example, Uganda’s 
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consideration of the death penalty for the crime of “unnatural sex.” Or consider the roman-
tic organicism in some environmental movements; for example, Earth First! founder David 
Foreman publicly recommended allowing Ethiopians to starve to death during the 1980s 
famine as a way of allowing the ecosystem to return to a “natural state” (Bookchin et al. 
1999).
Traditional African concepts of self-generation, like those of many indigenous cultures, 
focus neither on extracting value for export elsewhere nor on elevating the purity of nature 
over culture. Rather, they depend on collaborations of humans and nonhumans in which 
value is 1) allowed to remain in nonextracted, unalienated forms and 2) circulated from the 
bottom up. In Africa, this generative recursion has many different symbols, but one of the 
most vivid is the West African icon of a snake biting its own tail (figure 6.1). There are two 
underlying principles at work in this circular flow. One is what engineers might model as 
negative feedback: preventing greed, value hoarding, wealth inequality, or other dynamics 
from extracting value. This is well-visualized by a Baule carving in which each crocodile has 
the other’s tail in its jaws; it is said to represent “the chief and the people in balance”(figure 
6.2). The other principle is what engineers might model as positive feedback: a self-expanding 
source of value, sometimes disruptive or even chaotic, as we see in a second Baule carving, 
said to represent “the cycle of life” (figure 6.3).
Negative feedback is the force of stability. In African iconography and spiritual descrip-
tions, it is the force which is said to drive cyclic phenomena: calm waves in water, the sinu-
ous motion of an animal, the turn of seasons, and so on. However, these African depictions 
Figure 6.1
A traditional African symbol of recursion, this snake biting its tail appeared on the palace walls of the 
kingdom of Dahomey (now the Historical Museum of Abomey).
Source: Ron Eglash.
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of cyclic phenomena have been isolated in Western descriptions and thus form an incom-
plete and misleading portrait. The concept was first appropriated by colonial anthropology’s 
need for images of static, rule-bound traditionalism (Shaw 1995). Later, it was applied by 
politically conservative forces, such as in Disney’s The Lion King, in which the “great circle of 
life” justifies the lion’s inherited nobility and the hyenas’ banishment as welfare cheats (Gid-
dings 1999). Missing from this portrait is the opposing force: the positive feedback of a desta-
bilizing, creative, chaotic trickster—sometimes responsible for unfortunate random events, 
Figure 6.2
Baule carving, “The Chief and the People in Balance.” The background has been darkened for greater 
visibility.
Source: Hamill Gallery, Boston.
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Figure 6.3
Baule carving, “The Cycle of Life.”
Source: Ron Eglash.
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but also fundamental to imagination and innovation. Just as modernism appropriated the 
cycle, postmodernism valorized the trickster (Eglash 2003).
It is only when we see how stability and instability are coupled that we can grasp the sys-
tem as a whole. Figure 6.4 shows this pairing across different African cultures; the best known 
in the West is Dan and Legba in the Vodun religion, which is still practiced by about thirty 
million people in the West African nations of Benin, Togo, and Ghana and which gave rise 
to syncretic religions such as Voodoo in the Caribbean and Brazil. That is not to say that 
there is some sort of homogeneous cultural unity across all of Africa; the theme of 
self-generation of value arises in many different ways and forms. However, this spiritual 
structure is strikingly common: pairs of lower gods that embody complementary forces of 
order and disorder, and a distant “high god” whose life force combines these traits, creating 
a fractal—the dance between order and chance.
Fractals are the self-similar patterns mathematicians use to characterize living structures: 
branches of branches in trees and lungs; folds of folds in brains and intestinal villi; clumps of 
clumps in tiny cell organs or giant coral reefs. Complexity theory, which is the science of 
self-organization, shows that these fractals arise from a coupling of negative and positive 
feedback. Indeed, the inverted U-shape in figure 6.4 is typical in complexity theory: The least 
complex at the extremes of order and disorder, the apex of complexity occurs for fractal 
structures at the center.
Fractal patterns are also typical of African traditional architecture. Western architectural 
traditions of top-down civil engineering spatially encode authority in ways that substitute 
elite expertise for democratic decision-making. In theory, engineers are imposing the features 
that will make life better for all, but these city layouts often act to preserve and reinforce the 
spatial power of the wealthy (Bickford 2000)—hence phrases such as “born on the wrong side 
of the tracks.” In contrast, the bottom-up traditions of African village layouts often support 
bottom-up decision-making and hence more egalitarian economic and environmental struc-
tures. Caplan (1981), for example, studied the relation between housing and women’s auton-
omy in Tanzania. She described how the flexibility of housing allowed women to create new 
homes if they wanted a divorce or to extend old homes if they wanted to shift the family 
structure. As in many traditional African settlements, this self-organized housing allowed for 
greater social control by women. When socialism led to modernization programs, this auton-
omy was threatened by “improved” housing designs, which sometimes resembled concrete 
army barracks.
This traditional self-organization often results in self-similar spatial patterns: fractals. For 
example, in a fractal model of a Ba-ila village in Zambia (figure 6.5), we can see (a) a single 
ring-shaped house with the sacred altar toward the back; (b) the ring of rings with the human 
habitation toward the back forming a corral; and (c) the ring of rings of rings forming the 
village as a whole. At the center of the final shape (enlarged at right), the chief’s extended 
family surrounds the chief’s immediate family, which surrounds a tiny model village in 
which spirits of the ancestors reside. The relation between these scaling rings is described by 
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The mapping from ordered to disordered phenomena in African spiritual traditions.
Source: Ron Eglash.
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the locals as kulea (to nurture; Eglash 1999). This sense that ancestors nurture the current 
generation is another way to enforce intergenerational responsibility (reflected in religious 
obligations to ancestors, economic obligations to elders, etc.). It includes both positive 
feedback—fecundity and other forms of value generation—and the rule-bound negative 
feedback that prevents the system from creating the concentrations of wealth and power that 
plague capitalism.
These traditional fractal structures, created by a “nurturing” combination of negative and 
positive feedback, are not a utopian garden of Eden; like any other human organization, it 
is full of all the usual petty human failings. However, centuries of trial and error—discovering 
which practices cause environmental degradation and what conflict resolution works best—
result in a basin of attraction for generative justice (Eglash and Garvey 2014): the gradual 
evolution of agreed-upon rules that allow those who generate value to have a say in its 
circulation. A well-documented example is the hxaro tradition among hunter-gatherer 
groups in the Makgadikgadi (meaning a very dry place, corrupted to Kalahari Desert by 
European travelers): Meat belongs to the maker of the arrow, not the one who shot it. 
Because women can make arrows, even those who do not hunt are credited with the kill. 
Thus, gender relations have an economic basis for an egalitarian structure. Mavhunga (2014) 
makes the case for a wide variety of such communal characteristics in African traditional 
hunting practices, but he also points out that these traditions of generative justice did not 
simply evaporate in the face of either colonialism or “modernization” projects: Communal 
traditions in hunting were both adapted and appropriated during colonial and postcolonial 
eras. Similarly, fractal architecture is now enjoying its greatest expansion in the African 
context (May 2013).
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 6.5
Fractal model for Ba-ila village in Zambia: (a) single house; (b) family enclosure; (c) village as a whole.
Source: Ron Eglash.
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To summarize, colonial characterizations—still with us today in the form of romantic 
organicist movements—tend to view the environmental and social sustainability of indige-
nous societies as an unintentional consequence of living “closer to nature”—of less cognitive 
reflection and more intuitive action. To the contrary, these forms of generative justice evolved 
over centuries of conscious reflection and developed their own internal models for maintain-
ing an awareness, however deeply encoded in symbolism, for balancing sustainability and 
change. In the next section, we turn to the maker movement as the latest instance in which 
the African generative justice tradition is reinterpreted through contemporary materials and 
practices.
Generative Justice in Contemporary Sociotechnical Movements
In the West, two models have reigned supreme: the free market model that emphasizes inno-
vation from wealth concentration and the socialist model that makes similar assumptions 
regarding the need for top-down distribution. Both commit the same error in assuming that 
bottom-up systems result in a tragedy of the commons, which only privatization or state 
authority can resolve. However, many contemporary sociotechnical movements have proved 
this contention wrong. Open-source computing is one of the best known of these “bottom-up” 
systems: a kind of “communal” exchange of labor value in which thousands of volunteers 
contribute to code that is legally placed in the public domain. Open-source founders such as 
Eric Raymond made the explicit connection to indigenous societies, as evidenced by Ray-
mond’s 1998 essay, in a section titled “The Hacker Milieu as Gift Culture,” where he notes: 
“We can observe gift cultures in action among aboriginal cultures living in ecozones with 
mild climates and abundant food.”
We can compare the typical flow of value under socialism or capitalism to that of genera-
tive justice by using the flowcharts in figures 6.6 and 6.7. Figure 6.6 shows how labor value 
is normally extracted: profits go to the state under socialism, or to factory owners under 
capitalism, but typically little is returned to workers in either case. Figure 6.7 shows a value 
flow chart for one of the paradigmatic generative justice examples: an open-source hardware 
device called Arduino. We have diagrammed the arrows showing unalienated value with dou-
ble lines, as if the value being transferred were an embodied fluid moving through a pipe 
rather than an abstraction transmitted by wire. Rather than patent the circuit, the inventors 
of Arduino use an open-source license, which puts the intellectual property rights in the 
public domain. Anyone can download a blueprint, make whatever changes they like, and sell 
the new device themselves. And the software these circuits run is also open source, part of an 
enormous community in which both professionals and amateurs share their code with no 
strings attached.
It is by no means utopian: Because the Arduino is partly hardware, there must be a physi-
cal component, and in this case it is fabricated in factories and bought and sold like any other 
capitalist commodity, as in the loop on the left of figure 6.7. However, within the loop on the 
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right, there is a remarkable gift economy at work. As of 2014, about 1.2 million of the official 
boards had been sold, and the number of applications for the board is almost as large, rang-
ing from whimsical gadgets to innovations for disability (McAllister, Yuen, and Bush 2012) 
to citizen science for pollution detection (Gertz and Di Justo 2012) to low-cost health elec-
tronics for low-income communities (Monicka et al. 2014).
In the case of Arduino’s code sharing, there is little conflict, because each piece of code 
runs independently. However, even in large-scale open-source projects in which code must 
be unified, these conflicts can be resolved without top-down authority. Although older con-
tributors often have more authority in deciding what code is incorporated, newcomers—
contributors at the bottom—can always “fork” the code and simply start their own projects. 
Like the Baule door carving of two crocodiles each with the other’s tail in its mouth, this 
negative feedback prevents authoritarian abuse in labor structures and ensures a push toward 
cooperation from all sides. The pairing of positive feedback for innovation from these com-
puting communities and negative feedback made possible by open source’s balance of pow-
ers is what makes generative justice recognizable across both the indigenous and information 
technology domains (Eglash and Garvey 2014).
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Figure 6.6
Value flow under socialism or capitalism.
Source: Ron Eglash.
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In the case of organic gardening, this recursive circulation also applies to nonhumans as 
generators of value. When software developers say they want to release their code as open 
source rather than have its value extracted, they are saying that the value of the code they 
generated will now circulate in a community of developers, and that they make this choice 
because they can assume that others will do the same. If a plant could say it wants to recircu-
late the value it has generated, rather than have it extracted, surely it would mean it wants to 
decay and enrich the soil for its progeny, establish a gift exchange with bees (the value of 
nectar and the value of pollen distribution in common circulation), offer us their O2 for free 
on the assumption that we will continue to contribute our valuable CO2, and so forth. Com-
bined with human agency, this productivity is expandable. Contrary to Marx, there is noth-
ing that inherently limits the productivity of such unalienated value circulation to what he 
called Natur-bedurftigkeit (nature’s stinginess). We can keep value in unalienated forms and 
still leverage its productivity with technology: for example computational approaches to 
organic gardening now allow a combination of old-fashioned natural plant breeding with 
information technology for tracking desirable traits (Manning 2004).
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Value flow in the Arduino community.
Source: Ron Eglash.
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A Brief Introduction to Maker Movements in the United States
Maker and hacker practices in the United States are characterized by certain social formations 
and affinity groups, and may culminate in the physical instantiation of a hackerspace, also 
known as a makerspace. These are often group-owned and group-funded spaces in which 
like-minded individuals can meet to explore interests in hacking, making, and fabricating in 
a fairly general sense. The first hackerspace was probably c-base, initiated in Berlin in 1995, 
but hacker/maker culture soon proliferated throughout the United States and Europe, 
brought about by joint global conferences such as the Chaos Computer Conference (Toupin 
2014).
Hackerspaces/makerspaces now populate all continents, and the “maker movement” has 
been characterized as a transformative and global phenomenon (Anderson 2012). Practices 
shared can include soldering, simple circuitry, using woodworking and metalworking tools, 
knitting, sewing, and many more. The communities out of which these material practices 
and spaces grow often situate intent and point toward the need for particular tools or shared 
skills. There is a focus on communal sharing of not only tools, but also knowledges and 
access to different forms of knowing. One category of makerspaces, such as the TechShops 
chain, are more innovation-driven and geared to help start-up businesses perform simple 
prototyping and fabrication; others are focused on enrichment and educational opportuni-
ties (for example, makerspaces located in public libraries); still others have a more politically 
and socially minded theme, questioning gendered practices and consumer culture (Liberat-
ing Ourselves Locally in Oakland, Femhack in Montreal, and the Fixers Collective in New 
York City, for example).
The maker movement is not without its critics, who point out that its bottom-up charac-
teristics are often accompanied by top-down and consumerist-driven initiatives. DARPA, 
Microsoft, Intel, and other corporations find interest in its energy and endeavors for techno-
logical innovation (Morozov 2014, yet on-the-ground activities and more socially minded 
groups show that grassroots approaches are still profoundly in play. One particular group, the 
Fixers Collective (based in New York City but also active in Seattle and Portland), is interested 
in maintaining and caring for objects rather than disassembling them for component parts, 
which is the general practice among hackers and makers. The US-based Fixers Collective has 
a European counterpart in Repair Cafés, which are also communally and socially driven 
(Charter and Keiller 2014).
Makerspaces in Africa
Fixer practices are also quite prevalent in African countries—not as a political rebellion 
against planned obsolescence, but rather due to economic necessity: the expense of new 
devices, the paucity of products or even replacement parts, and the need for a means of 
employment. This puts hacker and maker practices in some African countries at an 
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interesting juncture, as “making do” craft skills and economic necessity intersects with the 
democratizing politics of questioning top-down technosocial practices and informing inno-
vation. The fixer sides of maker/hacker cultures are geared toward regenerating value in 
objects on a local scale. This side is prevalent in two of the African sites we visited in Ghana, 
the Creativity Group in Kumasi and the QAMP group in Accra, as will be discussed shortly. 
Similar to the findings of Foster’s work on US hacker and makerspaces (Foster 2015), these 
groups and others in Africa have complex ecologies, politics and cultures.
For the purposes of this chapter, we will focus on African makerspaces, which have been 
accelerating in popularity and prevalence across many different countries and groups. 
Although they align themselves under the general ethos of bricolage, skill sharing, and cre-
ative collaboration among those with many different interests, they are also locally and cul-
turally situated. From preliminary research conducted in Ghana and our communications 
with other groups, places, and spaces, it is clear that the fixer mentality is far more deeply 
entwined with the fabrication and making mentality on the African continent than in the 
United States or Europe.
This became immediately evident in our conversation with D. K. Asare-Oseo of the QAMP 
project in Accra: He remarked that as soon as he first heard of makerspaces, he immediately 
recognized the African scrap yards populated by fabricators and fixers as their predecessors; 
he also noted a deeply entrenched cultural value around repair and making do with what is 
at hand. Contemporary cultural connections are also continually remade; for example, in 
reply to a question about ablution in relation to toxic waste exposure, D. K. noted that many 
of the poor working in Accra now come from Islamic roots and hence have a strong presence 
in the scrap yards.
Another example of generative traditions that blur both the fixing/making and traditional/
contemporary lines is seen in the famous wire toys that can be found throughout the African 
continent. Davison and Skotnes (1986) note that analogous toys made from natural materi-
als could be found prior to colonialism; for example, in southern Africa, bovine clay figurines 
were toys in traditional cattle herding cultures, in areas in which wire cars are found today. 
As locals shifted from pastoral to industrial economies, both the object of reference (from 
cows to cars) and the materials utilized in labor (wire for shipping, fixing, and other applica-
tions) shifted along with them. Peffer (2009) examines the prevalence of wire toy copies of 
the police trucks used in the brutality of apartheid surveillance and enforcement; in the 
context of DIY protest artifacts, children made these copies as a means to explore and in 
some cases gain a sense of mastery over their oppressors. Today, African wire toys can be 
found in many African nations; they have become so iconic that in some places their manu-
facture is largely for the tourist market. At the same time, they have become a part of inter-
national maker lore, appearing in Make magazine, Afrigadget, and other popular forums (e.g., 
see Brucker-Cohen 2009).
Cultural connections have also been noted in Senegal’s Colobane market, where se 
débrouiller (making do) with repairs and salvaged materials can signify a collective ethos with 
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spiritual resonance. Grabski (2014) quotes Colobane resident Aminata Diop: “‘You know 
God has given the Senegalese people something, whatever we can see we can fix. Whatever 
we see broken we can make it work again.’” Schaller de la Cova (2013) notes that many Sen-
egalese now use the term Góorgóorlus—the Wolof name in a comic of a family that is con-
stantly making do—as an indigenous translation for “recycling, repairing, mending, reusing, 
scrimping, and stretching ... The world of góorgóorlus is one in which cracked plastic lawn 
chairs and calabash gourds are sewn together, not thrown away, where shoes are polished 
nightly because the dirt and the sand of neighborhood streets quickly dirties even the most 
shiny, rich leather with a coat of brown, white, or red dust” (224). The term plays on the 
noun góor (man/male in Wolof), and Schaller de la Cova suggests that the connection is 
implying the duties of a family provider to improvise in the face of challenges.
While the corner repair stores of the United States have declined to almost nonexistence, 
such that the fixers movement seems to be only possible as an offshoot of makerspaces, or at 
least a new flexibility made possible with contemporary electronics, this relationship may be 
reversed in Africa. Ghana in particular has a rich informal economy of street vendors who 
will sell new wares but also will fix cell phones, printers, and other electronics with complex 
circuitry. They learn their highly refined skills through attachments (or internships) and 
then aspire or move on to owning and running their own shops. In this vein, many 
self-described hacker or maker groups of Africa are geared toward preservation practices and 
the creative reuse of waste. They are simultaneously pulling the warp of innovation geared 
toward the future while also weaving in the weft of repair practices already deeply entrenched 
in their cultures.
This melding of a global maker movement with localized skills, knowledge, and mindsets 
opens rich possibilities. Repair cultures uphold an ethos of stabilizing feedback that works to 
keep waste at bay. Meanwhile, the positive loop of innovation, open-source technology 
development, and the establishment of makerspaces in which to gather and share ideas dis-
rupts and creates new ways to think about and reinterpret the possibilities of repair and 
waste. The snake bites its tail; fractal complexities grow as one-to-one skill sharing builds up 
to small working groups, networked together as a makerspace or tech hub, and ultimately 
perhaps a community of makerspaces that shares materials, practices, and projects.
Case Studies
Although there is a vast number of IT startup groups, computer/technology sharing centers 
geared toward innovation incubation, and hacker/maker groups within African cultures, the 
focus in this chapter is on socially minded efforts that culminate in locally contingent prac-
tices. Instead of critiquing the role that corporations such as Intel and Microsoft have had in 
co-opting local economies and innovation development in Africa and Ghana specifically, we 
are working here to explicate what is happening on the ground as an emergent and at times 
even subversive phenomena.
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Unlike the homogenizing forces of corporate culture or government bureaucracy, the 
bottom-up growth of these enterprises ensures that their particular local character is not lost. 
The hackerspace WoeLab, which is located in Lagos, is world-renowned for creating a 3-D 
printer out of e-waste: a tool that would normally be out of the participants’ price range, not 
to mention the challenges of importing a notoriously delicate device (Stevenson 2014). How-
ever, this is not a matter of sheer necessity; the tool itself is typically used in creative and even 
playful ways in makerspaces, and to create a 3-D printer using waste is by itself a subversively 
intelligent move that challenges the ways in which innovators in developing nations find 
their creativity censored or imprisoned by demands for practical application.
iSpace is located in downtown Accra and is a place for local creators and innovators to 
meet up and work on their projects using a collective space and some shared tools. It has 
been host to civic hack-a-thons, including a hack4good event in July 2014 that brought 
together individuals with expertise in computer programming, information technology, the 
medical world, and beyond to work on local problems within the field of medicine. The goal 
of the meetup was to have technologists talk to medical workers and determine their needs 
in terms of an open-source IT platform. The dialogues that transpired also made the technol-
ogists aware of different special knowledges to formulate helpful technologies for their 
local communities. The iSpace initiative is focused on building local economies, but is also 
invested in helping to foster alternative educational practices and skill sharing beyond 
these innovation endeavors (iSpace 2014). The iSpace initiative hopes to build skillsets and 
possible economies from the ground up to ensure local economic stability and growth, one 
hub at a time. The founders of iSpace, Fiifi Baidoo and Josiah Eyison, have IT and entrepre-
neurial backgrounds, and while they are supportive of both open-source code, they see 
community-oriented spaces built from the ground up—a kind of open sourcing of the built 
environment—as equally essential. There is a recognition across African countries of the 
importance of these places and their malleability for supporting various initiatives. Eyison 
is confident in the Ghanaian people’s ability to create change from within and generate 
more value through creative practice, focusing on ground-up technological transformation 
instead of hoping for policy or governmental action from above to foster technological 
development.
There is, of course, a double-edged sword in the independence of these initiatives: A 
neo-liberal ideology would jump upon these programs as justification for withdrawing gov-
ernment support. However, once we start thinking of generative justice as orthogonal to the 
ideological spectrum, we can see how both conservative and liberal political perspectives can 
be held accountable for providing support. Meyer (2014), for example, notes that the issue of 
net neutrality—to prevent Internet service providers from charging variable rates depending 
on use or content—has attracted supporters at both ends of the spectrum. Research on poli-
cies for supporting generative justice—legal support for open source, institutions for foster-
ing civic organizations, public use spaces, —and so on—is both unexplored and critical to 
advancing its spread.
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Tech Needs Girls is another Ghanaian, educationally focused group that speaks to the 
generative justice ethos and was working from iSpace for some time. Mainly based in Accra 
and Kumasi, Tech Needs Girls focuses on breaking down barriers to computer programming 
and IT education for underprivileged girls. Ruby on Rails workshops are taught by female 
mentors, pushing against the sexist mentality that women cannot navigate computers or 
should not be involved in technological development. Tech Needs Girls supports this 
endeavor by directly putting the technology in question in the hands of eager, driven young 
women who are typically not allowed such chances. The workshops are geared toward teach-
ing girls to create technology and content that is contingent upon and inclusive of their own 
realities, giving them a voice and a stake in the value of possible technical manipulation and 
thus creating their own value educationally and otherwise.
Tech Needs Girls is also working to establish satellite organizations throughout Ghana. 
Instead of relying on bringing these practices into the formal classroom setting, although 
they would like to, they are currently working with local university students who want to be 
mentors and help start workshops and programs on their own terms. As Eyison of iSpace has 
noted, with the difficulties of instigating change at the top-down governmental and policy 
level, Tech Needs Girls recognizes that it is difficult to transform long-standing school 
bureaucracies. By helping to facilitate bottom-up and generative skill sharing and educa-
tional structures, Tech Needs Girls is empowering often marginalized groups, which can go 
on to teach greater numbers of girls, thus generating a network of support for innovation and 
skill sharing.
Another group that is socially connected to iSpace, albeit geographically distant, is the 
CoCreation Hub in Nigeria. Much like iSpace, the hub is dedicated to fostering local startups 
to bolster the local economy. It has a similar focus on skill-sharing and educational practices, 
ranging from proposing new online services to hacking experiments with open-source hard-
ware equipment such as the Arduino. Although originally focused on LEGO Mindstorms for 
robotic educational practices, the group is considering a move to using the Raspberry Pi in 
afterschool activities (currently called “Bot Club”; see Bot Club, n.d.), because it is more 
affordable and malleable given its open-source software. More recently they held a two-day 
hackathon described on their blog as one that would “identify ways & build technology 
solutions leveraging social media for reporting and eliminating violence against women.” 
Thus, while an emphasis on entrepreneurial practices among these groups gives them legiti-
macy to corporate donors, they also aspire to incorporate social critiques and educational 
practices that are locally contingent and invested in how future local economies might grow 
and sustain themselves.
The Creativity Group is based out of Kwame Nkruma University of Science and Technol-
ogy (KNUST) in Kumasi and cofounded by two KNUST alumni, Jorge Appiah and Papa 
Kwadwo Wonkyie Mensah, but it is fully run by currently enrolled KNUST students who 
control the direction and flow of its projects. The Creativity Group is focused on creating 
appropriate and sustainable technologies out of available parts, typically from e-waste. 
Often, these technologies have educational merit, are open source, and focus on fostering 
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knowledge sharing and on hands-on learning. Cross-disciplinary collaborations are uncom-
mon at KNUST, but Creativity Group members come from many different academic back-
grounds and are invested in learning different skillsets from one another through the desgin 
of innovative and value-creating technologies. Appiah and Mensah created this group as a 
grassroots endeavor to avoid the specialization pressures that would come with formal insti-
tutional status such as an academic department.
Some of the Creativity Group’s projects include an educational student kit (ESK), High 
Altitude Balloon in Testing (HABIT), and raising awareness of problems involved in e-waste 
disposal practices (Creativity Group 2013). They have also engaged local Kumasi communi-
ties beyond the university, and many members have partnered with fabricators working out 
of Suame Magazine. Suame Magazine is a marketplace for acquiring second-hand parts and is 
home to many machine-technology fabricators and fixers who have acquired their skills 
through attachments beyond or instead of a formal engineering education. Other projects 
and studies are also being conducted to create more interaction between university engineer 
students and traditionally trained informal sector fabricators, with initiatives reaching as far 
back as the 1980s (Waldman-Brown, Obeng, and Adu-Gyamfi 2013).
Similarly, the AMP (Agoblogoshie Makerspace Platform) group brings many knowledges, 
practices, and local issues into play for its project. The group helps to foster more sustainable 
(both economically and environmentally) scrapping techniques within Agbogbloshie, a 
waste and informal scrapyard site located in downtown Accra. To say the group uses “brico-
lage” is not quite correct; as this term was introduced by Levi Strauss as an analogy to the 
“handyman” who is meeting preset goals with improvised materials. The AMP process is far 
more strategic; moving between planned blueprints at one end of the spectrum (founder D. 
K. Asare-Oseo is an architect) and allowing the “found” material to suggest its own uses at the 
other end. The AMP group is creating a platform or vehicle for something we have termed 
generative waste.
Generative waste applies the concept of generative justice to the socially viable possibili-
ties coming out of waste regimes. Tying into the Fixers Collective’s push against planned 
obsolescence, this conceptual and methodological framing works with what one might con-
sider marginal material to create possibilities for new networks and new systems of use. It 
also invokes Haraway’s (1991) work in complicating the nature/culture/machine divide and 
Alaimo’s (2010) “transcorporeality” by recognizing that, in the end, we become waste and 
waste becomes us as we move through and interact with it on a daily level. In this vein, AMP 
is working to generate further cultures, economies, and possibilities for education through 
remediation practices of a hazardous site—cycling through waste for positive feedback in a 
space that is based upon the negative feedback of trying to mediate, lessen, and repair waste 
that has been thrust upon it. While instigating new practices, the group works with scrap-
ping communities that have been located in Agbogbloshie for ten to twenty years, planning 
a future with instead of against their needs. Already, the working group has helped to explore 
new ways to extract copper from cables and wiring and safe forms of plastics processing on 
site (AMP 2015).
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This is not to romanticize the e-waste site at Agbogbloshie. Clearly, greater systemic mech-
anisms must change in order to fully ameliorate the situation within its geographic bounds 
and beyond. The environmental hazards are not trivial, something which the AMP group 
hopes to bring attention to and map (Caravanos et al. 2011; Osseo-Asare and Abbas 2015). 
Yet by tapping into maker/hacker and community-driven knowledge-sharing practices, the 
co-principal investigators of the AMP initiative (D. K. Osseo-Asare and Dr. Yasmine Abbas) are 
working in conjunction with local students and scrappers to reform the landscape and 
improve its viability as a safer and more fulfilling work site.
They also hope to bring attention to practices such as those at the Agbogbloshie site and 
Suame Magazine that have always been in the realm of making, hacking, and repair, even 
before the so-called maker movement was established. Osseo-Asare asserts that it is all well 
and good that other hacker/maker groups are interested in bringing outside technologies 
such as MakerBots and Arduinos into the mix of possibilities, but they also need to recognize 
the long-standing, innovative fixing and making traditions already established in Ghana. For 
them, the idea that a maker movement is coming from outside of Ghana and is aiming to 
transform its landscape is highly problematic. “The problem is it continues to reinforce the 
mentality ... that all of the amazing things need to be brought in [from outside of Africa]. 
There [are] already makerspace[s] in Ghana ... let’s see them as makerspaces and bring them 
into the discourse and not just focus on the negative side but try to use the positive side to 
change the negative side” (interview with D. K. Osseo-Asare, July 2014).
In AMP’s current work, the group has illuminated the social and cultural aspects of Agbog-
bloshie and are invested in helping local scrappers realize their desires to create more busi-
ness and stability, often through local processing and fabrication techniques. Osseo-Asare 
and Abbas hope to facilitate this through “inter-class innovation” (interview with D. K. 
Osseo-Asare, July 2014). Similar to Creativity Group’s interdisciplinarity, the AMP group is 
working to foster inter-class collaborations between Ghanaian college students graduating in 
fields of STEAM and scrappers with highly refined material expertise in order to rethink the 
landscape of Agbogbloshie. Although still in its inception stage, the group has started using 
scrap and waste material from Agbogbloshie itself to create makerspace hubs for on-site edu-
cational and fabrication practices that are neither subservient to solutions from outside nor 
ignorant of current technological developments. Considering that there are long-standing 
fabrication groups such as a blacksmith and pot-fabrication collective within Agbogbloshie, 
AMP has a striking opportunity to facilitate a new synthesis between international develop-
ments in innovation and the creation of more locally formed, locally contingent, and locally 
led maker groups. 
Conclusion
In the 1950s and 1960s, leaders such as Nyerere in Tanzania and Senghor in Senegal attempted 
to map African traditions into a Marxist-inspired framework and to implement this system 
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in their developing nations. This African socialism failed not because of corrupt individuals, 
but because it was the wrong mapping in the first place. As Mbah and Igariwey (2010, 56) 
note in regards to the Ujamaa movement in Tanzania: “Whatever the peasants produced was 
sold to the authorities, and the government controlled the prices. In this way, the state 
squeezed the peasants for as much surplus as possible. It would have been simply unthink-
able to imagine that Ujamaa, in its original, undiluted form, would have succeeded as part of 
a state system. To that extent, its failure was logical and inevitable.” Squeezing the peasants 
for surplus is a common feature of both capitalism and socialism; all systems that put a pre-
mium on value extraction will put their value generators—whether human or nonhuman—
at risk of failure to return that value.
We can think of the spectrum of political economy as a horizontal line, with a pure free 
market at the far right and pure communism at the far left. Generative justice, in contrast, is 
orthogonal to that spectrum; a y-axis to the horizontal range of ideologies. For example, in the 
case of communism, both labor and nature are (rightly) considered true generators of value. 
However, the value generated by labor and nature has to be extracted, just as it was in capital-
ist societies. The only difference from capitalism was that the extracted value would be 
“returned” to the people by the state (figure 6.6). This return of value has failed miserably in 
most attempts. Extracting nutrients from soil and attempting to return them in “alienated” 
forms of value—chemical fertilizers and pesticides—creates environmental damage. Extract-
ing labor value and attempting to return it in the form of “the people’s factory” is no less 
alienating than when capitalism extracts labor value. The Soviet Union, for example, was 
notorious for widespread poverty, environmental degradation, paranoid militarism, and the 
destruction of civil rights. Neither communism nor capitalism have a good record in the 
attempt to return extracted value to labor and nature. Rather than rely on extracting value 
and returning it in alienated forms via distributive justice, it is our contention that social 
equality and environmental balance can best flourish when structured by generative justice, 
which seeks to avoid value extraction in the first place.
It is obvious why capitalism would want this extraction: Its free market model requires that 
workers sell the only thing they have, their labor power, and that the “forces of production” 
(Noble 1984) thus compete to see who can extract from nature and labor with as little return 
as possible. But why have socialists—surely not a group bound by conservative assumptions—
tended to be blind to this issue? One reason might be the misleading colonial portrait we 
discussed earlier, in which indigenous societies in Africa and elsewhere were portrayed as 
trapped in negative feedback, remaining eternally fixed at barely above the subsistence level. 
Marx ([1939] 1973, 409–410), for example, explicitly stated that the unalienated labor of 
indigenous cultures, although admirable for its egalitarian relations, could not rise beyond 
Natur-bedurftigkeit. Only in extracting value and redistributing it in a top-down, alienated 
form from the state could we rise above “mere local developments of humanity” (409–410).
As we have seen, these contentions are factually incorrect. Bottom-up processes are not 
doomed to paltry existence, barely above the subsistence level; they can be profoundly 
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productive and innovative. African traditions of generative justice—placing emphasis on the 
rights of those who generate value to enjoy its benefits in unalienated forms, control its 
conditions of production, and nurture its circulation—are a better model for the original 
indigenous traditions and for their new technological hybrids. The makerspace movement in 
Africa is not a silver bullet for all ills, but it is just one arena in which generative justice tra-
ditions can find new footholds in the path toward egalitarian and sustainable futures.
Note
1. See http://generativejustice.wikispaces.com.
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Making Mobiles African
Toluwalogo Odumosu
Mobile telephones and Africa have become a feel-good story of sweeping technological and 
social transformation and of the rapid acceptance of modernity by a continent long plagued 
by a surfeit of bad news. This is why, for example, African journalists Tolu Ogunlesi and 
Stephanie Busari could write a piece for CNN entitled “Seven Ways Mobile Phones Have 
Changed Lives in Africa.”1 Their narrative is simple: The mobile phone has transformed the 
continent. Education, health care, activism, disaster management, entertainment, banking: 
There seems to be no section of the African economy that has escaped the magic of the tele-
phone. The article paints a picture of innovative solutions to specific challenges facing the 
continent, from countering the scourge of fake drugs in Ghana to election monitoring in 
Kenya using the Ushaidi platform. How did this happen, especially given the historical chal-
lenges other large technological infrastructures (such as electrical power) faced at adoption? 
This chapter argues that to understand the relative success of the mobile phone in Africa, we 
must understand the cultural and epistemic processes through which the African mobile 
emerges.
Mobiles and Place
What does it mean to examine how mobiles are being made African? Surely, mobile phone 
culture is a global phenomenon and a technology that has been adopted widely by various 
countries around the world, as evidenced by the high global demand for Apple’s iPhone. 
However, upon careful inspection, unique dimensions of mobile telephony can be observed 
in individual nation-states and geospatial areas. Culture, national politics, geography, and 
available infrastructure all contribute to shaping mobile networks. Therefore, Ito, Matsuda, 
and Okabe (2005) can argue convincingly that the Japanese keitai is a different sociocultural 
object from the cellular phone in the United States (which Ito argues is defined by technical 
infrastructure) or the mobile in the United Kingdom (defined by the move away from the 
predetermined locations that landlines represented). Roughly translated, keitai means “some-
thing you carry with you.” For Ito, the keitai is “not so much about a new technical 
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capability or freedom of motion but about a snug and intimate technosocial tethering, a 
personal device supporting communications that are a constant, lightweight and mundane 
presence in everyday life” (Ito, Matsuda, and Okabe 2005, 1).
Ito thus makes the compelling argument that though mobile telephony systems in differ-
ent nations may be technologically analogous, they possess different social histories and may 
occupy very different sociocultural niches. In a somewhat similar vein, the ethnography of 
Horst and Miller (2005, 2006) clearly describes the cultural construction of the cell phone in 
Jamaica. These studies of localized specificity in patterns of use and mobile culture are useful 
and important contributions to our understanding of the relationship between technology 
and society, and this chapter will attempt to do likewise in its examination of the state of 
mobile telephony in Nigeria and the broader implications of the Nigerian experience when 
we consider the continent of Africa.
Recent work on mobiles in Africa (de Bruijn, Nyamnjoh, and Brinkman 2009; Zegeye and 
Muponde 2012) have conceptualized the device in various ways to show how it is 
co-constituted with Africa. For example, de Bruijn, Nyamnjoh, and Brinkman (2009) in their 
comprehensive review show how various practices on the continent are generating new uses 
and innovations, such as in healing practices (van Beek 2009). Like many authors writing 
about science and technology from Africa (e.g., Mavhunga 2014), this chapter proceeds with 
an analysis from the viewpoint of Africans themselves (in this case, Nigerians) and seeks to 
explore their own practices and understandings of mobile technologies.
First, though, it is important to remember that the term phone (or in this case, mobile tele-
phony system) is linguistic shorthand for institutions (mobile operators, regulatory bodies), 
technologies (GSM, CDMA), people, and practices (Sterne 2003). This heterogeneity requires 
that any robust examination of the telephony system should not be limited to the artifact that 
individual mobile users carry around and present when they are asked for their “phones.” 
Rather, a thorough examination of mobile culture must also include an examination of reg-
ulatory practice, network design, and engineering culture, as well as the practices and behav-
iors of mobile users. In a quite literal sense, each phone is merely a node in an extensive 
sociocultural-material network, linked wirelessly to other mobile network devices, institu-
tions, and people. Every phone (i.e., hardware that mobile users utilize in interacting with the 
mobile system) is engaged in a seamless, elegantly scripted, bidirectional, electromagnetic 
duet with other network nodes. In addition to these material elements, the heterogeneous 
mixture represented by phone includes the software and hardware engineers that specify and 
build the mobile telephony network, the multiplicity of mobile phone users, possibly a 
state-appointed regulator, billing and other financial arrangements, various mobile phone 
companies along with the expertise and human capital they contain, and, of course, the legal 
statutes that govern the behavior of the entire amalgam. In other words, any description of 
African mobiles must demonstrate how the various elements of this heterogeneous mixture 
are invested in the process.
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Constitutive Appropriation: An Analytical Perspective
The question of possible analytical frames in the study of mobile phone use culture is an 
important one, because analytical frames and conceptual modes do much to guide research 
questions and illuminate unique aspects of the case being investigated. Thus does Donner’s 
(2007) choice of adaptive structuration theory emerge from his study of beeping practices, 
and the theory does much to illuminate the analysis that follows. Similarly, Horst and Miller 
(2006) use the concept of “communicative ecology” to great effect in their study of Jamaican 
cell phones. This chapter utilizes the concept of constitutive appropriation, building on the 
work of Eglash (2004), Jones and Twidale (2005), Bar, Pisani, and Weber (2007), and von 
Hippel (2005). A full treatment of constitutive appropriation has been undertaken elsewhere 
(Odumosu 2009); nevertheless a discussion of the salient points will be useful in analyzing 
the case under consideration in this chapter.
The concept of appropriation has been employed before by African authors writing about 
mobile phones (Zegeye and Muponde 2012). Eglash (2004) describes it as a focused examina-
tion of the “lay public as producers of technology and science” and against an understanding 
of the public as “merely passive recipients of technological products and scientific knowl-
edge” (vii). For Eglash, appropriated technologies are critical because of “their potential con-
tribution to sociopolitical resistance and social reconfiguration” (x).
Constitutive appropriation argues that consumption and production should be seen as 
analytical categories that are imposed on the messiness of the observed phenomena. They 
are both fully present simultaneously in the act of appropriation. The act of using a techno-
logical system entails producing knowledge about its possible and varied uses, constituting 
cultural practices around the artifact or system, the formation of community, and in some 
cases even the reconfiguration of the artifact or system itself—all activities subsumed in the 
term consumption. In a similar vein, the creation of a technological artifact involves produc-
tion that always utilizes a resource, whether it be labor or goods and/or services, encompass-
ing the design of the artifact, institutional arrangements that help define what the artifact is, 
the building of networks that give the artifact meaning, the creation of discourses that shape 
perceived acceptable and unacceptable uses, and sometimes imagining and creating the very 
publics that will be using said artifact.2 In The Grundrisse, Marx argues similarly that “produc-
tion is also immediately consumption. Twofold consumption, subjective and objective ... 
Consumption is also immediately production, just as in nature the consumption of the ele-
ments and chemical substances is the production of the plant” (Marks and Engel 1978, 228)
The point being made here is not that production and consumption are not useful con-
cepts, but that each is contained in the other, and that when in mundane speech we refer to 
production or consumption, we are willfully highlighting one aspect of the phenomena and 
downplaying the other. This insight is important because of the traditional way in which 
“consumptive” and “productive” acts are viewed. Appropriation works by inverting our 
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vision of the phenomena in question, highlighting the productive elements in acts that are 
usually viewed as consumptive in nature.
The framing of appropriation as the activity users undergo as they embed a technological 
system/artifact into their lives or social, economic, and political practices resonates with a 
media studies understanding of “domestication” (Silverstone and Hirsch 1992). Within their 
theory of the “moral economy of the household,” Silverstone and Hirsch identify four 
distinct phases in the dynamics of this moral economy, of which appropriation is the first, 
followed by objectification, incorporation, and conversion. For Silverstone and Hirsch, appro-
priation is the point at which an object leaves the world of commodities and is taken posses-
sion of by individuals or households and owned. As noted by Oudshoorn and Pinch in the 
introduction to their edited volume, media and cultural studies have “recognized the impor-
tance of studying users from the very beginning. Whereas historians and sociologists of tech-
nology have chosen technology as their major topic of analysis ... cultural and media studies 
have focused primarily on users and consumers. Their central thesis is that technologies 
must be culturally appropriated to become functional” (Oudshoorn and Pinch 2003, 12).
In summary, a few points emerge as pertinent to a theory of appropriation—a theory that, 
for the purpose of differentiation, I assign the label constitutive appropriation (I have appended 
the adjective constitutive as a reminder of the productive nature of the act of appropriation):
1. Constitutive appropriation can be described as the process whereby one or more users 
makes a technological artifact or system theirs, integrating it into their sociocultural world 
and in the process transforming said artifact or system to serve the user’s ends (Eglash 2004; 
Oudshoorn and Pinch 2003).
2. Constitutive appropriation by definition, then, is not necessarily circumscribed to studies 
of the marginal. It can be used in a more general sense (von Hippel 2005; Jones and Twidale 
2005; Bar, Pisani, and Weber 2007).
3. Consumption and production should not be viewed as opposite ends of a continuum; 
there is much to be gained by seeing them as operating simultaneously (von Hippel 2005; 
Marx and Engels 1978).
4. Constitutive appropriation is seen clearly in the mundane processes of integrating 
systems and artifacts into the lived experiences of individuals and communities. Any descrip-
tion of this process should attend to possible reconfigurations of social life (Silverstone and 
Hirsch 1992).
With this analysis in place we can proceed with an examination of the process of 
making mobiles African. I offer here two “selfies”3(by which I mean captured moments of 
self-reflection) of this process as it took place in Nigeria during fieldwork conducted in Lagos 
and in the Nigerian capital of Abuja from 2006 to 2008.
The first selfie, following the work of Nkomo and Khumalo (2012) on the linguistic impact 
of mobiles on Zimbabwe, is a discussion of the linguistic and epistemic difference between 
landlines and mobile phones in Nigeria. The second is an exploration of how Nigerian mobile 
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network engineers came up with innovative solutions to the unique challenges of building 
mobile networks in Nigeria and the reverberations that had on the design of global mobile 
network systems.
Is That a Landline in Your Pocket?
Her name was Jumoke. I met her a few weeks before I arrived in Lagos to start fieldwork. She was the 
first to introduce me to the dissonance between conceptual maps of mobile phones and land-phones, 
as opposed to the general meanings attached to those terms in the United States. I was invited into 
her kitchen; I found her seated at the kitchen table with three devices that all looked like phones and, 
at least to me, were inherently mobile—that is, lacking wires and possessing a small form factor. She 
was busy working on all three phones. Two of the devices had their batteries out, and the last one was 
being used to place a call. While carrying on a conversation on one mobile phone, she motioned for 
me to seat and wait. As I complied, she proceeded to attend to multiple tasks. Talking on one of the 
phones, she simultaneously swapped small electronic cards in the other two. When she was finally 
done talking, I asked her what she had been doing with the other two phones and why she had three 
phones. She patiently explained that she was moving the SIM card from one of her mobile phones to 
the other, while speaking to her fiancé on her “landline.” I pointed out that all three phones were 
capable of being moved from one place to the other; indeed, a stranger examining all three devices 
would probably not detect any major differences in their shapes, forms, or use possibilities. Such a 
stranger would most probably therefore conclude that all three devices would fulfill any reasonable 
criteria to qualify as mobile phones. Jumoke agreed with this observation, then patiently explained to 
me the differences among the three phones. Two of them, she said, were mobile phones—GSM 
phones. The last was a “landline”—a CDMA line. The reason she was swapping SIM cards was that 
one of her mobile phones’ batteries had lost its charge and she wanted to use the “credit” on the other 
“line” to place a call.
Speaking the Language
In the course of my field work, I became intimately familiar with terms like SIM card, GSM, 
CDMA, credit, landline, and mobile line. They are terms that most Nigerians have come to 
understand intuitively. They require no explanation in Lagos, or elsewhere in Nigeria. These 
terms have become part of the lexicon of everyday speech on the streets of Lagos, perhaps 
best described by Bourdieu’s notion of doxa, in which natural and social worlds appear to be 
self-evident (Bourdieu 1977, 164). To anyone immersed in the specific mobile phone culture 
of Lagos, knowledge of these terms and their meanings has become innate—a testament to 
the pervasiveness and widespread adoption of telecommunication technologies. For exam-
ple, the argument can be made that credit was a commonly used word in Lagosian parlance 
before 2001. Since the advent of mobiles, though, the term “credit” now has an added 
meaning.
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A point that quickly becomes apparent to the stranger visiting Lagos is that people living 
there perceive a marked difference between GSM/mobile and CDMA/landline and use the 
terms interchangeably in daily mundane conversation; that is, GSM is analogous with mobile 
and CDMA is at times analogous with landline. Here, the term GSM or mobile does not imply 
mobility, but rather a type of small, portable phone that possess an eleven-digit number and 
is capable of functioning anywhere in Nigeria. On the other hand, CDMA or landline implies 
a small, portable phone that has a seven-digit number and is usually only functional in a 
certain geographic region (for example, the state of Lagos). The argument could therefore be 
made that in Lagos, Nigeria, the term mobile phone does not even mean the same thing as it 
does elsewhere in the world. In other places, the mobile in mobile phone usually refers to the 
mobility of the communication device (phone), which is historically understood in contrast 
to the immobility of the preexisting, widely available copper telephony infrastructure. In 
Lagos, the historical nonexistence of such a nationwide copper-based telephone network has 
had a different effect, and mobility (defined here as a lack of wires) per se is not seen as a 
salient feature; indeed, in most cases it is assumed to be constitutive of telephony technology 
and not particularly interesting. The historical context in Nigeria has thus led to the state of 
affairs in which the term mobile more often than not references a particular technological 
configuration and not necessarily the mobility or immobility of a particular device.
This difference in meaning attached to mobile is particularly interesting, especially in the 
light of particular research trajectories of scholars working predominantly in countries with 
a history of widely available copper lines, where a significant portion of the research design 
has historically focused on the “mobility” of these new communication devices and the sub-
sequent implications of this new mobility (Katz and Aakhus 2002; Katz 2006). Mobility 
would probably not be as interesting in the same way to a researcher working from a country 
like Nigeria, because most Nigerians view the mobility of communication technologies not 
as a new feature that may possibly reconfigure social life, opening up new ways of being, but 
as an integral part of any contemporary telecommunication infrastructure. This point also 
calls into question the inherent problematic of the discourse of “technological leapfrogging,” 
in which countries like Nigeria are celebrated as having “skipped” the copper phase and 
moved to an all-wireless state of affairs. This way of framing presupposes the centrality of 
the technological history of a number of wealthy countries and evaluates developments 
elsewhere on that basis. It is only in such an analysis that a nation can leapfrog copper and 
move straight to wireless. A much more nuanced picture emerges when technological choices 
and sensibilities are evaluated within the specific histories of the countries within which 
they emerge.
During field work, I regularly met people who carried multiple phones around with them. 
A typical response to my questioning of this behavior was that one phone was a landline and 
the other a mobile phone. Nigerian users thus appear to use different terms to describe dif-
ferent aspects of the devices they carry around with them. Closer attention to these terms 
reveals a sophisticated complexity and grasp of not only the materiality of the technologies 
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in use, but also a fluidity in the normative meanings attached to concepts like landline and 
mobile phone, GSM and CDMA. It therefore is useful to probe these concepts and their areas 
of overlap and divergence.
Mobiles, Language, and Technological Understanding
Upon initial inspection, it appears that there are two classificatory systems at work here. One 
addresses the underlying technology that a device utilizes—GSM or CDMA—and the other is 
more concerned with the use of the device, mobile (portable) or landline (fixed). Although 
these classificatory schemes overlap, it would be wrong to infer that they are synonymous. 
What does it mean to identify a device as a mobile phone to a Nigerian user? Why did some 
of the people I spoke with respond to the question, “Is that your landline?” with, “No, it is 
my GSM.” As always, meaning is contingent and contextual.
In Nigeria’s “communicative ecology” (Slater and Tacchi 2004), users appear to categorize 
mobile operators according to the technologies they deploy in their networks. Currently, the 
marketplace is dominated by two distinctive technologies, GSM and CDMA. This bifurcation 
is transparent to Nigerian users in obvious ways.
First, GSM networks have different numbering schemas from CDMA networks. GSM num-
bers in Nigeria are eleven digits long. CDMA lines have traditionally been only seven digits 
long, along with a state code that identifies the calling area in which the number resides. In 
contrast, landline numbers and cell phone numbers in the United States, for example, are 
indistinguishable based on the length of the number, and it is impossible to determine the 
underlying technologies based on an evaluation of mobile phone numbers.
Also in Nigeria, the user-side hardware (the actual phone) is different under each system. 
The GSM (mobile) phones are usually more sophisticated, and there is a larger selection avail-
able than there is in the CDMA system. From the user’s perspective, the most visible differ-
entiator between CDMA and GSM (as of 2006) appeared to be the SIM card. The phones 
themselves are interestingly more transient; most of the people I spoke with had previously 
owned more than one phone and were always on the lookout for an opportunity to upgrade 
their phones. When asked, “How can you tell landlines from mobile phones if they are both 
easily carried around?” the standard response was, “Mobile phones have SIM cards, landlines 
do not.”
In other parts of the world, when asked about the differences between landlines and 
mobile phones most people would probably respond that landlines are connected to a local 
phone company through physical wires, whereas mobile phones are wireless. Although the 
reality of this insight is slowly changing, driven by services from nontraditional VOIP com-
panies, one suspects that the majority of telephony users in nations with extensive copper 
wire infrastructure still hold this view. In addition, most VOIP users still connect traditional 
phone sets to their “landlines” in their homes, and thus home phone is usually synonymous 
with landline. In the Nigerian case, in which a fixed copper infrastructure was only available 
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to few and has retrograded to the point of near obsolescence, a different understanding of 
what a landline is has emerged. Here, the idea of a landline is closely correlated with lower 
tariffs, eight-digit numbers, CDMA technology, and phones that are usually light on features 
compared to their GSM counterparts. Landlines can be mobile, or they can be fixed. They can 
be fixtures in homes or can possess the same level of mobility as “mobile phones.”
Thus, in Nigeria, although GSM and CDMA are seen as competing technological stan-
dards (developed in Europe and the United States, respectively), they are also identifiers of 
competing wireless network operators. Similarly, the concepts of mobile and landline do not 
refer to the mobility or immobility of devices or even to the presence or absence of a copper 
infrastructure, but rather to many different things: tariff structure, underlying technological 
standard, numbering scheme, and regional versus national service coverage. This is not to 
suggest that there is market parity between the two systems; GSM dominates the market and 
in many ways is the predominant standard, shaping user expectations of CDMA networks.
Configuring a “Nigerian” Mobile Network
The second selfie is a tale of engineering culture and presents a situated perspective that is 
unique to the Nigerian experience. This is a tale that resonates with me, inhabiting as I do 
the hybrid identity of being an engineer and STS scholar. It requires seeing the mobile system 
from a privileged viewpoint—that of a core network engineer. It is important to qualify the 
kind of engineer, because there are different types of engineering work involved in making 
any mobile system function. The engineers we are concerned with here are responsible for 
maintaining the core network: They specify, build, and optimize all the elements in the 
switching subsystem (also known as the core network). These elements include mobile switch-
ing centers (MSCs), base station controllers (BSCs), home and visitor location registers (HLRs 
and VLRs), and other specialized network equipment. Figure 7.1 presents a simplified dia-
gram of a typical mobile telephone system network topology, with the relevant core network 
elements circled.
The core network is so named because it is the heart of the mobile telephony system. The 
elements outside the circle are the base transceiver stations (BTSs) and individual mobile 
terminals—that is, phones (users are not shown on diagram because they are not typically 
indicated in diagrams of this sort that engineers utilize). Individual mobile phones commu-
nicate with the BTS, which is the interface between mobile phones and the network. The BTS 
is primarily a collection of transmitters and receivers that communicate with individual 
phones. BTSs have limited local intelligence and are directed and controlled by the BSC. BSCs 
monitor and control several BTSs and are in turn monitored and controlled by an MSC, 
which is the primary controller and processing hub of the network. If a wireless network can 
be described as having a heart or a brain, the MSC would fulfill both functions. The other 
elements in the diagram are ancillary and work as supportive agents for the MSC. The HLR is 
a database system of sorts that stores information about individual subscriber identities, and 
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the VLR is a similar system that caters to visitors to the network (e.g., roaming “guests” from 
other countries). This simplified diagram leaves out a number of elements because they are 
not necessary for telling the tale.
In order to appreciate the story to come, it is important to know a little about how a 
mobile telephony network handles calls. Telephone calls on GSM mobile networks are com-
plicated things. Each call requires a number of operations and generates multiple control 
messages between the phone and the rest of the network. When a mobile user dials a num-
ber, the network sends information back and forth in a process referred to as the call setup 
procedure, which prepares and makes available a voice channel that will carry the conversation 
between both parties of the call. This setting up process involves a number of database queries 
to determine the last known position of the party being dialed in order to get the phone on 
the other end to ring. All this activity on the network is called signaling traffic—differentiated 
from voice traffic, which is traffic that is billable and thus earns money for the mobile opera-
tor. Signaling traffic is a continuous phenomenon, occurring in the background; as long as a 
mobile phone is switched on, it is required to constantly update the network about its geo-
graphical location and status. However, signaling traffic intensifies when a call is in the pro-
cess of being placed.
CORE NETWORK
MSC
HLR
VLR
BSC
BTS
BTS
BTS
BTS
BSC
BSC
Figure 7.1
Typical network topology, showing elements in the core network.
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In conversations with radio and network engineers at MTN (the largest network operator 
in Nigeria), I learned that when it came to configuring the mobile network in Nigeria, the 
traditional rules that were invoked as standard and conventional failed miserably. Following 
generally accepted rules and practices, MTN engineers designed and configured their net-
work to handle the specified number of users on their network, taking into account the 
geography of the coverage area, frequency selection, size of each cell, and other important 
variables. However, the network that resulted from the outcome of this design process quickly 
ran into problems as crucial sections of the core network became saturated and acted as bot-
tlenecks to the flow of traffic, bringing the network to its knees. These problems elicited 
complaints from users all over the country; in response, the Nigerian Communication Com-
mission (NCC) put pressure on MTN and other operators. In response, MTN stopped accept-
ing new subscribers for a time while they tried to figure out the root cause of the problems.
As I reconstructed their efforts over the course of multiple interviews, a picture of what 
they were up against emerged. It turns out that mobile users in Nigeria behave differently 
from mobile users elsewhere, and it was this different behavior that made all the old rules of 
dimensioning (an engineering term that refers to the process of generating specifications based 
on particular constraints) the network irrelevant. As the engineers responsible for dimension-
ing the network quickly discovered, the standard rules did not apply. Their solution was 
overdimensioning the network (i.e., going beyond the standard recommended values). This 
was achieved by using more BSCs, and fewer BTSs per BSC, increasing the number of MSCs, 
and upgrading the data link communication channels between core network elements (rep-
resented in figure 7.1 by solid lines; the radio connections are represented by dotted lines). It 
was only after these substantial and expensive changes that the network was sufficiently 
robust and capable of handling the kind of traffic that Nigerian users generated. In the words 
of a top executive at MTN who managed the network directly, “What is really strange in 
Nigeria is that we have a very high busy hour call attempt ... whereas in a country like South 
Africa and a lot of other developed nations you see between 1 and 1.5 busy hour call attempts, 
the average here is about 3.6 or 3.9.” The CTO added: “In Nigeria what you find is that sub-
scribers have quite short Mean Hold Times. 19 seconds for outgoing calls and 32 seconds for 
incoming calls” (MTN executive, personal communication, July 3, 2008).
These two indices—mean holding time (MHT) and busy hour call attempts (BHCA)—are 
ways of describing mobile phone user behavior. They also have a tremendous impact (at least 
in Nigeria) on the way networks are designed. The MHT index on the MTN network was 
woefully small and measured in seconds, whereas according to the CTO, European indices 
are usually measured in minutes. MHT reflects the average amount of time users spend on a 
call. Nigerian MTN users stay on the phone for an average of roughly nineteen seconds per 
call. In essence, they spend a short time on the phone speaking if they initiate the call and 
roughly one and a half times as long if they receive the call. This discrepancy between time 
spent when receiving a call and time spent when making a call may be explained in some 
measure by the fact that the policy of mobile phone billing in Nigeria is the same as in 
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Europe (the calling party pays); the effect of this is that the party placing the call shoulders 
the entire cost and the party on the receiving end pays nothing.
BHCA is a teletraffic measure that represents the number of calls attempted at the busiest 
hour of the day by all users. In experiential terms, a BHCA of 3.9 means that Nigerian sub-
scribers at the busiest hour of the day, when confronted with a busy signal, will retry four 
more times before giving up. “Developed nation” (in the words of the MTN CTO) users, on 
the other hand, usually try just one more time and then give up upon receiving a busy signal. 
By interpreting both indices, a picture emerges of the average user during peak periods.4 In 
addition, the high prevalence of flashing (cf. Donner 2007)—a practice that uses missed calls 
to communicate—also qualifies average Nigerian users. The average Nigerian mobile phone 
user only stays on the phone for nineteen seconds once connected. If the line is busy, said 
user tries immediately to make another call and, if unsuccessful, keeps on trying at least four 
more times. In addition, if said user is able to make a connection, they sometimes drop the 
call almost immediately and use the opportunity to “flash.” As mentioned previously, each 
time a call is initiated the network needs to locate the mobile phone of the receiving party 
(which it does by querying its databases) and then actively select and devote voice channel 
resources to the call. All this requires substantial processing by the MSC and utilizes valuable 
bandwidth as messages travel back and forth among the various network elements in their 
effort to accomplish this process, which in engineering speak is referred to as call setup. These 
processes utilize the processing capacities of the MSC, HLRs, and VLRs, even if the call does not 
go through (i.e., is unsuccessful for whatever reason). Taking into account the high BHCA and 
the low MHT, it is easy to see how the network can quickly become saturated, as subscribers 
who are unable to get through have precious limited resources allocated to them. They keep 
on trying, tying up further network resources, only to get through and spend a short time on 
the phone before making another call.
The result of attempting traditional dimensioning methodology was that though the net-
work could theoretically (here, the basis of the theory was the behavior of a well-known quan-
tity, the average South African or European user) handle all the traffic, the processing capacity 
limit was being reached quickly, and very few calls (if any) were being successfully routed. 
MTN had to go back to the drawing board and redesign the network (based on the real Nige-
rian user). This resulted in the network being over-dimensioned with respect to the old stan-
dard. In effect, this meant using more MSCs and BSCs and implementing high-speed links 
between them.
It is important to point out that overdimensioning the mobile network was not driven by 
the need to handle larger amounts of mobile traffic than was expected, but rather by the 
need to handle a different kind of traffic. In engineering vernacular, the traffic profile of Nige-
rian users required a fundamentally different kind of network. As MTN built out (produced) 
its network, what was being used up (consumed)? This question naturally leads to an exam-
ination of the relationship between MTN and its suppliers. As a large transnational corpora-
tion with substantial buying power, MTN operates in a relatively small market (there are not 
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that many mobile operators in the world) and as such enjoys a closer coupling with suppliers 
and has much greater input into the design cycle of the businesses from which it purchases 
its equipment. It was therefore inevitable that the challenges of building GSM networks in 
places like Nigeria would be brought to the attention of MTN’s suppliers—in this case, the 
Swedish global telecommunication giant Ericsson. Observations about the strange behavior 
of Nigerian users were communicated to Ericsson by MTN. The challenge was that Ericsson’s 
designs for mobile network devices were predicated on the existence of a specific kind of 
user (e.g., users in South Africa), and the implied traffic profile guided design decisions relat-
ing to network processing capacity. Because Nigerians used their mobile phones differently, 
it quickly became apparent that the standard processing capacities were inadequate to deal 
with the traffic profile, hence the need to overdimension: buying more devices than usual in 
order to provide the network with greater processing capabilities.
Ericsson and other core network equipment manufacturers have since developed new 
designs for their network devices (based on blade server architecture) that allow their end 
users (the mobile operators) to upgrade specific portions of the hardware.5 These new designs 
allow for selective upgrades to the processing capabilities of mobile networks. As an example 
of constitutive appropriation, this example highlights the importance of paying attention to 
the dualism of production and consumption. It is true that the MTN engineers were in many 
respects the designers of the mobile network. However, it is also true that the Ericsson repre-
sentatives I spoke with in London saw and spoke of the MTN engineers as their users. The 
MTN network engineers, when faced with different mobile user behavior (in the form of 
unique traffic profiles, short mean call times, high BHCA, and flashing), adapted by deploy-
ing core network elements in new configurations, ignoring standard rules of network dimen-
sioning. Even more interestingly, by problematizing particular aspects of the architecture of 
the MSC (i.e., processing capacity vs. switching capacity) and communicating that informa-
tion to their suppliers, the network engineers at MTN may have catalyzed the development 
of new switch architectures that led to scalability of MSC processing power—affecting the 
design of future individual mobile network components (MSCs and BSCs).
How should we make sense of these two selfies, and what insights do they provide in 
understanding how the African mobile is being made?
Conclusion
One important point is that as Nigerian engineers and system designers encountered the 
behavior of actual Nigerian users, they determined that a fully functional Nigerian network 
has to take into account real users and their particular use practices. The result of their con-
stitutive appropriation was a mobile network that was materially, topologically, and instru-
mentally dissimilar to networks of similar size and membership elsewhere in the world. The 
case studies presented in this chapter also reverse the traditional role of engineering system 
designers solely as productive actors.
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In addition, the cases point to the innovative paths that mobile network technology pro-
ceeds upon, on which new challenges and practices inspire new language, new understand-
ings, designs, and innovative solutions (overdimensioning) that can then be folded into the 
upstream design process in tangible and substantial ways—such as new blade server designs! 
It is clear that following the actors and artifacts (at least in this example) requires us to 
rethink our classical assumptions about the categories of users and producers. In this case, 
they are not ontologically reified; rather, these categories describe functional relationships. In 
other words, the Nigerian engineers and system designers here are simultaneously users and 
producers.
Returning our attention to the question of the “African mobile,” what does it mean to say 
that mobiles have been made African? The Nigerian case clearly illustrates that local context 
can affect the shape and outline of national mobile telephony design, yet it is also true that 
there are similar factors in various African nations that can materially contribute to the 
design of mobile telephony networks. For example, the challenge of delivering electrical 
power to various base stations is a common challenge faced across most of the continent. In 
some areas, the problem lies in a troublesome electrical grid; in other areas, there is no grid. 
These common challenges have exerted an influence over how mobile networks in Africa are 
designed and run. In particular, lower-power, high-efficiency base stations that are resistant 
to wide voltage variability have become a design criterion. Although it is perhaps too early to 
conclude that the African mobile, like the Japanese keitai, is a singular sociocultural con-
struct, it is clear that the social, political, and infrastructural peculiarities of the continent are 
shaping the design and development of mobile telephone networks there. There is no singu-
lar African mobile, but we can expect a family resemblance among the various national 
instantiations. Furthermore, the emergence of this African mobile owes much to the innova-
tive solutions and creative problem solving of thousands of African mobile network engi-
neers. After all, the essence of engineering is creative problem solving.
This chapter contains two examples of Nigerians and Nigerian society engaging in acts of 
appropriation, and thus we may fruitfully inquire: Does this happen because there is some-
thing unique about the Nigerian situation? For example, the overdimensioning of the mobile 
system by network engineers is indicative of the type of appropriation of traditional practice 
that Dosunmu (2005) points out is occurring in Wole Soyinka’s play Death and the King’s 
Horseman.
Although it is difficult to delineate direct causal links, what is undeniable is that Nigeria 
has a history of being innovative. From the post–World War II Onitsha Market School of 
novelists,6 responsible for the boom in indigenous pop culture novels during the 1980s, to 
“419 scams” (Odumosu and Eglash 2010) that utilize emails and faxes to prey on people for 
money, either through sympathy or greed, Nigerians seem to have a knack for embracing 
technologies and making them their own. We can also add to this list the exponential growth 
of the Nigerian home movie industry—Nollywood (Marston, Woodward, and Jones 2007)—
which began by utilizing video recording equipment designed for making movies at home to 
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tell traditional and contemporary stories through the popular VCD format. This practice has 
clear historical roots in the traditional Yoruba culture of drama and dance (Dosunmu 2005). 
Perhaps the Nigerian cultural history of innovating has some role to play in the dynamism 
of the examples discussed here. It is important to note that all of these practices have a few 
things in common, not the least of which is the political history of colonization and the 
abject failure of the mechanisms of the state. The fact that the bustle and excitement of Nol-
lywood, the 419 scams, and the ingenuity of overdimensioning the mobile network all 
emerge from the same history is instructive.
Notes
1. See http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/13/world/africa/mobile-phones-change-africa/.
2. Callon’s (1987) study of the electric vehicle (VEL) in France illustrates the point that engineers 
involved in the design did not just design the vehicle, but also imagined the society in which it was to 
be used, including the role of users and their anticipated behavior.
3. My use of the term selfie is deliberate. To take a selfie is to use a mobile phone as a tool of 
self-inspection and representation—that is, to turn the gaze of the camera back on one’s self. As an 
African, an STS scholar, and an engineer, this term is particularly useful for me in this text.
4. Of course, said “average user” is a fiction generated by these numbers. In reality, Nigerian citizens 
vary widely in their use of mobile technology, with some users spending much longer on calls and 
others spending shorter amounts of time on calls. For more on the construction of both users and non-
users, see Wyatt 2003.
5. I tried in vain to establish direct causal links between the concerns of organizations like MTN about 
the need to overdimension their networks and the new initiatives from Ericsson to introduce new prod-
uct architecture that allows for specific upgrades as required. I visited Ericsson offices in London and 
Lagos, and in the course of conversations with various engineers and project managers I was able to 
establish that the design cycle directly utilized user feedback (here, the users are the mobile operators), 
but there were other considerations that led to these substantial changes, including advances in com-
puter hardware technology. In other words, Ericsson engineers were hesitant to fully attribute their new 
design decisions to the kinds of user feedback described here. They did, however, concede that “emerg-
ing markets” like those in Africa were crucial to their ongoing success, and as such the needs of such 
markets were influential in the decision-making process.
6. Cypian Ekwensi, probably the most prolific Nigerian author of all time, is associated with this school.
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Innovation for Development: Africa
Garrick E. Louis, Neda Nazemi, and Scott Remer
Introduction
This chapter is about Africa, but much of the data is taken from reports that list sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) as an entity distinct from North Africa (NA) and the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA). We do not agree with these distinctions but use them because of the data. Further-
more, Africa is a continent of fifty-four countries, each with its own individual profile of 
development issues and innovation priorities. Therefore, this discussion of Africa as a conti-
nent is subject to all the flaws of aggregation and does not completely represent the situation 
in any specific country. Finally, we acknowledge that metrics for and representations of 
human development used by the international community are embedded with Western val-
ues about development that may be different from African beliefs about development. We 
note these shortcomings to the reader even as we use the metrics and representations to 
argue for strategic African innovation for human development in Africa.
In this chapter, we define innovation as the creation or enhancement of artifacts to improve 
the human condition. These artifacts may be tangible, such as devices and services, or they 
may be intangible, such as philosophical concepts (e.g., democracy, ethics, equity) or pro-
cesses (e.g., an application for a building permit). We can think of three general categories of 
innovation: incidental, institutional, and strategic. Incidental innovation is unintentional dis-
covery or invention by an individual or group—for example, Velcro (Suddath 2010). Institu-
tional innovation arises out of organized research sponsored and/or conducted by private 
companies, academic institutions, and the government. This category may be subdivided 
into basic and applied research. Strategic innovation consists of planned, systemic efforts coor-
dinated by the government and aimed at achieving well-defined national goals, such as 
human and economic development. It can be a leveraging complement to a nation’s inciden-
tal and institutional innovation.
Africa has a history of all three forms of innovation that spans millennia before colonial-
ism. An example of institutional innovation is the making of high-grade carbon steel by the 
Haya people of Tanzania as far back as two thousand years ago. The steel was produced in 
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kilns that reached temperatures of 1800°C, which was 200 to 400°C hotter than kiln tempera-
tures in Europe before the industrial era (Blatch 2013; Lienhard 1988–1997a, 2004; Shore 
1983). Examples of strategic innovation in precolonial Africa can be found in the governance 
in its ancient city-states, such as Great Zimbabwe, the city-state that featured a 250-meter 
long, fifteen-thousand-ton, curved granite wall (Blatch 2013; Lienhard 1988–1997b, 2004; 
Asante and Asante 1983). There are many other examples—including in the incidental inno-
vation realm—in astronomy, mathematics, medicine, and even hunting (van Sertima 1983; 
Mavhunga 2014). These examples underscore the point that Africa has a long and broad 
history of innovation. However, this history—and continued African innovation—has either 
been appropriated without acknowledgment by others from outside Africa, been suppressed 
as a threat to established power and ways of thinking about Africa, or remains unrecognized 
and underdeveloped by a system of scholarship and enterprise that largely ignores innova-
tion from Africa (Rodney 1972; Cooper 1994). This denial includes both indigenous innova-
tion that originates in Africa and innovative African adaptations of existing artifacts that 
were produced outside Africa or by non-Africans.
Africa faces significant human, social, and economic development challenges today, as 
described further on in this chapter. Africa needs innovation of all forms to overcome these 
challenges. This innovation is most likely to be effective and sustained if it builds upon and 
leverages domestic capacity within Africa.; it must also emphasize strategic innovation 
focused on the goal of African development. This chapter makes the case for strategic inno-
vation for African development in Africa and by Africans (Watkins and Ehst 2008) through 
five main points:
1. Africa has a pressing need for essential human services.
2. These services are necessary stepping-stones on the path to development.
3. Countries have to build domestic capacity to provide these services in order to sustain 
their drive to higher levels of development.
4. Capacity building, broadly defined, is an effective framework for innovation for develop-
ment (IfD).
5. Official development aid (ODA) must prioritize capacity building that fosters African 
innovation for development.
Africa Has a Pressing Need for Essential Human Services
By many commonly reported indicators of human development, Africa compares unfavor-
ably to other regions of the world. Table 8.1 illustrates this point for selected indicators from 
the 2014 Millennium Development Goal (MDG) Report (UN 2014).
These indicators are highly selective, are embedded with the values of the agencies that 
compile them, and do not capture the multiple dimensions of well-being that constitute 
development. However, because they are broadly and commonly used, their familiarity can 
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Table 8.1
MDG indicators* by UN World Regions**
Indicator SSA NA LAC SA OC SEA EA CCA WA
1a. Proportion of people 
living on less than 
$1.25 a day, 2010 (%)
48 1 6 30 n/a 14 12 4 4
1b. Proportion of 
undernourished people, 
2011–2013 (%)
25 < 5 8 17 12 11 11 7 10
2. Adjusted net 
enrollment rate for 
primary education, 
2012 (%)
78 99 94 94 89 94 97 95 93
3. Employees in 
nonagricultural wage 
employment who are 
women, 2012 (%)
33 19 44 20 38 39 42 44 20
4. Under-five mortality 
rate, 2012 (deaths per 
1,000 live births)
98 22 19 58 55 30 14 36 25
5. Maternal mortality 
ratio, 2013 (maternal 
deaths per 100,000 live 
births, women aged 
15–49)
510 69 n/a 190 190 140 33 39 74
6. New HIV infections 
per 100 people per year 
(2012 estimate)
0.16–
1.02
0.01 0.03–
0.05
0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01
7. Proportion of 
population using an 
improved drinkingwater 
source, 2012 (%)
64 92 94 91 56 89 92 86 91
8. External debt service 
payments as a 
proportion of export 
revenues, 2012 (%)
3.3 4.4 6.6 3.0 1.8 2.5 0.4 1.1 6.6
*These indicators are for relative comparison only. They may not reflect local value systems.
**SSA—sub-Saharan Africa; NA—North Africa; LAC—Latin America and the Caribbean; SA—South Asia; 
OC—Oceania; SEA—Southeast Asia; EA—East Asia; CCA—Caucasus and Central Asia; WA—West Asia.
Source: UN 2014.
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provide a starting point for this discussion. By the indicators of poverty and hunger 
(Goal 1), universal primary education (Goal 2), child mortality (Goal 4), maternal health 
(Goal 5), infectious diseases (Goal 6), and access to an improved water source (Goal 7), 
SSA ranks last when compared to other UN world regions. On the indicator for gender equity 
and empowerment of women (Goal 3), SSA ranks sixth of the nine UN world regions, and 
it ranks fourth of nine on the indicator for building global partnerships for development 
(Goal 8).
What does this imply for a strategy for African development? What should the priorities 
for innovation be to foster such development? To answer these questions, it is necessary to 
first define some key terms: poverty, development, and innovation.
Essential Human Services Are Necessary Steps toward Development
We define poverty as the incapacity to achieve one’s human potential within the era in which 
one lives. Here, human potential refers to the full contribution that an individual is capable of 
making to society. Maslow’s self-actualization in a hierarchy of needs provides a convenient, 
though more individualistic, illustration of this concept, as represented in figure 8.1 (Maslow 
1943). The World Bank and the United Nations have similar definitions: poverty is generally 
defined in relation to “whether households or individuals have enough resources or abilities 
today to meet their needs” (Coudouel, Hentschel, and Wodon 2002; Narayan et al. 2000; 
Smelser 2001). We propose two categories of human needs: primary or basic needs, and sec-
ondary needs. In social groups, these needs are provided by means of infrastructure in the 
form of essential human services (EHS). Table 8.2 summarizes primary needs and selected 
secondary human services; these needs coincide with the physiological and safety needs of 
Maslow.
Figure 8.1 suggests a set of steps to go from the physiological or basic human needs to the 
level of self-actualization, achieving one’s human potential. Indeed, one definition of devel-
opment is the process of achieving one’s human potential.1 Here, “one” may be an individual 
or a group within a larger social context (Soubbotina and Sheram 2000).
In order to achieve one’s human potential, one needs the capabilities or skills and the 
opportunities and choices to do so (Baroudi 2004). Thus, human development is the extension 
of human capabilities and expansion of the choices available in all aspects of personal and 
social endeavor for all individuals and groups in a society. Innovation as defined earlier is the 
creation or enhancement of artifacts to improve the human condition (Greenhalgh and Rog-
ers 2010). Thus, innovation for development is the creation or enhancement of artifacts that 
allow people to achieve their human potential (Lopez-Claros and Mata 2010).
In its 1990 Human Development Report, the UNDP stated: “People are the real wealth of a 
nation. The basic objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to 
live long, healthy, and creative lives” (UN 1990, 9)—that is, achieve their human potential. If 
the role of government is to secure and sustain the wellbeing of its people, then governments, 
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Physiological Needs
Air, Food, Water, Shelter, Sleep, ...
Safety and Security
Health, Employment, Family, Social Stability
Love and Belonging
Friendship, Family, Intimacy
Self-Esteem
Condence, Achievement, Respect
Self-Actualization
Morality, Creativity,
Spontaneity, Acceptance
Figure 8.1
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.
Source: Adapted from http://communicationtheory.org/maslow’s-hierarchy-of-needs/.
Table 8.2
Primary needs and selected secondary human services
Primary needs Secondary services
Water Education
Sanitation Healthcare
Shelter (including clothing) Employment/commerce
Air (indoor) Electricity
Household energy (cooking, heat, light) Communications
Food Transportation
Personal security Governance/social stability
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including those in Africa, are engaged in creating the means for people to achieve their human 
potential. Thus, governments are engaged in innovation for development.
This chapter posits a two-part strategy for national development. The first part prioritizes 
national investments in the order of human needs. Thus, the highest priority would be given 
to the basic human needs at the bottom of the pyramid in figure 8.1 and would be appor-
tioned accordingly as people move up the pyramid. This is not a linear process: Certainly, all 
of a nation’s needs have to be met to some degree simultaneously. Thus, water and sanitation 
must be provided at the same time as healthcare, education, and national security. However, 
in order to put its people on the path to self-actualization, a nation as a people must acquire 
the capability to provide for their most basic human needs, then move onto the capability 
for secondary and other higher-order needs. Figure 8.2 illustrates this relationship among 
basic needs, capabilities, and levels of human development.2 Levels of human development 
reflect Maslow’s illustrative hierarchies on the left side of the pyramid. Capabilities to meet 
those needs begin with the awareness of basic human needs and the social cooperation to 
address those needs through the combination of natural resources and energy, as well as 
economic/financial, technical, human resource, and institutional capacity. Thus, capacity 
factors represent the capability necessary for self-determined, sustained human development 
along the lines of Sen’s “capability as choice” view (Sen 1985, 1999). Figure 8.2 represents 
social cooperation to address mutual needs as the most fundamental level of capability and 
Love and Belonging
Secondary Needs
Institutional
Human Resources
Technical
Economic/Financial
Natural Resources/EnergyPrimary Needs
Sociocultural
Essential Human Services
Human
Development
Human Development Capabilities
Self-Esteem
Self-
Actualization
Figure 8.2
A human development model of capabilities. Source: Author.
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human development. This is in response to Rutledge’s (2011) critique of Maslow’s omission 
of the important role of social networking in human development (Rutledge 2011).
A lack of access to basic needs compromises efforts to provide for higher-order needs and 
short-circuits strategies for development. For example, lack of access to an adequate quantity 
and quality of safe drinking water and sanitation (watsan) results in an estimated 1.8 million 
child deaths and the loss of 443 million school days each year. In SSA, it causes an estimated 
annual GDP loss of 5 percent, or $28.4 billion (UNDP 2006c). According to UNDP, “Research 
in sub-Saharan Africa suggests that women and girls in low-income countries spend 
40 billion hours a year collecting water” (UN Women 2009, 36; see also UNDP 2006a). This 
time could be spent on other, more productive activities that empower women and girls. 
Thus, the lack of primary services (watsan) compromises secondary services (health, educa-
tion, productive employment) and produces losses that inhibit economic and ultimately 
human development (OECD 2012). Note that we define employment as income-earning 
activity.
Countries Must Build Domestic Capacity for EHS as a First Step toward Development
Countries need domestic capacity in order to assure sustained delivery of EHS to their people. 
For example, a lack of qualified local human resources may result in the failure of the water 
supply system to deliver its designed quantity of water and maintain its quality of service 
over time. This may be simply due to inadequate or inappropriate operation and mainte-
nance (Davis and Brikké 1995; Brikké 2000). Reliance on foreign personnel to design, build, 
operate, and maintain local services can be expensive and may be unreliable if that talent, 
with no ties to the local community, is drawn away by more lucrative service contracts else-
where. A case from the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is illustrative: 
NEPAD’s Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) has an estimated capital 
cost of US$360 billion by 2040, with a cost of $68 billion expected by 2020. However, it has 
a present funding gap of US$31 billion (Commonwealth Business Council 2013). NEPAD 
does not specify what percentage of these projects will be implemented and/or managed in 
the long term by African, domestic private, or public sector entities. However, in a 2005 
report on NEPAD’s Short-Term Action Plan for Africa’s Infrastructure, the African Develop-
ment Bank noted that none of the expected US$7.1 billion in domestic private sector invest-
ment had materialized (UNDP 2006b). This indicates a need for local financial capacity 
building in NEPAD’s plans.
More broadly, one may argue that it is not possible to sustain higher-order development 
processes like manufacturing without reliable basic services, such as water and sanitation. 
These essential services require a robust domestic capability to operate, maintain, and man-
age their associated infrastructure. In many cases in Africa, this capability is inadequate to 
meet current demands and must be developed.
158 Chapter 8
Capacity Building Is an Effective Innovation for Development Framework
We define capacity broadly in terms of the eight factors that determine sustained access to 
water and sanitation services. These capacity factors are summarized in table 8.3 (Brikké and 
Bredero 2003; Louis and Bouabid 2006).
The capacity factors can provide an effective framework for assessing the IfD needs. For 
example, table 8.4 compares the capacity factors to the Millennium Development Goals as 
frameworks for assessing the likely effect of innovation on national development objectives. 
A country could seek innovative ways to accomplish the MDGs in the expectation that this 
would also improve its citizens’ access to primary and secondary services. For example, table 
8.4 illustrates that innovation exclusively in pursuit of Goal 1, the poverty and hunger goal, 
is not likely to increase access to shelter, nor improve indoor air quality, and will have only 
questionable effects on increasing personal security. Innovation in pursuit of Goal 1 also is 
not likely to improve access to the secondary services of electricity, communication, trans-
portation, and national security. Institutional innovation will facilitate sustained access to 
shelter and to employment; innovation directed at eliminating extreme poverty and hunger 
will not improve access to shelter, but will improve access to employment.
This suggests that a focus on innovative capacity building for each of the factors shown in 
table 8.4 (and defined in table 8.3) can serve a larger number of primary and secondary needs 
than a development strategy based on the MDGs. Other national or global strategies can be 
evaluated using the capacity factors as well.
The Yes (Y), No (N), and Questionable (?) cells in table 8.4 have been filled in subjectively 
by the authors, but work is under way to complete this table with empirical results for water 
and sanitation. The capacity factors are offered as an objective, systematic method for 
national self-assessment and prioritization of the innovation effort aimed at clearly defined 
targets in the form of primary and secondary human services. The assumption is that a solid 
domestic capability to assure sustained access to these services will be the foundation for 
access to the higher-level objectives of human development. The Sustainable Development 
Goals of 2015 can provide more clearly defined targets for this strategic capacity and capabil-
ity building.
Table 8.3
Capacity factors for sustained delivery of essential human services
Capacity factor Explanation
1. Institutional/governance Policies, programs, processes
2. Human resources Professional, technical, administrative, labor
3. Technical Support services, supply chain
4. Economic/financial Budget, taxes, fees, private providers
5. Environmental/natural resources Stock of resources, consumption/recharge rates
6. Energy Grid electricity, other sources, intensity, reliability
7. Sociocultural Participation rate by gender, caste, class
8. Service Quantity, quality, accessibility, reliability
Innovation for Development 159
Ta
b
le
 8
.4
C
om
p
ar
is
on
 o
f 
ca
p
ac
it
y 
fa
ct
or
s 
an
d
 M
D
G
 f
or
 I
fD
 p
la
n
n
in
g*
C
ap
ac
it
y 
fa
ct
o
rs
P
ri
m
ar
y 
n
ee
d
s
M
D
G
W
at
er
Sa
n
it
at
io
n
Sh
el
te
r
H
H
 E
n
er
gy
In
d
oo
r 
A
ir
Fo
od
Pe
rs
 S
ec
u
ri
ty
In
st
it
u
ti
on
al
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
?
Po
vt
/H
u
n
ge
r
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
H
u
m
an
 R
es
ou
rc
e
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
?
Y
Y
Y
Y
Pr
im
ar
y 
Ed
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
?
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
?
Y
G
en
d
er
/W
om
n
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
?
Ec
on
/F
in
an
ce
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
?
Y
C
h
ld
 M
or
t
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
En
vt
/N
at
 R
es
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
M
at
n
l 
H
ea
lt
h
Y
Y
?
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
?
?
?
En
er
gy
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
H
IV
/A
ID
S+
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
?
So
ci
oc
u
lt
u
ra
l
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
En
vt
 S
u
st
ai
n
Y
Y
Y
?
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Se
rv
ic
e
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
G
lo
ba
l 
Pa
rt
n
er
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
H
ea
lt
h
Ed
u
ca
ti
on
Em
p
lo
y
El
ec
tr
ic
it
y
C
om
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
T
ra
n
sp
or
t
N
at
 S
ec
u
ri
ty
Se
co
n
d
ar
y 
Se
rv
ic
es
*H
H
—
H
ou
se
h
ol
d
; Y
—
Ye
s;
 N
—
N
o;
 ?
—
Q
u
es
ti
on
ab
le
; E
m
p
lo
y—
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t;
 P
er
s—
Pe
rs
on
al
; N
at
—
N
at
io
n
al
; P
ov
t—
Po
ve
rt
y;
 E
d
—
Ed
u
ca
ti
on
; 
W
om
n
—
W
om
en
; 
C
h
ld
—
C
h
il
d
; 
M
at
n
l—
M
at
er
n
al
; 
M
or
t—
M
or
ta
li
ty
; 
En
vt
—
En
vi
ro
n
m
en
t.
160 Chapter 8
Foreign Aid Impedes Africa’s Development
Aid dependency in Africa has long been widely debated in the literature. Bräutigam and 
Knack (2004) provide an insightful analysis with a focus on governance. Stampini, Salami, 
and Sullivan (2009) examine the performance of ODA in the water and sanitation sector. 
Moyo (2009) makes a forceful critique of foreign aid in Africa and proposes a formula of 5 
percent aid, 30 percent trade, 30 percent foreign direct investment, 10 percent from capital 
markets, and 25 percent from remittances and directed domestic savings as a self-determinant 
strategy for financing development. Andrews (2009) conducts a limited literature review and 
concludes that greater attention should be paid to sociocultural factors to explain the mixed 
performance of official overseas financing (OOF) in Africa. We will not repeat this debate in 
this chapter; instead, it is instrumental to summarize the main points with respect to strate-
gic African innovation:
• ODA comes with conditions that can favor the donors at the expense of the recipient.
• The different forms of ODA are not always consistent with long-term development 
planning.
• ODA dampens the incentive for domestic IfD by suppressing the different forms of 
capacity.
Now, we will briefly consider each of these points in turn.
ODA Comes with Unfavorable Strings Attached
Bilateral and multilateral aid to Africa often comes with requirements that are favorable to 
the donor but may be unfavorable to the recipient country. These include requirements that 
the recipient purchase supplies or services from donor country vendors, which may not offer 
the most competitive prices or appropriate goods and services. In addition, ODA does not 
consistently remove barriers of entry to products from the aid recipient country, which 
remains open to products from the donor country. In addition, structural adjustment require-
ments may attempt to direct the types of socioeconomic programs on which funds may be 
spent; may not reflect the priorities of sovereign, democratically elected local governments; 
and thus can have a politically destabilizing effect. An illustrative example is Glennie’s (2011) 
report on the decline of the cotton industry in Mali due to subsidies paid to cotton farmers 
in donor countries. Loans required Mali to privatize its cotton industry, though it could not 
provide comparable subsidies to private farmers in Mali. Thus, Mali cotton could not com-
pete by price on the open market with cotton from subsidized farmers in the donor 
country. 
Moyo (2009) cites the example of the US$15 billion in aid from the US president’s Emer-
gency Plan for Aids Relief in 2003, which set aside two-thirds of funding for proabstinence 
programs and restricted the use of funds by organizations that provided abortion services. 
Such restrictions disregard the cultural preferences or public health priorities of the recipient 
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country. In large infrastructure projects like the Lesotho Highlands Water project, implemen-
tation can be dominated by foreign companies from OECD countries and non-OECD coun-
tries like China (Bräutigam 2010; Mwangi 2007; Zawdie and Langford 2002).
In essence, African countries borrow money from International Development Banks, then 
use the loan funds to pay companies from the donor countries to do the work. If this process 
yielded residual domestic capacity in Africa to manage the resulting projects and implement 
future ones, it could be seen as a form of investment in necessary capacity building. However, 
there is little evidence that this form of capacity building occurs. Instead, the debt from these 
projects is associated with a continuing cycle of dependency by Africans on foreign financing 
and technical and management resources. This is a model for neither African innovation nor 
African development.
Different Forms of ODA Are Inconsistent with Development Planning
Figure 8.3 summarizes the trends in foreign aid to Africa by type and as a percentage of GDP 
from 2000 to 2014 (projected). It shows that total OOF to Africa reached a high of just over 
12 percent of GDP in 2006, experienced a decline concurrent with the global financial decline 
in 2008, and has remained fairly steady at roughly 9 percent of GDP since then. ODA has 
declined from a high of 42 percent of OOF in 2003 to a projected low of 27 percent in 2014. 
The percentages are higher for the twenty-seven countries in Africa ranked as low-income by 
the World Bank.
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External financial flows to Africa, 2000–2014.
Source: African Development Bank, OECD, and UNDP 2014.
162 Chapter 8
Humanitarian aid and charity-based aid are often specified for emergencies or for specific 
social benefit projects identified by charities. Emergency aid (food, medicine, temporary 
shelter, and the like) and charity-directed aid are sporadic in timing, type, and quantity and 
not amenable to systematic long-range planning for development. Systematic aid, both bilat-
eral (government to government) and multilateral aid (from the World Bank and regional 
development banks) could foster development if tied to clearly identified projects with spe-
cific development goals, strong accountability systems, and careful planning for the genera-
tion of returns from the projects that cover loan and interest payments plus operation and 
maintenance costs (Moyo 2009). Unfortunately, this has not commonly been the case in 
Africa (Bräutigam and Knack 2004). Finally, fragmentation caused by a large number of for-
eign aid projects that overwhelm the management capacity of the recipient government can 
be a limit to the effectiveness of OOF.
ODA Suppresses Domestic Capacity Building
Foreign aid dependency can diminish local capacity building and innovation for develop-
ment. First, ODA can exacerbate historically weak governance by removing the need for 
multistakeholder negotiations over taxation and budgets, by removing accountability for 
revenues, and by bolstering regimes that would otherwise not be able to retain power (Moyo 
2009; Toïngar 2014). Second, ODA—either in the form of concessional loans, which are rou-
tinely forgiven, or grants, which do not have to be repaid—can serve as a form of insurance 
for governments that subsequently undertake projects with higher risks of failure than they 
would otherwise consider and exert less effort when collecting tax revenue to finance gov-
ernment expenditure. In effect, ODA creates a form of moral hazard in recipient countries. 
Hence, ODA can suppress institutional capacity building. Third, technical assistance on aid 
projects often uses foreign advisors, who may come at a higher cost to the project than locals, 
and this also restricts the number of locals trained to implement and ultimately take owner-
ship of projects. In this way, ODA can suppress local human resource capacity building. To 
the extent that these projects poach scarce local expertise from government agencies and the 
domestic private sector by offering higher salaries, they further stifle local human resources 
and financial capacity building in the private sector. 
Table 8.5 shows the estimated percentage of government expenditure provided by ODA in 
selected African countries in 1999. Although this data is fifteen years old, it remains in ques-
tion how much this level of external aid and its potentially inhibiting effects on autonomous 
African development planning has diminished. Prolonged, high levels of financial aid and 
technical assistance can diminish opportunities for domestic personnel and agencies to learn 
from experience and innovate, which are integral aspects of capacity building.
Examples of Innovation for Development for Watsan Services
Table 8.6 lists a few examples of capacity-based innovation in the provision of water and 
sanitation services that are part of the first step toward human development in a country. It 
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is important to note that IfD in Africa by Africans can also build on innovations generated 
outside of Africa and by non-Africans. For example, automobiles were not invented in Africa, 
but that does not mean that Africans cannot find innovative ways to use automobile trans-
portation systems to further development in Africa.
Institutionale
Village water and sanitation committees (VWSCs) are an example of innovation in the insti-
tutional capacity factor, because they can provide an alternative to absent or less effective 
government agencies in gaining access to improved watsan services, particularly in rural 
Table 8.5
ODA as percentage of government expenditure in selected SSA countries, 
1999 (Bräutigam and Knack 2004)
Country % Country %
Rwanda 99 Senegal 54
Malawi 89 Uganda 51
Mauritania 87 Benin 51
Sao Tome and Principe 84 Djibouti 47
Zambia 72 Sierra Leone 45
Cape Verde 67 Comoros 45
Guinea Bissau 67 Burundi 43
Chad 65 Guinea 41
Central African Republic 63 Ethiopia 37
Tanzania 62 Gambia 36
Niger 58 Ghana 30
Burkina Faso 57 Togo 27
Mali 55 Cameroon 25
Madagascar 54
Table 8.6
Examples of innovation in the sustained delivery of watsan services
Capacity factor Innovation example
Institutional Village water and sanitation committees (Stalker, Abyankar, and Iyer 2001)
Human resources Global Water Operators Partnership Alliance (UN Habitat; GWOPA 2014)
Technical Point-of-collection chlorine dispenser system (Innovations for Poverty Action; 
IfPA 2015)
Economic Maji Ni Maisha, Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid, Kenya (World Bank 
2010b)
Environmental WaDImena* (IDRC 2004)
Energy Solar Electric Light Fund (SELF 2015)
Sociocultural Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS 2011)
Service Aakash Ganga rainwater harvesting system (“Aakash Ganga” 2009)
*Water Demand Management Initiative—Middle East and North Africa.
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areas. The World Bank’s Water and Sanitation Program—South Asia studied the effectiveness 
of VWSCs in the states of Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh, India. They found that four features 
were important for effective VWSCs: Transparency is openness of the decision-making and 
management processes to villagers; participation refers to a representative mass of community 
members who understand the benefits of the project and set the rules of engagement; inclu-
sion is the opportunity for all subgroups and households to contribute to the project and 
receive its services; and ownership is the community’s sense of stewardship for the infrastruc-
ture and its sustained operation and maintenance. The study found that VWSCs were effec-
tive in implementing watsan projects, that community members were generally satisfied 
with the projects and services they delivered, and that villages in Uttar Pradesh were able to 
bypass the traditional regional government in implementing and managing their watsan 
system (Stalker, Abyankar, and Iyer 2001).
Human Resources
The human resource capacity factor addresses the availability and capability of individuals to 
build, operate, and maintain watsan services. The Global Water Operators Partnerships Alli-
ance (GWOPA), hosted by UN Habitat, facilitates peer support arrangements between watsan 
operators and organizations to share knowledge and tools that can help sustain and improve 
the performance of water and sanitation systems.3 Agua Para La Vida (APLV), a nonprofit 
organization operating in Nicaragua, aids in the development of rural, community-based, 
gravity-fed water systems. APLV trains water system builders at its facility in Rio Blanco, Nic-
aragua. These builders then provide technical expertise and leadership to help communities 
build small water supply systems. During the construction process, APLV personnel train 
community members to operate and maintain the systems so that they will remain in service 
after APLV has withdrawn. Over twelve thousand people have been reached through APLV’s 
efforts to date.4
Technical
The technical capacity factor refers to the supply chain for producing the service along 
with the necessary spare parts and support services for sustained operation and maintenance 
of the system. Despite the availability of inexpensive bottled chlorine (less than 0.3 dollars 
per month for a family of five) in rural Kenya, its use for disinfection of drinking water in 
households remains low. Hiring local promoters has a temporary effect on household chlori-
nation, but rates then fall off again. The point-of-collection chlorine dispenser system is a 
device for dispensing a diluted chlorine solution from standpipes and other public 
water-dispensing services to improve access to disinfected water in communities that do not 
have water piped into homes. The system has been implemented in Western Kenya. Install-
ment of these dispensers at points of water collection has led to an increase in the use of 
chlorinated drinking water by 52 percent in targeted communities; as the technology became 
easier to use, people were influenced by their neighbors who were using it. The cost of dis-
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penser hardware, refill, maintenance, and management is less than 0.5 dollars per year 
per person, which is much lower than the home delivery bottled method. Furthermore, the 
entire project is run through a close partnership with local NGOs, local manufacturers, and 
local managers, which greatly increases local capacity to sustain the system (Poverty Action 
Lab 2015).
Economic and Financial
Maji Ni Maisha (Water Is Life; MNM) is a financing program for small- to medium-scale water 
projects in Kenya. The scheme consists of four major stakeholder groups: (1) the community 
acquiring the water project, including its contracting water service provider; (2) K-Rep Bank, 
which provides and manages the loan for the water project, drawing from funds in a trust 
supported by the World Bank and European Union; (3) government regulators that control 
the water extraction, environmental impacts, and the water service provider; and (4) support 
organizations that help the community apply for the loan, contractors that design and build 
the system, and others that monitor the performance of the project with respect to its tar-
geted number of users served.
The MNM process consists of three major steps: (1) a detailed loan qualification and dis-
bursement process, which includes 20 percent of project costs deposited by the community; 
(2) project implementation by a contractor—selected as a requirement of the loan; and (3) 
postimplementation operation and management by a contracted service provider, output 
target verification, and payment of a government subsidy to the community to reduce the 
total amount of the loan.
K-Rep Bank works with regional water service boards across Kenya (K-Rep Bank 2010). Its 
detailed attention to loan qualification by communities, the use of contracted service provid-
ers, and the requirement of achieving water service output targets to receive a government 
subsidy suggest that MNM is an innovative approach to providing water service to commu-
nities that are willing and able to pay the final subsidized cost. Not all communities meet 
these criteria, but MNM can be a worthwhile model for those that do. From 2008 to 2013, 
MNM financed thirty-five water projects to the tune of KES$415 million (around US$4.4 
million), benefitting almost 220,000 people (Otuki 2013).
Environmental and Natural Resources
The Water Demand Initiative in the Middle East and North Africa (WaDImena) is a regional 
water resource–management and conservation program serving the water-scarce countries of 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This multifunded program was initiated in 2005 
to foster innovative solutions for water-usage efficiency, equity, and sustainability in these 
countries. It emphasizes a participatory approach of close relations between local people and 
government, encouraging an exchange of experience and knowledge in order to find the 
most appropriate solutions to regional water demand and to build individual and institu-
tional capabilities (Lahlou and Attia 2005; Soer and Lebdi 2011). For instance, one of these 
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projects is reviving an old Yemeni practice of reusing gray water from mosques for crop irri-
gation (Khaled 2007).
Energy
The Solar Electric Light Fund (SELF) is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1990 by Nev-
ille Williams and based in Washington, DC. SELF helps to provide affordable, village-wide 
solar electric systems to rural communities that lack access to grid electricity. Using its Whole 
Village Development Model, SELF addresses other needs in the community that require elec-
tricity, including drip irrigation for crops, refrigeration, and online learning. Since 1990, SELF 
has worked with partners to bring modular electricity to villages in twenty countries world-
wide, providing innovative access to electricity in rural villages (Wood 2013). Africans can 
adapt the SELF model to extend decentralized electricity services to other off-the-grid com-
munities across the continent as an example of African IfD based on a technology developed 
outside of Africa.
Sociocultural
Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) is a self-help program pioneered by Atul Wad in 
2000; it increases sustained access to improved sanitation services for communities in Ban-
gladesh and elsewhere. CLTS uses trained facilitators to engage community residents in rec-
ognizing the dangers and undesirability of open defecation in their villages. Residents receive 
guidance on how to develop sanitary defecation habits and install the necessary infrastruc-
ture. When they have done this, the community is awarded the open defecation–free status. 
CLTS has now spread to India, Indonesia, and parts of Africa. CLTS makes innovative use of 
social marketing and participation to achieve widespread, sustained access to improved san-
itation services (Kar and Chambers 2008). It can be adapted to work in Africa by Africans.
Service
Service capacity or capability refers to the quantity and quality of a service as well as its acces-
sibility (distance, price, terrain) and reliability (percentage of scheduled demand available). 
Aakash Ganga (river from the skies) is a public-private-community partnership that uses rain-
water harvesting to provide sustained access to drinking water in Rajasthan State, also known 
as India’s desert state. B. P. Agrawal, the driving force behind the project, assembled a partner-
ship of state and local governments, villages, local university resources, and NGOs to imple-
ment the initial project with a $200,000 grant from the World Bank’s Development 
Marketplace. The project carefully integrated local customs and social practices to assure 
equitable usage fees and access to water services, which allows villagers to meet their water 
needs for ten to twelve months per year instead of depending on more expensive, 
lower-quality, truck-borne government water supplies. The project generates a small surplus 
in revenue, and evidence is emerging that in the villages served by these water schemes, there 
is a higher level of school attendance by girls, and homes are able to grow small vegetable 
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gardens. Aakash Ganga is now being considered for broader expansion across Rajasthan and 
is being considered by the Guiyang Municipality of Guizhou Province, China (“Aakash 
Ganga” 2009).
Conclusion
This chapter argues that African countries can set their own agendas for development by 
prioritizing primary and secondary human services, developing innovative ways to build 
their broad-based capacity, and selectively and strategically using foreign aid. The premise is 
that building domestic capacity for sustained access to essential human services is the first 
step on the ladder to personal and national human development. The chapter presents 
human development as the realization of a person’s full potential in society, enhanced by the 
availability of choice, freedom, and social networks and capabilities necessary for satisfying 
a person’s needs and exploiting available opportunities. What this implies, but does not artic-
ulate, is that the aggregate of a systematic approach to development by individual countries 
will produce the type of innovation that leads to sustainable human development, driven by 
Africans across the continent of Africa.
Notes
1. This discussion centers on human development. It assumes that technological and economic devel-
opment are means to achieve the goal of human development.
2. Capacity is the potential to meet a need, such as the amount of water in a river. Capability is the 
means to meet the need, such as pumping and piping the water to its point of use.
3. See http://www.gwopa.org.
4. See https://aplv.org.
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Science, Technology, and Innovation in Africa: Conceptualizations, 
Relevance, and Policy Directions
Chux Daniels
The field of science, technology, and innovation (STI) is an engine of growth in any economy. Realizing 
that Africa can also benefit from STI activities, in 2005 the African Ministerial Council on Science and 
Technology (AMCOST) adopted Africa’s Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of Action (CPA), 
which articulates the African Union (AU) agenda for harnessing STI to boost economic growth and 
improve the lives of African people. (NEPAD1 2014, xxviii)
It is generally accepted that STI contributes to growth, socioeconomic development, and the 
competitiveness of nation states (Juma 2005; Kraemer-Mbula and Wamae 2010; UNCTAD 
2014). This notion, and the realization of STI as an engine of growth, has become so wide-
spread that few words and phrases surpass innovation in modern-day science and technology 
(S&T), development, or policy discourse, and this holds true in Africa as well. We find such 
evidence, for example, in the new ten-year Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa 
2024 (STISA-2024) document “On the Wings of Innovation” (STISA 2014). There are also 
promises of similar strategies and policy documents in the months and years to come, such 
as the formulation of “a broader and long-term AU Agenda 2063” strategy leading up to the 
AU’s hundred-year anniversary (STISA 2014, 10). It is therefore arguable, on the basis of this 
AU long-term strategy, that STI will continue to play a center-stage role in Africa in the fore-
seeable future.
In line with this center-stage role for STI in Africa, various collaborative efforts have been 
initiated at both AU and regional levels aimed at supporting, promoting, and applying STI as 
an instrument for development (Mugabe 2009)—with varying degrees of success and chal-
lenges: “The challenges are how to link science, technology and innovation to poverty reduc-
tion, job creation, sustainable livelihoods and the improved well-being of citizens. How 
should capacity and competencies be built in order to innovate? As countries engage in 
knowledge intensive activities, how will Africa expand its knowledge?” (NEPAD 2014).
NEPAD’s statement aptly captures the concerns of many scholars and technocrats in their 
attempts to better grasp Africa’s development challenges through the STI lens. In this chap-
ter, I argue that some of the reasons that these attempts have yielded less than optimal results 
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lie in the way STI is conceptualized in the continent, an inability to make STI relevance felt 
by the wider society, and weaknesses in STI (including public) policies.2
The AU, in STISA-2024, identifies (some of) the STI priority areas for Africa:
Eradication of Hunger and Achieving Food Security; Prevention and Control of Diseases; Communica-
tion (Physical and Intellectual Mobility); Protection of our Space; Live Together—Build the Society; and 
Wealth Creation. The strategy further defines four mutually reinforcing pillars which are prerequisite 
conditions for its success. These pillars are: building and/or upgrading research infrastructures; enhanc-
ing professional and technical competencies; promoting entrepreneurship and innovation; and provid-
ing an enabling environment for STI development in the African continent. (STISA 2014, 10)
These challenges or variations thereof are echoed across Africa in regions and in individ-
ual nations. Nonetheless, substantial gaps remain in our knowledge of suitable approaches to 
addressing challenges in areas such as STI understanding, definition, and conceptualization 
(Aubert 2005; Foster and Heeks 2013); innovation ecosystems, like institutions, landscape 
dynamics, and actors, which can ensure effective interactions and partnerships (Adebowale 
2012; Kruss 2012; Kruss et al. 2013); and the capabilities, knowledge, and learning required 
to achieve Africa’s STI aspirations (Marcelle 2004; Berdegué 2005; Bell 2007; Oyeyinka 2012). 
Furthermore, the relevance of STI to African societies, rich and poor (Lorentzen and Mohamed 
2009; Cozzens 2010) and the indicators and measurement methodologies and frameworks 
required (Arocena and Sutz 2010; OECD 2012; Sutz 2012; Daniels 2014), in addition to the 
policy instruments, policy mix, and policy frameworks needed to address these challenges, 
remain somewhat elusive (Mugabe 2009; World Bank 2010a; OECD 2013; Phiri et al. 2013; 
Daniels 2015; UNDP 2014; UNCTAD 2014).
There is also the need to ensure that STI can help tackle these challenges and realize the 
development priority areas outlined without exacerbating poverty, inequality, and social 
exclusion (Cozzens and Kaplinsky 2009; OECD 2012; Hart, Jacobs, and Mhula 2013; Scerri 
and Lastres 2013; World Bank 2013). Although access to basic education and services3 con-
tinue to improve in Africa, indicating a decline in poverty, unemployment continues to rise, 
and “inequality remains extreme” across some parts of the continent (UNDP 2014, 6). Ulti-
mately, the goal must be to ensure that Africa’s core interests remain top in the agenda 
(Muchie, Gammeltoft, and Lundvall 2003). To achieve this requires a critical examination of 
what science, technology, and innovation mean from Africa, for Africa, and to Africa: STI 
through the lens of Africans themselves.
With much hope resting on the ability of STI “to impact across critical sectors such as 
agriculture, energy, environment, health, infrastructure development, mining, security and 
water among others” (STISA 2014, 10), it behooves us to look closer into what STI means 
from Africa. What are the current definitions of STI in Africa? How is STI conceptualized, 
theorized, and applied in addressing these development challenges and priority areas that are 
now taken for granted in academic circles? What is included or excluded in the STI black box 
in Africa? Who controls the narrative? What development trajectories have been identified, 
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and how are they being addressed? How is the current brand of STI in Africa (potentially) 
effective in tackling not just the needs of the elite, high and mighty multinationals and big 
firms, but also the poor and rural dwellers, “grassroots” innovators, small and medium enter-
prises (SMEs), and entrepreneurs below the radar or at the base/bottom of the pyramid? How 
do we ensure that STI delivers on its promises in Africa?
In this chapter, I argue that the potential of STI to contribute to Africa’s socioeconomic 
development hinges to a large extent on what STI means from an African perspective or in 
an African definition, how it is conceptualized and operationalized, and the impact of poli-
cies targeted at STI. I argue that these factors have bearing on the relevance of STI to address-
ing societal needs.
The History and Development of Science, Technology, and Innovation
Some key scholarly works and academic disciplines have influenced the way science, tech-
nology, and innovation are currently defined, theorized, and conceptualized. In tracing the 
origins and evolution of innovation studies, Martin (2012a) identifies the key intellectual 
developments in the field over the last fifty years, reveals how it drew upon a range of disci-
plines in the late 1950s and 1960s, and how it has continued to evolve. The author adds: 
“Around the mid-1980s, substantial parts of innovation studies started to coalesce into a 
more coherent field centered on the adoption of an evolutionary (or neo-Schumpeterian) 
economics framework, an interactive model of the innovation process, and the concept of 
‘systems of innovation’” (Martin 2012a, 1219).
In addition to Schumpeter’s seminal work on innovation, other key works that have 
shaped this field include the National System of Innovation (NSI) framework (Freeman 1987; 
Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993); evolutionary economics; the theory of economic change, rou-
tines, skills, and capabilities (Nelson and Winter 1977, 1982); technological paradigms and 
trajectories (Dosi 1982); sectorial taxonomy of technical change (Pavitt 1984); and structural 
crises of adjustment (Freeman and Perez 1988). Others include absorptive capacity (Cohen 
and Levinthal 1990); technical change; rates of return to R&D (Hall, Griliches, and Hausman 
1986; Griliches 1990); diffusion of innovation (Rogers [1962] 2003); innovation and entre-
preneurship (Drucker 1985); technological capabilities (Marcelle 2004; Bell 2009); and others 
on growth theory and technological change, catch-up, falling behind, and so on.
More recently, we find contributions and influences from newer streams of research, such 
as inclusive innovation (a term used in this chapter to cover the wide spectrum of innovation 
at grassroots, social, frugal, imitative, and reverse innovation [Gupta et al. 2003; Gupta 2012; 
Fressoli, Smith, and Thomas 2011; World Bank 2013; Daniels 2015; Smith, Fressoli, and 
Thomas 2014]), the “triple helix” (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000); measurements of inno-
vation studies and practice; the Oslo Manual (OECD and Eurostat 2005); open innovation 
(Chesbrough 2003); democratizing innovation and user innovation (von Hippel 2005); soci-
otechnical studies and transitions (Geels 2004); and many others.
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Empirical evidence provided in Martin 2012a indicates that other works from “outside” 
innovation studies or from “neighboring” domains that have had considerable influence on 
the field include works on organizations (March and Simon 1958), resource-based views of 
firms (Penrose 1959), paradigms (Kuhn 1992), knowledge (Polanyi 1966), competitive strat-
egy (Porter 1980), and much more.4 Since Schumpeter’s seminal discussion of innovation in 
the context of economics and subsequent contributions from evolutionary economists, 
innovation studies have evolved to incorporate perspectives from a range of social science 
disciplines, such as policy studies, sociology, anthropology, management, history, public 
administration, organizational studies, and business (for more on these, see, e.g., Martin 
2012a).
A revisit of this brief historical account is helpful in debunking the myth and often 
misplaced attention on the idea of advanced R&D and S&T (or basic science) as the predom-
inant (and sometimes the only) source of innovation in Africa and the Global South. This 
tendency toward exclusivity of the S&T-centric approach in innovation studies has sadly 
become the predominant narrative and framing of STI in Africa—contrary to the evidence 
that it does not explain the totality of innovation activities or sources. It therefore distorts 
the collection and interpretation of data, fuels the assumption that there is little innovative 
activity in Africa, and impacts the meaning of STI from Africa.
Consequently, the point being made in this section is that although some domains have 
played “major” roles in the development of innovation studies, there is a need for new and 
different perspectives in Africa that are not effectively captured by current research, policy, 
and practice—resulting in weakness in the way STI is conceptualized in Africa, the relevance 
of STI, and policy focus. Therefore, the exclusion of contributions from “minor” fields in 
innovation studies and the focus on S&T-centric innovation only weakens the potential con-
tributions of innovation to development and its role in addressing societal challenges. This 
point has important bearing on the meaning of STI from Africa, particularly in terms of 
how STI is defined, what counts (or not) as STI, and what is included or excluded in STI 
measurements.
The examples in boxes 9.1 and 9.2 show cases of STI from Africa defined primarily in 
terms of R&D, product and process innovation, and S&T-centric indicators such as patents, 
science publications, and citations, R&D expenditure (percentage of GDP), number of 
researchers, labor force with tertiary education, and so on (see, e.g., AOSTI 2013; and Vroh 
2014). Unfortunately, these narrow framings of STI in Africa are propagated in part by both 
small and large institutions alike, including the AU establishments. One outcome of such 
“endorsements” unintended as they may be, is the imposition of the dominant “Western” 
narrative and induced innovation directionality, which favors innovation by means of R&D 
in formal institutions, big science, and innovation driven by advanced S&T. This approach 
neglects innovation in the informal domain, such as inclusive (and grassroots) innovation, 
that incorporates indigenous knowledge and learning practices.
Science, Technology, and Innovation in Africa 173
The case of M-Pesa demonstrates that the nature of innovation in developing country 
settings extends beyond conventional product and process innovation, because such inno-
vations take advantage of extensive, complex, volatile, embedded networks of actors to 
facilitate diffusion, a process that in itself requires technical and social innovation (Foster 
and Heeks 2013). Achieving commercial success is pegged on a deep understanding of local 
culture, social networks, and indigenous knowledge. I reiterate here the importance of 
widening the scope of STI studies in general and tackling the challenges in operationalizing 
the relevant frameworks (e.g., NSI [discussed later], research, development, and policy 
frameworks).
Ahead, I will describe other factors that are useful in deepening the knowledge and under-
standing of what has gone before us. They shed light on why it is important for Africa to 
challenge the status quo rather than build on historical paths that are at odds with its devel-
opment aspirations and philosophical underpinnings. Africa must redefine, reconceptualize, 
and theorize STI in a way that is relevant to its specific context and challenges. The continent 
must be willing to trust its own decisions (i.e., decisions made by those in authority). When 
applicable, Africa must be willing to chart a different STI and development trajectory if 
necessary.
Box 9.1
For one practical example, consider the case of Nigeria’s 2012 STI policymaking. The fastest grow-
ing sector in the economy over the last two decades (the movie and entertainment industry) was 
not regarded as STI and not included in policymaking processes, nor were actors of this important 
sector consulted during policy formulation exercises (FMST 2012). This is despite the substantial 
number of jobs generated by this sector. Another positive impact of Nigeria’s movie industry is its 
significant contribution to GDP growth, which enabled Nigeria to overtake South Africa and gain 
the status of Africa’s largest economy.
Box 9.2
M-Pesa is a mobile payment system that is revolutionizing mainstream banking not only in Ken-
ya, but in the rest of the region, with the potential for continental and global reach and implica-
tions. In contrast to Nigeria’s movie industry, with significant instances of social, organizational, 
process, and marketing innovation, M-Pesa is more easily recognized as innovation, because it is 
an S&T-based, technology-driven example of product innovation.
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The beginnings of innovation studies and the development of the resultant concepts have 
also been shaped by global events such as World War I and II and the race for technological 
superiority and dominance that ensued, with an “emphasis on basic science and defense” 
(Shapira and Kuhlmann 2001, 2). This emphasis gave rise to the use of S&T as a national 
competitive tool—rather than as a source of development and cooperation, which would 
currently be more favorable to Africa. In spite of these influences, the consensus is that there 
is increased awareness of STI not for defense, technological superiority, and competitiveness, 
but for broadened policy goals and societal development that is inclusive, strives to reduce 
poverty and inequality (Freeman 1991; Shapira and Kuhlmann 2001; Kaplinsky 2011a, 
2011b), is friendlier to the environment, and promotes sustainable practices. To achieve 
these aims, innovation will need to be transformed.
Freeman (1991, 1), in analyzing this evolutionary trend—that is, the shift from science to 
technology and innovation with an emphasis on the quality of life—sums it up as follows:
During the lifetime of SPRU,5 the emphasis in science and technology policies has shifted from an 
essentially science-push framework in the 1950s, through a phase of preoccupation with economic 
growth and management of innovation in the 1960s, and on to a wider concern with the environment 
and quality of life since the 1970s. Within this context, some quality of life issues are discussed which 
are only indirectly related to economic growth: civil liberty, quality, variety and choice in new prod-
ucts and services, and social equity. A number of examples are given of changes in trend which are 
influenced by, and sometimes closely related to, changes in science and technology, which give some 
grounds for hope.
The National System of Innovation (NSI) framework has had a significant influence on 
innovation studies (Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993). The NSI was introduced to 
help explain differences in the adoption and rate of technological changes between 
nations—that is, why some countries experience greater technological dynamism than oth-
ers. Although the NSI is widely utilized in innovation studies and has proved useful, its 
application particularly in Africa and the Global South6 has been growing (Johnson, Edquist, 
and Lundvall 2003). Some of the major critiques of the NSI framework include its focus on 
formal institutions; promotion of R&D and science-based activities as predominant sources 
of innovation; and a bias toward firms (i.e., the centrality of firms as engines of innova-
tion), with less attention on nonfirm innovation sources that are equally important (if not 
more relevant) in Africa. Kraemer-Mbula and Wamae (2010), Foster and Heeks (2013), and 
Iizuka and Sadre Ghazi (2011) make these arguments. Other arguments against NSI include 
its focus on formal knowledge sources while neglecting indigenous knowledge and learning, 
along with a preference for radical rather than incremental novelty in terms of “new” prod-
ucts and services—as opposed to improvements in the value and quality of life (Freeman 
1991).
In spite of these shortcomings, the NSI framework has remained the dominant frame-
work for understanding and analyzing national innovation activities in both academic and 
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policy circles. The implication is that the NSI determines to a large extent how STI, and 
innovation in particular, is defined, conceptualized, measured (i.e., what is included in 
the definition, counted or not counted, and determined by measurement indicators) in 
Africa. Given its weaknesses, a well-articulated research agenda focused on the review of, 
for example, the NSI and the triple helix in ways that ensure it better captures the practical 
realities of STI in the continent’s priorities is therefore essential if STI is to have the right 
meaning, influence, and relevance in Africa. A culture or practice that allows scholars to 
apply the NSI framework without incorporating Africa-centric issues must be challenged 
and discouraged. This is essential for optimizing the contributions of STI to development in 
Africa.
Historically, innovation efforts in Africa have focused on R&D, referred to as the First 
Frame in innovation policy circles by some scholars. From R&D, we experienced a move to 
the NSI framework approach to innovation policies, the Second Frame. The emphasis is now 
on the Third Frame of innovation policy, with an emphasis on the need to transform, rethink, 
or reimagine innovation in a way that ensures that it is inclusive, does not exacerbate pov-
erty, is friendlier to the environment, embeds sustainable practices, and focuses on address-
ing global (mega) challenges, as outlined in the SDGs, for example.
Africa: What We Already Know
The evidence gathered, the indicators used in capturing that evidence, the interpretation of 
the evidence, and the lenses (i.e., frameworks) through which the resulting knowledge and 
information about the continent are analyzed have a bearing on what STI means from Africa. 
Ahead, I will analyze the impacts of demographic changes, informal economy, education, 
and knowledge on Africa’s STI and development.
Judging from the current data, the information in figure 9.1, and a variety of projections,7 
we find interesting trends with implications on the potential role for STI in Africa’s develop-
ment. A continent’s population—from which the labor force and the market are drawn—are 
at the core of development. The available data indicate that by 2030 Africa’s population will 
rise from one billion in 2010 to 1.6 billion, representing 19 percent of the world’s total. There 
will be reduced child mortality and an increased average life expectancy, from fifty-seven 
(2010 estimate) to sixty-five years. A large young, active, and educated population presents 
the challenges of unemployment, political instability, and backlash but also opportunities 
for large workforces, markets, increased productivity, “global powerhouses,” and many oth-
ers (AFDB 2012). Drummond, Thakoor, and Yu, noting the importance of harnessing the 
demographic changes envisioned, write:
Africa will account for 80 percent of the projected 4 billion increase in the global population by 2100. 
The accompanying increase in its working age population creates a window of opportunity, which if 
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properly harnessed, can translate into higher growth and yield a “demographic dividend.”8 It will be 
critical to ensure that the “right” supportive policies, including those fostering human capital accu-
mulation and job creation, are in place to translate this opportunity into concrete economic growth. 
(Drummond, Thakoor, and Yu 2014, 2)
Such an increase in population calls for finding innovative ways to meet local needs that 
become even more pressing with the increase; thus, there is a need for policy, research, and 
practice to shift focus to interventions that take advantage of local resources (knowledge, 
capabilities, labor, local solutions, new or alternative STI and development indicators, etc.). 
This kind of shift requires a change in mindset. The importance of research, investments, and 
policy support for inclusive innovation (or innovation for inclusive development) that tar-
gets rural (grassroots) populations at the base of the pyramid is therefore heightened (Daniels 
2015). This presents opportunities for STI that are adequately reconceptualized in a way that 
ensures that STI is relevant to wider societies.
Figure 9.1
African demography: fertility rates.
Source: The Economist 2014.
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We know that a large section of the African economy is informal (ILO 2009, 2012; 
Charmes, Gault, and Wunsch-Vincent 2015). A significant amount of innovation activity in 
the continent, as in the wider Global South, draws from indigenous knowledge, occurs in 
informal settings, and is largely ignored in innovation, development, and management stud-
ies (Kraemer-Mbula and Wamae 2010; Godfrey 2011; Cozzens and Sutz 2012). Therefore, the 
definition, conceptualization, and meaning of STI from Africa must reflect this fact. Further-
more, STI measurement indicators need that capture innovation activities both from formal 
sectors (driven by R&D and advanced S&T-centric activities) and informal sectors (i.e., pre-
dominantly non-R&D focused). Evidence abounds that shows that both sources of innova-
tion are critical to development. There is therefore the need for new and/or alternative STI 
measurement indicators to capture the full extent of innovation in Africa.
Attempts to understand STI in Africa must also take into account the nature of education. 
So far, formal curricula have focused on science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 
(STEM) in particular and also on technology and innovation management (TIM) courses,9 
thereby emphasizing technological capabilities. However, just as innovative activity in Africa 
is diverse, the underlying education systems are diverse too, featuring a mix of formal educa-
tion in schools and institutions of higher learning, apprenticeship programs, and indigenous 
education that passes down tacit knowledge of innovative processes at rural and grassroots 
levels. Africa is knowledge-rich thanks to such a diverse educational system; STI education 
should be expanded to include these sources and reflect this diversity.
A few universities are beginning to teach creativity and entrepreneurship courses in 
Africa. STI and capabilities for policymaking curricula have to a large extent focused on 
physics, chemistry, biology, and mathematics. This practice has resulted in a large percentage 
of the educated population with academic qualifications in STEM courses struggling to 
find jobs that are nonexistent, rather than acquiring the knowledge and abilities to create 
jobs.
What picture does this conjure vis-à-vis the meaning of STI from Africa? What links to 
creativity, entrepreneurship, S&T, and innovation can be made? Review Farlon’s story, pre-
sented in box 9.3. How would such linkages make STI more relevant to Farlon and the mil-
lions like him? Are such linkages possible and realistic? The bigger question is this: Why does 
the continent continue along a trajectory that produces millions of graduates in disciplines 
in which they cannot find work, thereby exacerbating unemployment, rather than equip-
ping students with the tools to create jobs when jobs have not already been created for them? 
Five years after his university education, Farlon is still unemployed.
A paradigm shift in education is necessary in order to produce graduates who are equipped 
with the tools they need on completion of their formal education and know what it takes to 
convert their academic training in any chosen discipline into innovative and profitable busi-
nesses, self-employment opportunities, or global brands. Such a transformation in education 
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could potentially result in an explosion of innovation across the continent as graduates 
identify needs and apply their training (alone or in collaboration with other individuals, 
firms, civil societies, NGOs, or government agencies) to find innovative solutions that address 
societal challenges; by doing so, they can create jobs and foster economic socioeconomic 
development.
Related to education, as discussed earlier, is knowledge production and circulation. Infor-
mal education in Africa, such as by means of apprenticeship and craftsmanship, involves 
passing down tacit knowledge of innovative local practices (agriculture, sustainability, 
medicine, conservation, and so on), which could be drawn into an STI framing of knowledge 
generation and circulation. The implication is that the nature of social capital in Africa, if 
leveraged, may help in developing networks for collaboration and knowledge sharing. 
Informal networks are sometimes valued more than formal networks in the continent. 
Although there are some disadvantages, they offer unique potential for development, as 
research evidence on clusters in Africa indicate (McCormick and Schmitz 2009). Therefore, 
although education and knowledge through formal sources are critical in shaping the mean-
ing of STI from/in Africa, knowledge production, transfer, circulation, and “learning by 
doing,” as is common with artisans and traditional craftsmanship, are also critical to innova-
tion and inclusive development. As Richard Nelson (2015, ix) has observed: “A large share of 
innovation efforts fail; success requires a considerable amount of learning by doing and 
using before acquiring the needed innovation capabilities.”
It is important to reiterate—and, by so doing, emphasize—that knowledge is knowledge, 
regardless of whether it is produced in Africa or the Global South or North. Innovation 
lies in the abilities of STI actors to convert, utilize [strategic] knowledge, and transform it 
into improvements in the provision of goods, services, processes, and practices that enrich 
the quality of life, thereby contributing to development. The goal here is not necessarily to 
Box 9.3
Farlon is a bright entrepreneurial African man. Growing up, he sang in the church choir, acted, 
and danced—evidence of his rich artistic skills. He was even more talented in fine arts—painting, 
drawing, design, and sculpture. Due to lack of funds, he could not continue his education. But 
being entrepreneurial, he set up a photography business. The money from this business enabled 
him to fund his university education. Farlon obtained a bachelor’s degree in fine arts, graduating 
at the top of his class. On completion of his master’s degree, he realized that even with his fine 
arts skills (arts, painting, and drawing), photography skills, and academic qualifications, he did 
not receive any training that could equip him with the know-how to sell his artwork and become 
an entrepreneur. The outcome? He joined the already overcrowded job search space with increas-
ing disappointment and frustration as days turn into weeks, weeks into months, and months 
into years.
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move toward path-breaking, advanced S&T-centric, and radical innovation, desirable though 
it may. Instead, it is to move toward sustainable and incremental innovation in the sense 
of introducing something new to a particular context, community, region, or nation 
(Nelson 2015).
Knowledge is a critical component of innovation and competitiveness at firm, farm, and 
national levels. It is therefore vital to create an environment that fosters the development, 
circulation and utilization of knowledge” through measures that include government poli-
cies in areas such as education, scientific research, and technology promotion (Kruss 2008; 
Albuquerque et al. 2015). A rethinking of the definitions and reconceptualizations of STI to 
include problem solving, indigenous knowledge through learning by doing, the develop-
ment of innovation capabilities, and targeted STI policies is necessary. Related to this point 
on broadening the definition of STI, there is also a need to broaden the actors to include 
NGOs, advocacy groups, and civil society organizations, in addition to the major actors in 
sectors such as university, industry, and government.
In the sections that follow, I reexamine the connections between STI conceptualizations, 
relevance, and policy directions for Africa. I stress the importance of ensuring that STI in 
Africa is focused on problem solving (i.e., addressing development challenges). This is in line 
with Nelson’s thinking: “Economic development in countries behind the technological fron-
tier requires innovation both by firms, and by farms, hospitals, and other organizations that 
provide goods and services. This is not innovation in the sense of introducing something 
new to the world economy, but of introducing something new to the particular context” 
(Nelson, 2015, ix). In summarizing the arguments to define, rethink, and reconceptualize 
innovation in a way that is relevant to addressing societal needs and challenges, rather than 
innovation for innovation’s sake, I revisit issues of definition, framing, and narratives. Here, 
I explain that the “Western” definitions of S&T and innovation were developed to suit the 
context, specific needs at that time, and practical realities of economic growth and competi-
tiveness in advanced countries, driven by firms’ productivity and performance (Freeman 
1987). In this context and by these definitions, firms play the central role in innovation 
processes through R&D. As a result, there is nothing wrong with these definitions, for firms 
based in advanced countries (in the Global North). Nevertheless, the realization that innova-
tion also occurs in nonfirm institutional settings leads to an expansion of these definitions 
and ensuing frameworks in order to ensure that they can help explain and promote innova-
tion in the public sector, in services, and in other areas. This willingness to redefine, and to 
be open to redefining, is in itself innovation.
However, for Africa and the rest of the Global South, the situation is different in the sense 
that innovation activities from firms and formal institutions account for a significantly 
smaller amount of estimated national GDPs when compared with those of Global North 
countries. Therefore, the centrality of firms as users and producers of knowledge and STI in 
Africa (particularly in terms of products and services) is drastically diminished. This calls for 
rethinking the way innovation is conceptualized in Africa and the importance of ensuring 
180 Chapter 9
that S&T, and innovation especially, adequately captures contributions from non-firm-based 
sources of innovation that arise in the informal economy in addition to formal R&D-driven, 
firm-based innovation.
The arguments therefore are (1) that various domains have contributed to the origins and 
development of STI studies, the implication being that Africans must be willing to engage 
with STI, to “experiment” (play with it), to foster innovation from a wide range of sources—
anthropology, sociology, business and management, history, archeology, S&T, arts and 
media, and so on—and to conceptualize and constantly re/define STI if need be; and (2) that 
innovation is not necessarily based on formal institutions (firms), R&D, and basic science 
alone but can also result from informal institutions and settings and innovation practitioners 
with indigenous knowledge, not based on formal R&D and S&T. On the basis of these two 
propositions and preceding discussions, the meaning of STI from Africa must therefore shift 
from the current status of S&T- or R&D-based innovation from “laboratories” to a broader 
and more inclusive sense of innovation for development, in line with the needs, concrete 
realities, and aspirations of the continent.
Science, technology and innovation are major factors in the generation of economic and 
social change and can contribute to growth and development (Kraemer-Mbula and Wamae 
2010). Although this notion is widely held to be true, experts in STI fields also acknowledge 
that innovation can lead to exclusion and inequalities in society (Cozzens and Kaplinsky 
2009; Cozzens 2010; OECD 2012; Hart, Jacobs, and Mhula 2013; World Bank 2013). In South 
Africa, for example, Hart, Jacobs, and Mhula (2013, 3) maintain that “the continued presence 
of high levels of poverty, inequality and unemployment” has remained a major challenge. If 
the purpose of STI is to improve the quality of life, then perhaps STI reconceptualized in a 
way that broadens the concepts involved and enhances inclusiveness may contribute to 
ensuring that innovation addresses the needs of wider segments of society. This change in 
perception of STI is critical if it is to be relevant to both the rich and the poor in Africa.
Kruss (2008) describes an interesting knowledge production and circulation mechanism 
in which old and new forms of interactions coexist, resulting in partnerships among actors 
of innovation ecosystems aimed toward addressing societal needs. This involves complex 
systems that may be characterized by problem orientation, impact orientation, and policy 
orientation, with broad approaches that are inclusive rather than exclusive. A greater empha-
sis on the democratization of science by also including nonacademic stakeholders such as 
problem owners and policymakers in all stages of research, knowledge production, and prob-
lem setting should therefore stress mutual learning that includes traditional and local as well 
as scientific and expert knowledge. This balance is essential.
Measurement of Innovation in Africa
The Oslo Manual (OECD and Eurostat 2005) has remained the dominant guiding literature in 
the measurement of innovation according to indicators and surveys of R&D using the Com-
munity Innovation Survey (CIS) methodology (Daniels 2014). However, in spite of this global 
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dominance, the Oslo Manual has been criticized for its inappropriateness for a Global South 
context (Salazar and Holbrook 2004; Schibany and Streicher 2008; Srinivas and Sutz 2008). 
Although the CIS-based innovation measurement approach captures innovation predomi-
nantly in the R&D realm and from formal sources, the approach is used widely around the 
world, including in Africa (AU-NEPAD 2010, 2014). Daniels (2014, 2) maintains that some of 
the weaknesses of the Oslo Manual that the CIS methodology does not address or measure, 
even though they are more relevant to Africa, include the use of R&D as a measure of inno-
vation, definition and choice of measurement indicators, and confusion between measuring 
R&D and equating it with measuring innovation. Others include the importance of linking 
innovation measurements with economic development, productivity, and growth; an inabil-
ity to sufficiently capture innovation from the informal sector, which accounts for a substan-
tial amount of Africa’s innovation activities; and the relationships between innovation and, 
for example, poverty, inequality, exclusion, and social progress.
The principal challenge lies in the indicators and measurement criteria used in iden-
tifying, mapping, and capturing some data while deciding what to prioritize, include, or 
exclude. Martin (2012b, 6–7) submits that a huge amount of “invisible”10 innovative activ-
ity goes on in developing countries “beneath the radar”—for instance, incremental process 
innovations that do not involve R&D or work by “scientists” or patents, creating a case 
of “dark innovation.”11 This “dark innovation” in Africa needs to be defined, conceptual-
ized, measured, analyzed, and better understood. There also is the risk of directionality12 
in innovation and the potential of being accused of “picking winners.” A broadened, rede-
fined, reconceptualized, or transformed notion of innovation in Africa, in line with the argu-
ments advanced in this chapter, will help ensure that innovation from formal and informal 
sources are captured. The implication of such an approach is that the Oslo Manual and CIS, 
in their current forms, can no longer be central to innovation indicators or measurements 
in Africa.
Prior to STISA-2024, other initiatives, “plans,” strategy documents, and policies13 were 
designed with the same goal in mind: to use S&T and, more recently, innovation as mecha-
nisms to drive socioeconomic development in Africa and emphasize the need for concerted 
efforts in this regard. Against the backdrop of these continental STI policies, decisions such 
as striving toward the investment of 1 percent of national GDP on R&D were born, pro-
moted, and continue to be encouraged (STISA 2014, 40–41). Although well-intentioned, such 
passive policy directives as policy instruments have been difficult to justify in the political 
arena or to implement in national budgets. Two decades down the line, such blunt policy 
instruments have yielded less than optimum results. Also troubling is the implication for 
Africa’s innovation ecosystem, which is still developing, and the underlying message that 
(formal) R&D equals innovation, thus undermining the support and promotion of non-R&D 
innovation sources that occur in the informal economy. At the country level, various STI 
policies and strategy documents—such as Kenya (Kenya2030 2013), Nigeria (FMST 2012), 
and South Africa’s 2014 National Development Plan (NPC 2012)—reinforce this unflinching 
belief in formal STI as the panacea for Africa’s development challenges.
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STI policies, like other public policies, exert considerable impact on development (Stiglitz 
2012; UNDP 2014). Incumbent policies in a developing country context are particularly 
important in driving development projects, activities, and initiatives. In advanced countries, 
although an up-to-date innovation strategy is desirable and required to be incumbent, the 
innovation ecosystem is mature and robust enough for innovation activities to flourish, 
though sometimes at suboptimal levels, with minimum and predictable disruptions. This 
ability of innovation to flourish, even though sometimes at suboptimal levels, may be 
explained by the existence of strong formal institutions (Lundvall et al. 2009). In developing 
countries, however, the experience is somewhat different: Without the formulation and 
legitimization of an STI policy, for example, the relevant legal framework, funds, and 
resources may not be put in place. This partly explains some of the difficulties in operation-
alizing the AU’s STISA-2024 plan or the directive to invest 1 percent of GDP into R&D. It also 
partly explains other weaknesses observed in STI policies across the continent.
Although STISA-2024 is a major step in the right direction, responses to the strategy have 
been insufficient and uncoordinated and may not provide the ideal level of constructive 
engagement that such a policy document with continental implications deserves (Marcelle, 
Daniels, and Whisgary 2014, 25). Another important insight that can be gleaned from Afri-
ca’s policymaking is that policy learning is not taking place, or that the learning that has 
taken place has not been (or is not being) captured. As a dynamic innovation capability, 
learning involves experimentation designed to continuously improve organizational and 
policy performance (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Daniels, 
forthcoming).
Policy learning facilitates the strategic use of knowledge and information in policymak-
ing, thereby inducing innovation (Bennett and Howlett 1992; Borrás 2011; Edquist 2011). 
Who learns, what they learn, and the effect of learning on subsequent policies are important 
factors in policymaking. Of the three interdependent levels of learning—government learn-
ing, drawing lessons, and social learning—the most relevant to this discussion is government 
learning, which relates to state officials learning about policy processes in policymaking and, 
by so doing, generating organizational innovation and change (Bennett and Howlett 1992; 
Borrás 2011; Daniels 2015).
In spite of general acknowledgment of the importance of policymaking to development 
and experience gained over the past five decades in Africa, evidence reveals that weaknesses14 
observed in extant policies, such as the Lagos Plan and CPA, are still evident in STISA-2024, 
which was formulated in 2014. Effective policy learning would help ensure that policies and 
policymaking exercises in the future adequately build on past knowledge and strengths while 
correcting for the weaknesses of extant policies and policymaking. As straightforward as 
these approaches may sound, conditions such as the availability of policy capabilities (indi-
vidual and institutional), funding, and political will are necessary for success (Daniels 2015).
The challenge for Africa’s STI stakeholder community15 therefore is to identify and map 
the continent’s STI and development ecosystems, determine and refine the continent’s 
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strategic priority areas, and conceptualize and transform these areas into policy priorities. 
This will require an in-depth understanding of policy capabilities (processes, routines, and 
skills; Daniels 2015), interactions among policy actors, and the government’s extensive col-
laborative work with stakeholders.
Should Africa focus on mission-oriented STI policies, like sending astronauts to the moon, 
which generate less than 5 percent employment, or perhaps on agriculture (through innova-
tion policies more relevant to grassroots efforts), which affects the livelihood of about 40 to 
70 percent of the population involved in such sectors and accounts for about 50 percent of 
the employment in some countries? Or should it do both? Answers to such innovation pol-
icy and development questions are difficult and must be developed through robust policy 
engagements and interventions.
Policy learning, in conjunction with well-articulated policy research, is necessary for find-
ing answers to such questions through various mechanisms. For example, it can help policy-
makers appreciate that the emphasis on mission-oriented, advanced R&D- and S&T-centric 
policies16 (1) has produced less than optimum results; (2) has, as in other continents, contrib-
uted to inequality and social exclusion and exacerbated poverty in some cases; (3) has pro-
duced STI policies and policymaking exercises driven by governments (and neglecting 
industry, academia, and civil society), based on the use of “experts” and societal elites, with-
out active participation of the poor and marginalized, contributing to the weaknesses 
observed in policy learning, increased policy somersaults, and resulted in policy failures; and 
(4) provides justification for a change to a balanced policymaking that incorporates STI pol-
icy instruments that foster inclusive development and respond to innovation initiatives at 
grassroots levels.
Conclusion
An understanding of STI in Africa informs the meaning of STI from Africa, the conceptualiza-
tions and definitions of STI, knowledge generated and captured, and the relevance of STI to 
citizens. In addition, these attributes determine what is measured (or not measured), the 
policies formulated to support and promote STI, and the enabling environments for STI cre-
ated in the continent.
What does STI mean from Africa? Drawing from the analysis of this chapter, the answer 
lies in neither advanced R&D- and S&T-centric innovation on the one hand nor grassroots 
innovation on the other hand. It lies in both. If innovation is meant for development (OECD 
2012; UNCTAD 2014), the most important criteria for measuring its impact and effectiveness 
in Africa must be based on carefully selected, context-specific development indicators that 
value and incorporate as examples the number of jobs generated, poverty reduction metrics/
proxies, reductions in inequality and the social interactions such reductions enable, and so 
on. Such a system would acknowledge that indicators such as patents, number of publica-
tions, citations, and researchers, although equally critical to innovation and development, 
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cannot and should not be used in isolation as the only valid metrics, as is currently the case 
in many AU establishments and related agencies.
Although the critical mass of STI scholars and policy practitioners may be less than what 
is desired, Africans skilled in STI areas are based in practically every world-class research, 
policy, or government institution across the globe. The elephant in the room therefore is 
this: What is stopping the continent from redefining, reconceptualizing, theorizing, apply-
ing, and utilizing STI in a way that suits Africa’s specific contexts and realities? Is it a case of 
waiting for endorsements from its Global North counterparts and colleagues? There is abso-
lutely no need for that! The development challenges to tackle are too grave to allow for any 
form of complacency or delays in taking the necessary steps needed to harness the potentials 
of STI, like other nations and continents, and refocus the continent’s economies and devel-
opment trajectories.
If STI is defined, conceptualized, and understood as a mechanism that is, for example, 
useful in converting African history, stories and folklores, crafts, culture and traditions, and 
so on into world-class arts, music, movies, cartoons (printed, computer, and TV-based), apps, 
books, merchandise (clothes, toys, accessories), resulting in some form of Silicon Valley–
styled network of actors, businesses, incubators, and venture capitalists and creating millions 
of jobs (e.g., computer graphics work, designers, programmers, marketers, distributors), then 
STI may take on a different conceptual meaning, value, and relevance. This change can help 
diffuse the tension between “mission-oriented” and “grassroots” innovation policies and 
contribute toward a balanced innovation policy approach that strives to increase national 
innovation capabilities, inclusive growth, and sustainable development while reducing pov-
erty levels, inequality, and exclusion of all forms and at all levels.
•  Africa, the poorest continent has also the weakest research infrastructure
•  Africa produces less than 2% of the World research publications
 referenced by citation indexes [India [2.5%) and Latin America 3.5%]
•  Lack of research capabilities and continued brain drain
•  South Africa and Egypt produce 50% of the Continent’s publications
•  Disciplinary analysis reveals that few African countries have the minimum
 number of scientists required for the functioning of a scientic discipline
•  Africa’s inventive prole (Patents): less than on thousand of the World’s 
 inventions
•  88% of the Continent’s inventive activity is concentrated in South Africa
•  The GERD objective of 1% GDP has not yet been reached by the vast 
 majority of African countries 
State of Science and Technology in Africa
Figure 9.2
Impact of measurement indicators on STI definition, interpretation, and conceptualization in Africa.
Source: Vroh 2014.
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Notes
1. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a strategic framework for Pan-African socio-
economic development, is both a vision and a policy framework for Africa in the twenty-first century. 
NEPAD is a radically new intervention, spearheaded by African leaders, to address critical challenges 
facing the continent: poverty, development, and Africa’s marginalization internationally.
2. Such as development, economic, finance, environmental, and other policies directly and/or indi-
rectly connected to STI policies.
3. Such as piped water, sanitation, electricity, and refuse removal.
4. For a comprehensive review and more in-depth study of the literature, see, for example, Godin 
(2008a, 2010a, 2010b) for genealogical history and Martin (2012a) for recent accounts.
5. Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), University of Sussex, United Kingdom. Chris Freeman was the 
founding director of SPRU.
6. Used in this instance as a synonym for developing and/or less developed countries.
7. See, for example, UN (2004, 2013); World Bank (2004); AFDB (2012); The Economist (2014); and 
UNICEF (2014).
8. Opportunities that open up for a country as result of effective management of demographic transi-
tions.
9. Or a third, sometimes distant relative, public policy courses—although the majority of the courses in 
this third group do not target STI.
10. Because it is generally not captured in conventional innovation indicators.
11. Martin (2012b) borrows an analogy from astronomy, in which telescopes reveal only a small pro-
portion of the universe; the majority lies unseen in the form of dark matter and dark energy. Even 
though we know it is there, we cannot measure it, at least not directly with our existing instruments—
analogous to innovation occurring in Africa’s informal economy.
12. In this sense, referring to who decides what is important and what is not.
13. For example, the Monrovia Strategy of 1979, the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA 1980), the Consolidated 
Plan of Action (CPA 2005), and now STISA-2024 (STISA 2014).
14. Such as a lack of commitment and funding from national governments, a top-down government 
approach, insufficient stakeholder engagement, and so on.
15. Government, academia, industry, civil society and rural communities, and others.
16. Made over the last three to five decades (and more recently, innovation policies in some countries).
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